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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and United Kingdom both frame the threat posed by pandemic disease and 
biological weapons as a national security concern.  The United States’ most recent National 
Security Strategy, for instance, released in May 2010, highlights the dangers posed by weapons of 
mass destruction, pandemic disease, natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crime, and large-

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scale cyber attacks.1  The United Kingdom’s first National Security Strategy, released in March 
2008, similarly recognizes that the Cold War threat has been replaced by concerns about 
“international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and 
trans-national crime.”2  The Cabinet Office explains,    
Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to 
our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state. That is why this strategy deals with trans-
national crime, pandemics and flooding – not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly 
challenges that can affect large numbers of our citizens, and which demand some of the same responses as more 
traditional security threats, including terrorism.3 
In both countries, moreover, identifying and responding to the threat posed by, on the one hand, 
naturally-occurring disease and, on the other, man-made biological agents or weapons, are linked.  
The reasons for this are straightforward.  According to the UK, substantial loss of life may 
accompany any outbreak of disease—regardless of its origin.4  The scale and speed of the risk each 
threat poses could result in equally devastating consequences.   
[O]ur approach to them – to assess and monitor the risks, to learn from experiences at home and overseas, to 
develop capabilities to minimise the risks and the potential harm, and to absorb whatever harm does occur and 
then return to normality as soon as possible – is similar to our approach to other national security challenges, 
including terrorism.5 
Institutions used in response thus provide a dual function.  In 2000, the Royal Society explained, 
“Detection of BW attacks should be based on the existing civil arrangements in the United 
Kingdom for dealing with natural outbreaks.”6 
Statutes and policy documents in the United States similarly link disease and weapons in terms 
of institutions, authorities, and approach.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, for example, focuses on preparedness for public health 
emergencies and biological terrorism.7  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 claims that 
the traditional public health approach is no longer sufficient.  Health care providers and public 
health officials are among the first lines of defense to counter the biological weapons threat.8  A 
new biodefense program thus combines (and strengthens the state’s ability to respond to) natural 
disease and biological weapons.9  National Security Presidential Directive 33, released in April 
2004, similarly focuses on “21st Century Biodefense.”  Included in the concept are improvements to 
capabilities “not only against threats posed by terrorists, but for medical response in the wake of 
natural catastrophes and in response to naturally-occurring biological hazards such as SARS.”10   
Myriad further examples present themselves.11 

1 United States National Security Strategy, at 8, 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
2 THE CABINET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2008, Cm 7291, at 3, available at 
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf.  
3 Id., at 3-4. 
4 Id., at 14-15 (“We estimate that a pandemic could cause fatalities in the United Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000, although both 
the timing and the impact are impossible to predict exactly.”).  
5 Id., at 14-15. 
6 Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons (Royal Soc’y., London, England) Jul. 2000, available at 
http://royalsociety.org/Measures-for-controlling-the-threat-from-biological-weapons-full-report/. 
7 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 294 (codified in 
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.,  29 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).  
8  Biodefense for the 21st Century, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, Apr. 28, 2004, [hereinafter HSPD 10] available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Biodefense for the 21st Century, National Security Presidential Directive 33, Apr. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/biodef.html. 
11 See, e.g., National Response Framework, Dep’t. Of Homeland Sec., at 74 (Jan. 2008), available at 
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	 (noting that both the National Institutes of Health and the National Biodefense 
Analysis and Countermeasure Center at the Department of Homeland Security will focus on biological weapons as well as pandemic 
disease); Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, cover letter (Oct. 2007), at 1, 10, 16, 27 (bundling 
biological weapons and pandemic disease); Dr. Jeff Runge, DHS Chief Medical Officer on Pandemic Preparedness, Press Briefing on 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan:  One Year Summary (Jul. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-13.html (“We at DHS are focused on multi-use institutions that we can 
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 Where the United Kingdom and the United States part ways is in what they see as the role of 
the central government and most effective response to the twin threats.  U.S. federal law and policy 
anticipates the federal imposition of quarantine and isolation.12  The Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, for instance, streamlines and clarifies 
quarantine provisions.13  In 2003 the Department of Health and Human Services amended its 
regulations to incorporate any quarantinable disease listed by Executive Order, bypassing 
rulemaking requirements.14  CDC’s proposed regulations establish new periods of quarantine and 
the procedure to be followed in the event of its implementation.15  The agency explains: 
Quarantine of exposed persons may be the best initial way to prevent the uncontrolled spread of highly 
dangerous biologic agents such as smallpox, plague, and Ebola fever….Quarantine may be particularly 
important if a biologic agent has been rendered contagious, drug-resistant, or vaccine-resistant through 
bioengineering, making  other disease control measures less effective.16   
CDC, accordingly, expanded the number of domestic quarantine stations.17 
Quarantine similarly lies at the core of the U.S. Pandemic Influenza Strategy Implementation 
Plan, which was issued by HHS as a blueprint for how agencies will respond in the event that 
Avian Influenza becomes human-to-human transferrable—despite the document’s admission that 
influenza is one disease for which quarantine is likely to be particularly ineffective.  Nevertheless, 
it refers to quarantine 138 times, and in a manner of consequence, detailing the use of quarantine 
both at ports of entry and in the execution of geographic quarantine (cordon sanitaire).18  The 
criteria adopted for determining whom to quarantine is broad:  anyone showing signs or symptoms 
of pandemic influenza, or who may have been exposed to influenza within 10 months.19  The 
framework calls for the use of local law enforcement to execute quarantine.20  Where states may be 
unable either to implement quarantine or to maintain law and order, the government will fall back 
upon federal law enforcement and the military.21  Even if unsuccessful, “delaying the spread of the 
disease could provide the Federal Government with valuable time to activate the domestic 
response.”22 
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put into place for whatever emergencies arise.”).  See also remarks of Dr. Venkayya, Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, at 
id., (suggesting that the purpose in releasing the document was to re-define public health as a national security priority). 
12 The federal government also has provided the lead to state governments in updating and strengthening their laws governing quarantine 
and isolation.  The President’s 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security listed review of quarantine authority as a priority for state 
governments.  Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Jun. 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf.  CDC, in turn, funded the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities to develop a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY 
HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf. By 2006 the Act had been 
introduced in whole or part via 171 bills or resolutions in forty-four (44) states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariannas 
Islands. Center for Public Health and Law, Legislative Status Update (Jul. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php.  
13 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act makes quarantine applicable at an earlier stage by 
replacing language that previously required that the disease be “in a communicable stage” with a measure allowing quarantine “in a 
qualifying stage.”  42 U.S.C. § 264. 
14 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.6 and 71.3 (2003).  The White House expanded the list of quarantinable diseases to include SARS (April 2003) and 
pandemic influenza (April 2005). Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 
17,299  (Apr. 5, 2005). 
15 42 C.F.R. Pt. 70 and 71, under Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 264-271); Proposed under 25 U.S.C. §§ 198, 231, and 1661; 
42 U.S.C. §§ 243, 248, 249, 264-272, and 2007; 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892-71,948 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
16 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
17 CDC’s Airport Quarantine Stations Designed to Halt Disease Epidemics, Airport Security Report, Vol. 12, Issue 8 (2005).  See also 
Institute of Medicine, Report: Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public’s Health, Sept. 1, 2005 (calling for a stronger 
quarantine regime at ports of entry). 
18 U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza:  Implementation Plan (May 2006), available at 
 ! [hereinafter Implementation Plan].  See also U.S. Homeland 
Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, at 7 (recommending the isolation of ill and the quarantine of non-ill 
passengers); Id., at 77-78 (recommending that inbound flights be funneled to facilitate the mass quarantine of travelers); Id., at 159 
(discussing domestic travel restrictions); Id., at 108 (anticipating the use of cordon sanitaire). 
19Id., at 91. 
20Id., at 12. 
21 Id., at 13. See also Id., at 153. 
22 Id., at 108. The decision whether or not to cordon off certain geographic areas would depend on a number of variables, such as the 
area and population affected, whether implementation is feasible, the likely success of other interventions, the ability of authorities to 
provide for the needs of the quarantined population, and other geopolitical considerations. Id., at 109. 
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The influenza framework introduces a range of initiatives that demonstrate how seriously 
quarantine is considered a potential response.23  It builds the execution of quarantine into incident 
command.24  It directs state, local, and tribal entities to prepare to “address the implementation and 
enforcement of isolation and quarantine.”25  Within 72 hours of the initial outbreak, HHS will issue 
guidance on geographic quarantine.26  HHS, along with DHS, DOD, and mathematical modelers, 
are to complete research on strategies for home quarantine.27  The plan considers the impact of 
cordon sanitaire, discussing the interruption of transportation, distribution of food and medicine, 
and other essential services.28  Consular communication is taken into account.29  Private industry 
and schools are to consider mitigation strategies to counter prolonged absences.30  The document 
goes so far as to address the mental health concerns that may arise in the event that quarantine is 
used.31  Such provisions, considered at such length in regard to influenza, are even more relevant 
for other types of biological threats, particularly where highly virulent or no known vaccination 
may exist.32 
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom, from the perspective of both law and 
policy, does not appear to consider the national imposition of quarantine to be a viable option.  
Government Ministers, although recently granted more legal authority, still do not have the same 
breadth of power to implement quarantine as that provided to their U.S. counterparts.   
The United Kingdom’s legal stance is grounded in history:  more than a century ago, Great 
Britain removed explicit quarantine power from its public health laws, as the 1896 Public Health 
Act repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825.33  The statute remained largely unchanged until the 
Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984 and the Public Health (Infectious Disease) 
Regulations of 1988.34  Updated by the Health and Social Care Act of 2008, the statute gives the 
Secretary the authority to place international travelers in quarantine.  But it prevents the national 

23 See, e.g., US National Security Strategy for Pandemic Influenza – Containment Plan, at 47, 131 (listing school closures, snow days, 
and quarantines as examples of social distancing measures).  See also Implementation Plan, supra note 18, at 100 and 37 (advocating 
social distancing measures and noting that the immediate response for overseas outbreaks will be to activate domestic quarantine stations 
and to begin quarantining passengers). 
24 Id., at 155. 
25 Implementation Plan, supra note 11, at 110.  See also Id., at 155. HHS, coordinating with DHS, DOT, Education, DOC, DOD, and 
Treasury, is to give State, local, tribal entities guidance for execution of quarantine during emergency. Id., at 130. 
26 Id., at 131. 
27 Id., at 131. 
28 Id., at 80.  For a discussion of the long-term impacts on the transportation sector see Id., at 97. 
29 Id., at 52-53. 
30 Id., at Appendix A, at 183, 185, 188, 192. 
31 Id., at 111. 
32  Implementation Plan, supra note 11, at 109.  Notably, the Department of Homeland Security—not the Department of Health and 
Human Services—has taken a leading role. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002 §421, Pub.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 745,  (amending 6 
U.S.C. 231 to transfer agricultural, entry inspection functions previously given to Secretary of Agriculture under Animal Health 
Protection Act, to DHS; these provisions can be used to stop humans as well.); Memorandum of Understanding Between Dep’t of Health 
and Human Serv. and the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., (Oct. 19, 2005) (signed by HHS and DHS to coordinate border screening 
activities/information for sharing contact tracing during outbreak of communicable disease (preliminary to quarantine provisions), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/hhs_dhs_mou.pdf; National Biosurveillance Integration System (created by DHS to 
collect, integrate, analyze domestic and international all-source information); BioSense Real-Time Clinical Connections Program 
(allowing real-time surveillance of disease in communities; extended to all 31 Bio Watch communities).  U.S. Panflu National Plan, p. 
22. It could be argued that the contemporary emphasis in the United States on quarantine is simply an effort to clarify quarantine 
authorities – that quarantine is, essentially, a relic of the past and that, perhaps even as evidenced by the recent Avian influenza outbreak, 
the government has no intention of actually imposing widespread measures.  I am not convinced by this argument.  It is irrelevant to 
claim that such powers will never be used.  During high-level exercises, frequent recourse to quarantine is made:  in the TOPOFF 
exercises in Denver, Colorado, for instance, CDC advised for the entire state to be cordoned off “to limit the futher spread of plague 
throughout the United States and other countries.  Colorado officials express[ed] concern about their ability to get food and supplies into 
the state.”  Briefing Memo for Subcomm. On National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 
http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/web_resources/briefing_memo_july_23.htm..  The fact that such powers are on the books, moreover, 
and expanding, justifies taking a closer look at these authorities.  And even if the current office holders do not intend to use them 
(although this could be questioned), different individuals will eventually come to office, in which case such powers will be available. 
33 An Act to Make Further Provision with Respect to Epidemic, Endemic, and Infectious Diseases, and to Repeal the Acts Relating to 
Quarantine, 1896, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 19, [hereinafter Public Health Act, 1896] (repealing An Act to Repeal the Several Laws Relating to 
the Performance of Quarantine, and to make other Provisions in Lieu Thereof, 1828, 6 Geo. IV, c. 78). 
34 Health (Control of Disease) Act, 1984, c.22 (U.K.); Public Health (Infectious Disease) Regulations, 1988, S.I. 1546 (U.K.). 
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government from taking local action.  Instead, the provisions require that a Justice of the Peace, on 
application from a Local Authority, sign any Order requiring an individual to submit to medical 
examination, be removed to or detained in a hospital or other suitable place, or be kept in isolation 
or quarantine.35  The decision ultimately rests with local officials.36  
It is not just British statutes that depart from the American model:  as a matter of policy, 
despite considerable concern in the United Kingdom about pandemic disease and biological agents, 
for neither threat is quarantine looked to as a first line of defense.  In 1999, for instance, the 
Ministry of Defence issued a paper, Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical 
Weapons.37  It highlighted specific steps to respond to biological weapons threats, without once 
discussing the potential use of quarantine or isolation.38  Three years later, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presented a report to Parliament on how to counter the threat 
from biological weapons.  The document focused, inter alia, on strengthening the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention and creating a new Convention to criminalize the use of biological 
weapons.39  Despite the UK’s international treaty obligations, it did not consider quarantine.40   
Even for influenza which, according to the UK’s National Security Strategy, “could cause 
fatalities in the United Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000”41, ministers explicitly reject 
quarantine. “Mandatory quarantine and curfews,” the Department of Health writes, “are generally 
not considered necessary and are not currently covered by public health legislation.”42  The 
government explains, 
There is some evidence that big gatherings of people encourage spread, and measures to flatten the epidemic 
curve can helpful [sic.] in easing the most intense pressure on health services.  In general, however, quarantine 
has been ineffective, at the most postponing epidemics of influenza by a few weeks to 2 months and even the 
most severe restrictions on travel and trade have gained only a few weeks.43 
For influenza and “other forms of infectious disease”, documents emphasize other responses, such 
as the use of vaccines, international disease monitoring, and resilience.44 
 Why is it that the two countries, both of which consider pandemic disease and biological 
weapons to be a national security concern—and, indeed, link them in terms of potential 
identification and response—have such different approaches to the threat?  This article suggests 
that the answer is deeply historical, shaped by each country’s unique experiences with disease, as 
well as each country’s constitutional framework.  Careful examination of the evolution of public 
health law suggests that the two countries have followed distinct—and essentially reverse—

35 Health and Social Care Act, 2008, c. 14, §45(d)(3) (U.K).  See also Public Health Etc. (Scotland) Act, 2008, (A.S.P. 5) for the 
equivalent statute in Scotland. 
36 But see discussion, infra, regarding the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, c. 36, §19(1) (U.K.). 
37 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENDING AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 1999, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/issues/cbw/index.htm.  See also SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, 
STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW, 1998, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/wp_contents.htm. 
38 Id., see, e.g.,id. c. 7 (discussing the development of vaccines, procurement of the next generation of equipment for detecting, 
identifying and monitoring biological hazzards, and establishing a joint nuclear, biological and chemical regiment). See also Scientific 
Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, (Royal Soc’y, London, England) Jul. 1994, available at 
http://royalsociety.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5946. (omitting reference to quarantine); Measures for Controlling the threat 
from Biological Weapons, supra note 6 (omitting reference to quarantine). 
39 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS 
CONVENTION:  COUNTERING THE THREAT FORM BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 2002, Cm 5484, (U.K.) available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/fcobw.pdf. 
40 Id.  See also HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS GREEN PAPER, FIRST REPORT OF 
SESSION 2002-3, H.C. 150, at 5-6, available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/foreign-affairs-
committee/fac-pn-19-0203-/. 
41 UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2 at ¶3.22, at 14-15. 
42 2005: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU: UK INFLUENZA PANDEMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN, (Oct. 2005), at 49, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_10_05_bird_flu.pdf.   See also 2007:  DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU: A 
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, (Nov. 2007), at 39 (arguing against both home quarantine and 
cordon sanitaire).  See also 2008 UK Int’l Preparedness Strategy, 13, at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_089527. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2, at ¶¶4.56-4.57, 4.58, 4.59, pp. 42-43. 
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trajectories, which continue to influence the manner in which current law and policy has evolved in 
respect to pandemic disease and biological weapons.  Constitutional constraints played a key role 
throughout. 
 In the United States, what started during the colonial period as a decidedly local authority 
evolved, post-Revolution, to be both a local and a state authority.  For more than a century, the 
federal government proved reluctant to interfere.  It was not that disease did not pose a severe 
threat – or, indeed, that it was never used as a weapon.  To the contrary, the colonies and, later, the 
states, had significant concerns about the effects of disease and, even during the Revolutionary 
War, there was evidence and widespread belief that the British used smallpox as a weapon.  During 
the Civil War as well, there were several reported efforts by the Confederates to use biological 
weapons against Union forces.  But the federal government did not adopt quarantine laws.  
Quarantine was widely regarded as a central tenet of state police powers.45  It was so decidedly 
local, that many states explicitly gave towns the authority to exclude any persons or goods believed 
to carry sickness—even if they traveled or were transported from other U.S. cities or states.  Towns 
and local health boards could indefinitely imprison anyone within their bounds.  They could coerce 
doctors, nurses, and caregivers into treating those who fell ill, and they could introduce a range of 
other measures to try to stem the advance of disease. 
During the late nineteenth century, however, the balance of power subtly shifted.   The federal 
government avoided a direct Commerce Clause assertion and, instead, began to use the power of 
the purse to buy up local and state ports, transferring their operation to federal control.  Federal 
statutory and regulatory authorities followed.  By the end of the twentieth century, federal 
quarantine law—at least in respect to inter-state travelers and those entering or leaving the 
country—had become firmly established.  By the early 21st century, policy documents had begun to 
refer to the potential use of quarantine to respond either to pandemic or targeted attacks, shifting 
the discussion from Commerce Clause considerations to Article II and foreign affairs.  National 
security demanded a federal, not a state, response.  Post-Hurricane Katrina, an even more visible 
discussion emerged, tied to the precise role of the military in enforcing domestic provisions.  
The United Kingdom, in contrast, developed in the opposite direction.  The first recorded 
quarantine orders, issued under Henry VIII, demonstrate a monarch willing to use the military to 
exercise his Royal Prerogative.  As the constitutional structure of the country changed, the manner 
in which quarantine was accomplished altered. With the Stuarts’ realization that quarantine could 
be wielded as a powerful political tool, use of the provisions led to greater friction with Parliament.  
The Privy Council reformed its approach, seeking statutory authorization prior to issuing orders.  
The demise of the Council and transfer of public health authorities to Parliament led to the 
abandonment of broad quarantine power.  Commercial interests lobbied it out of existence.  Aided 
by medical treatises, the 19th century sanitation movement, and the growth of a professional 
bureaucracy, local port authorities and public health provisions took their place.  Accordingly, by 
the early twenty-first century, no broad quarantine laws existed, and such policy documents as 
were issued to outline the government’s response in the event of biological weapons or pandemic 
disease specifically noted that quarantine would not be used. 
These important differences have almost entirely escaped academic notice. Secondary 
materials that discuss the history of quarantine law qua quarantine law tend to draw broad brush-
strokes over its appearance globally.46  There are very few works that carefully consider the 
evolution of quarantine law on either side of the Atlantic, much less in juxtaposition to the other 

45 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 at 203 (1824). 
46 See, e.g., Joseph B. Topinka, Yaw, Pitch, and Roll: Quarantine and Isolation at United States Airports, 30 J. LEG. MED. 51, 53-57 
(2009) (discussing broadly the appearance of quarantine provisions in Egypt, Marseilles, and Venice); Brock C.  Hampton, Development 
of the National Maritime Quarantine System of the United States, 55 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 28 Jul. 12, 1940, at 1241 (discussing the 
development of a quarantine station in Marseilles and Venice); DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE:  A HISTORY 
OF PUBLIC HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES (1999). 
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country.47  Instead, accounts tend to be regional and episodic:  they focus on particular states, 
regions, or quarantine stations,48 or on particular plagues or pandemic diseases, drawing attention 
to the virulence of the disease, the state’s immediate response, and the political, social, and 
economic consequences.49  There are no accounts available on the US response to biological 
weapons that connect the history of quarantine provisions to the contemporary response; nor are 
there similar studies on the British side.  Resultantly, not only have key differences between the 
countries been missed, but no explanation as to why such differences mark the two states’ 
approaches has been suggested. 
This article presents a new and detailed history of quarantine provisions in the two countries, 
offering in the process a novel explanation as to why we continue to see disparate approaches to the 
use of quarantine for natural disease as well as deliberate attack.  It may be that there are other 
explanations for the current biodefense stance in both countries.  Indeed, the simple conjunction of 
historical precedent and contemporary approaches would, alone, be insufficient explanation.  It is 
my argument, however, that there is considerably more than this in the historical record and the 
influence of constitutional constraints on either side of the Atlantic, which continues to shape the 
contemporary dialogue.  Threading through each account is the importance of the type of threat 
faced.  For the specific diseases each country confronted, which differed, played a key role in 
shaping subsequent measures.  The United States struggled with yellow fever, smallpox, and 
cholera.  The United Kingdom developed its law primarily in response to plague.  This influenced 
the contours of the measures and the groups most impacted by quarantine, leading to a tolerance of 
such provisions on the American side of the Atlantic, and a rejection of the same on British shores. 
 
II.  STATE POLICE POWERS AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF U.S. QUARANTINE LAW 
 
Prior to the founding the American colonists routinely used both land and maritime quarantine to 
respond to disease.  Three key observations about these measures can be made.  First, such early 
efforts often were not successful, leading many of the colonial and early state statutes to begin by 

47 See, e.g., Krista Maglen, The First Line of Defence: British Quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authorities in the 19th Century, 15 SOC. 
HIST. OF MED. 3, 413, 414 (2002) (writing about the United Kingdom: “[T]he policies and practices which operated to intercept the 
importation of infectious diseases at the ports have attracted little more than a handful of articles and sections of book chapters.”).   
48 See, e.g., Howard Markel, A Gate to the City: The Baltimore Quarantine Station, 1918-28,  110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 2, 218 (1995); Jo 
Ann Carrington, Impact of Yellow Fever on Life in Louisiana. 4 J. OF THE LA. HIST. ASS’N., 1 (1963);  Susan Wade Peabody, Historical 
Study of Legislation Regarding Public Health in the States of New York and Massachusetts, J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 1, 1-151 (Suat 
No. 4, 1909); M. DUREY, THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE:  BRITISH SOCIETY AND THE CHOLERA, 1831-2, (1979); N. LONGMATE, KING 
CHOLERA:  THE BIOGRAPHY OF A DISEASE (1966); R.J. MORRIS, CHOLERA, 1832:  THE SOCIAL RESPONSES T O AN EPIDEMIC (1976); M. 
PELLING, CHOLERA, FEVER AND ENGLISH MEDICINE 1825-1865 (1978); W. COLEMAN, YELLOW FEVER IN THE NORTH:  THE METHODS 
OF EARLY EPIDEMIOLOGY 139-167 (1987).  
For works on specific time periods, see P. BALDWIN, CONTAGION AND THE STATE IN EUROPE, 1830-1930 (1999); JOHN BOOKER, 
MARITIME QUARANTINE:  THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE C 1650-1900 (2007); J.L. BRAND, DOCTORS AND THE STATE:  THE BRITISH 
MEDICAL PROFESSION AND GOVERNMENT ACTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH, 1870-1912 (1965); G.C. COOK, FROM THE GREENWISH HULKS 
TO OLD ST. PANCRAS:  A HISTORY OF TROPICAL DISEASE IN LONDON (1992); Anne Hardy, Public Health and the Expert:  London 
Medical Officers of Health, 1856-1900, in, GOVERNMENT AND EXPERTISE—SPECIALISTS, ADMINISTRATORS AND PROFESSIONALS, 
1860-1919 128-42 (R. MacLeod ed., 1988); A. Hardy, Cholera, Quarantine and the English Preventative System, 37 MED. HIST. 250, 
250-269 (1993); J. C. McDonald, The History of Quarantine in Britain in the Nineteenth Century, 25 BULL. OF THE HIST. OF MED. 22, 
22-44 (1951); The First Line of Defence, supra note 47 at 413-428. 
49 See, e.g. J.B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TOWN OF BOSTON, 1630-1822 (1959); D.M. REESE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE EPIDEMIC 
OF 1819, AS IT  PREVAILED IN A PART OF THE CITY OF BALTIMORE (1819); Impact of Yellow Fever on Life in Louisiana, supra note 48; J. 
H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD:  THE GREAT PLAGUE OF YELLOW FEVER IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1793 (1949), John B. Blake, Yellow 
Fever in Eighteenth Century America, 44 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 6, (1968); H.R. CARTER, YELLOW FEVER:  AN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF ITS PLACE OF ORIGIN, (1931); [NB:  ADD 1918-19 Spanish flu articles/book chapters].  But see Alfred J. 
Sciarrino:  The Grapes of Wrath & the Speckled Monster (Epidemics, Biological Terrorism and the Early Legal History of Two Major 
Defenses—Quarantine and Vaccination), Part I, 7 J. MED. & L. 119 (2003-03); The Grapes of Wrath, Part II, 8 J. MED. & L. 1; and The 
Grapes of Wrath and the Speckled Monster, Part III:  Epidemics, Natural Disasters and Biological Terrorism—the Federal Response, 
10 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 429 (2006).  There are biographical works on public health reformers (e.g., S. Jarcho, John Mitchell, 
Benjamin Rush, and Yellow Fever, 31 BULL. HIST. MED. 132-36 (1957)), and historical accounts of the evolution of public health 
generally.  While these are helpful for the broader context, they offer neither comprehensive nor detailed accounts of the quarantine laws 
and their evolution. 
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lamenting the continuing and devastating effect of disease.50  This lack of effectiveness proved 
critical in generating later support for federal control. 
Second, the components of disease which now place it within a national security framework 
were present from the founding:  disease took an incredibly high toll in terms of human life and, at 
times, threatened the very foundation of government.  It also was used as a weapon—by criminals 
and by other countries.  Thus, despite scientific advances that contribute to the current biological 
weapons threat (such as biological engineering), the idea of disease as a weapon, which could be 
used against individuals or the country itself, is not new and was considered and confronted by 
early American measures. 
 Third, unlike English law, which was shaped primarily by concern about plague, colonial—and 
later state—measures tended to focus on smallpox and other contagious disease.51  By 1721, 
quarantine became paired with inoculation as response to smallpox in particular.52  When Yellow 
Fever became epidemic in late 18th century, it quickly became linked to sanitation, spurring new 
legislation to mitigate nuisances and continuing the use of quarantine.  Cholera later became 
epidemic.53  This is not to say that plague played no role; it did have some impact.  But plague 
provisions often merited their own legal response, while the core provisions continued to be 
shaped, in the main, by other infectious diseases. This mattered because the emphasis was on 
individuals carrying the disease, and not on items of commerce, such as silk, wool, and linens—
widely believed to carry plague and thus subject, across the Atlantic, to disinfection procedures that 
often destroyed the goods in question.  As a practical matter, what this meant was that the strong 
commercial lobby in Britain that opposed the use of quarantine provisions was not mirrored on the 
American side of the Atlantic.  To the contrary, it was the immigrant community, and not shipping 
interests, that was most often affected by the provisions.  A tacit acceptance of the measures 
followed. 
A.  Early Colonial Quarantine Provisions 
The American colonies maintained quarantine provisions to counter the threat of disease.  
Massachusetts Bay,54 New York,55 the Province of Pennsylvania,56 New-Castle upon Delaware,57 
Maryland,58 Rhode Island,59 South Carolina, and Virginia entertained provisions that imposed 
harsh penalties—such as death without benefit of Clergy—on those refusing to abide by the law.  

50 See, e.g., Act to Prevent the Coming of Sickly Vessells, &c., Abstract or Abridgment of the Laws made and past by William Penn 
Absolute Proprietary, and Governour in Chief of the Province of Pensilvania and Territories there unto belonging, with the Advice and 
Consent of the Free-men thereof in Generall-Assembly mett at New-Castle, Oct. 14 1700-Nov. 27, 1700, *26.  See also Blake, Yellow 
Fever in Eighteenth Century America, supra note 49, at 674. 
51 Peabody, supra note 48, at 46. 
52 Id., at 47. 
53 See, e.g., Joseph K. Barnes and John Maynard Woodworth, et al. The cholera epidemic of 1873 in the United States. Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1875; John Odin Jensen, The unwanted: cholera, immigrants, and national public health in 1892. Thesis 
(M.A.): East Carolina University, 1992. 
54 See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND, VOL. II, 1642-1649 
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff MD, ed. , 1853); ACTS RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF QUARANTINE OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM THE 
SETTLEMENT OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY TO THE PRESENT TIME (Boston, MA Board of Health, 1881), at 5. 
55 See, e.g., An Act to prevent infectious Distempers being brought into this Colony, and to hinder the spreading thereof, (1755) Act 
XIII, in Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, and constitutions, Ordained, Made and Established by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty, of 
the City of New-York, Convened in Common Council for The good Rule and government of the Inhabitants and Refidents of the said 
City, Nov. 9, 1762. 
56 See, e.g., An Act to prevent sickly Vessels coming into this Government, The Laws of the Province of Pennsilvania Collected into 
One Volumn, By Order of the Governour and Assembly of the said Province, 1714, c. LXII, p. 19. 
57 An Act to prevent sickly Vessels coming into this Government, Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex, Upon 
Delaware, 1752, *67 
58 See, e.g., An Act to oblige infected ships and other vessels coming into this province to perform quarantine, Lib. HS. Fol. 655, Ch. 
XXV, Nov. 1766, in The Laws of Maryland to which are Prefixed the Original Charter, with an English Translation, the Bill of Rights 
and Constitution, 1799.  See also Charles V. Chtion of the State, Vol. I, 1799.apin, History of State and Municipal Control of Disease, in 
A Half Century of Public Health 143 (1921); RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE:  1798-1950 
63 (1951). 
59 See, e.g., An Act to Prevent the Spreading of Infectious Sickness, 1712, Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Rhode-Island, and 
Providence-Plantations in America, at 63-64 (on file with author). 
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Such measures tended to be reactive and temporary.  Initially, they focused on maritime trade, as 
reports of disease abroad resulted in orders placing vessels under quarantine.  Local quarantine 
proved the first (and last) line of defense; accordingly, steep penalties accompanied failure to 
observe the law.  With Britain’s trading interests implicated by commercial delays that ensued, the 
Privy Council in England did not always look kindly on provisions originating in the new world. 

1.  Massachusetts Bay 
From the earliest days, townsmen in Boston passed orders regulating the town’s internal 
health.60  Yet initially neither the government of Boston nor the colony’s General Court took steps 
to prohibit the landing of vessels carrying infectious disease or arriving from infected ports.61  In 
1647, however, the colony of Massachusetts Bay received reports that the “plague, or like grievous 
[in]fectious disease” had broken out in the West Indies.62  John Winthrop, who that year became 
governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, described the devastation:  
After the great dearth of victuals in [the West Indies] followed presently a great mortality, (whether it were the 
plague, or pestilent fever, it killed in three days,) that in Barbados there died six thousand, and in Christophers, 
of English and French, near as many, and in other islands proportionable.  The report of this coming to us by a 
vessel which came from Fayal, the court published an order, that all vessels, which should come from the West 
Indies, should stay at the castle, and not come on shore, nor put any goods on shore, without license of three of 
the council, on pain of one hundred pounds nor any to go aboard, etc., except they continued there, etc., on like 
penalty.63 
The General Court subsequently passed an order instituting maritime quarantine against all vessels 
arriving from the West Indies.64  The order required: 
[A]ll (our own) and othr vessels comeg from any pts of ye West Indies to Boston harbor shall stop (and come to 
an) anchor before they come at ye Castle, undr ye penalty of 100£, & that no pson comeing in any vessel from 
the West Indies shall go ashore in any towne, village, or farme, or come within foure rods of any othr pson, but 
such as belongs to the vessels company yt hee or shee came in, or any wayes land or convey any goods brought 
in any such vessels to any towne, village, or farme aforesaid, or any othr place wthin this jurisdiction, except it 
be upon some iland where no inhabitant resides, wthout license from ye councell, or some three of them, undr ye 
aforesaid penalty of a hundred pound for evry offence.65 
Not only were individuals on board ship prohibited from coming ashore, but all persons residing 
within Massachusetts Bay Colony were prohibited from boarding any ships or vessels arriving 
from the West Indies, or from buying any goods or merchandise from such vessels, without a valid 

60 Shurtleff, supra note 54; BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5. Such powers fell well within local authority. See 
1635 Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England. 
61 Id.  The government of Boston was a separate municipal entity, subordinate to the colony of Massachusetts Bay.  The General Court 
served simultaneously as a legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative body.    
62 Order regulating the quarantine of vessels from the West Indies, (March) 1647-48, *200, reprinted in Shurtleff, supra note 54 at 237. 
63 JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, Vol. 2, 321 (James Kendall Hosmer, ed. 1908) (Winthrop chosen 
Governor in 1647); id., at 329 (Quarantine order issued). 
64 Id. There is discrepancy in the secondary literature about the exact date of the Massachusetts Bay order; some put it at 1647, others at 
1648.  Compare, e.g., RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE:  1798-1950 (1951), at 65; LAWRENCE 
O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 205-206 (2000); Richard A. Goodman, Paul L. Kocher, Daniel J. O’Brien, 
and Frank S. Alexander, The Structure of Law in Public Health Systems and Practice in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 46-51, 263 
(Richard A. Goodman  et al, eds. 2007); with CHARLES V. CHAPIN, HISTORY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF DISEASE, IN A 
HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 133 (1921).  The original writes “March 1647-1648”.  At the time, the start of Britain’s 
governmental year did not line up with the Gregorian Calendar (dating from 1582), but, instead, it coincided with the Julian Calendar, 
which began each year on March 25.  By implication, this suggests that the discussion regarding quarantine and the subsequent order 
took place between January 1, 1648 and March 24 1648, making 1648 the more likely date of the first quarantine order issued by the 
American colonies.  The English government did not switch to the Gregorian Calendar until 1752.  See HANDBOOK OF DATES FOR 
STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY 6-11 (C.R. Cheney ed., 1978). See also First Order of General Court, regulating Quarantine of vessels 
passed at a session of the General court the first month (March) 1647-48, *200, reprinted in Shurtleff, supra note 54 at 237; BOSTON 
MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5. 
65 BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5-6.  See also Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in 
New England, Vol. 2, p. 237; Hampton supra note 46 at 1245.  Hampton cites to John Winthrop’s History of New England and Susan 
Wade Peabody’s “Historical Study of Legislation Regarding Public Health in the States of New York and Massachusetts.”  J. Inf. Dis., 
Suat No. 4, Feb. 1909. According to Hampton, the New York colony may have also implemented quarantine in the same year.  For other 
sources citing the MA Bay Colony order, see Sidney Edelman, International Travel and our National Quarantine System, 37 TEMPLE 
LAW QUARTERLY 28, 29 (1963). 
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license.66  The penalty for violating the order was £100.67  Infractions fell subject to the law.68  The 
colony repealed the order May 2, 1649, when the yellow fever epidemic ceased.69   
It was not until October 1665 that the settlement again imposed quarantine on vessels, this time 
in response to the “great plague” in London (later determined to be typhus).70  The order required 
that permission be obtained from the governor or council to land either passengers or goods 
arriving from England.71  Like the first order, it was intended to be temporary in nature, and in 
October 1667 the General Court repealed the provision.72   
Following the outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1699, Massachusetts tried to deal 
with the threat posed by the disease by passing a permanent and particularly stringent Quarantine 
Act.73  No vessel carrying smallpox, or any other contagious sickness, would be allowed within 
half a mile of shore, without first obtaining a license from the governor or commander-in-chief of 
the province, or from two justices of the peace if the harbor was located more than ten miles from 
the governor’s home.74  Neither goods nor passengers could be conveyed to land without such a 
license, with any violation of the provision earning the master of the vessel a £100 fine.75  The 
1699 statute required the captain of the vessel to inquire into the health of all passengers and to 
keep a record of any sicknesses on board.76  Any passenger or sailor breaking quarantine would be 
isolated and imprisoned, held responsible financially for any costs thereby incurred by the colony, 
and fined a further £20.77  
England did not always acquiesce in the colonial provisions.  The charter of 1691 retained a 
check on Massachusetts Bay.  The Privy Council had three years, from the moment it obtained a 
copy of the colonial measures, to declare them void.78  Quarantine here proved particularly vexing:  

66 BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 6.  See also Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in New 
England, Vol. 2, p. 237. 
67 Id. The Order made arrangements for promulgation locally and to any vessels affected by its provisions. Id 
68 Winthrop recounts that Goodman Dell of Boston, having been informed of the order, simply lied, saying he had not been in the West 
Indies.  He was later found out and bound over to court to answer for contempt.  JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND supra 
note 63, at 329. 
69 Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England, Vol. 2, p. 280 (“The Courte doth thinke meete that the order concerning 
the stoping of West India ships at the Castle should hereby be repealed, seeing it hath pleased God to stay the sicknes there.”)  See also 
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at; Order that stopt [sic.] the West Indy ships at the Castle repeld [sic.], May 16, 
1649, *235; reprinted in Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, Ed. By Nathanial B. 
Shurtleff, Vol. III, 1644-1657 (1854), at 168.  See also Records of the Col. Of Mass. Bay in New England, Vol. 2, *280, West India 
Ships, May 2, 1649, reprinted in BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7 (“The Courte doth thinke meete that the 
order concerning the stoping of West India ships at the Castle should hereby be repealed, seeing it hath pleased God to stay the sicknes 
there.”)  £100 in 1647 amounts to 114.46 times that amount in 2009; i.e., ~£11,446.  Roughly translated at the current exchange rate of 
0.65, this comes to $17,609.  For rates of inflation and exchange see http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/ukearncpi/result.php.  In 
terms of earnings and purchase power, however, the number increases to some $244,000 today.  Susan Wade Peabody, an early 20th 
century scholar, identifies the epidemic as yellow fever.  See Peabody, supra note 48, at 41. 
70 Record of the Order Establishing Quarantine, Oct. 11, 1665 reprinted in Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in 
New England, Vol. 4, pt. 2, 1661-1674 (1854), at 280.  See also Order from the General Court, Oct. 11, 1665, reprinted in BOSTON 
MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7. 
71 Order from the General Court, Oct. 11, 1665, reprinted in BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7-8. 
72 Order for stopping of shipps [sic] at ye Castle repealed, Oct. 9, 1667, reprinted in Records of the Colony of the Mass. Bay in New 
England, Vol. 4, pt. 2, p. 345.  See also Order for stopping of ships at ye Castle repealed, Oct. 9, 1667, reprinted in BOSTON MA 
BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 8.  The Records of the Governor and company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, ed. 
By Dr. Shurtleff, terminated in 1686; there was a period of six years before the Governor authorized publication of the Acts and Laws of 
Massachusetts Bay.  For much of the intervening period, there are few records, and none, in the State Library, that contain reference to 
quarantine law.  See BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 8.  In 1678 a Salem Massachusetts ordinance again 
addressed smallpox. 
73 An Act for the Better Preventing of the Spreading of Infectious Sicknesses, July 18, 1699 (Massachusetts-Bay), 11 Wm. 3.  See also 
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 9 (reprinting Act in full).  The act itself singled out smallpox, but included 
other infectious disease, whether carried by persons or goods; its introduction was specifically in response to the Yellow Fever outbreak. 
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7. 
74 An Act for the Better Preventing of the Spreading of Infectious Sicknesses, July 18, 1699 (Massachusetts-Bay), 11 Wm. 3, §1. 
75 Id. 
76 Id., §2. 
77 Id., §3. 
78 1 POORE’S CHARTERS 952 (1877). For most of the other colonies, there was no limit to the time period within which the Privy Council 
must either accept or disallow new laws.  The effect of an Order in Council disallowing a statute was to repeal it, effective from the time 
the colonial governor received notice of the order. Dudley Odell McGovney, The British Privy Council’s Power to Restrain the 
Legislatures of Colonial America: Power to Disallow Statutes:  Power to Veto, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 73-74 (1945-1946).  See also ACTS 
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it fed into a broader concern held by English statesmen that “the uncontrolled manner in which the 
Colony was exercising its powers was becoming increasingly detrimental to the economic welfare 
of England and the Empire.”79  Being able to retain a ship, indefinitely, simply because of the 
presence of any contagious disease, coupled with a significant fine for failing to observe such 
measures, fell beyond the Pale.80  At the request of the Lords of Trade, the Privy Council refused to 
allow the 1699 statute to stand.81  The Lords of Trade, however, did not long prevail.   
In 1701 the General Assembly passed another statute that became the basis for Massachusetts’ 
quarantine law.82  Instead of applying to any contagious disease, the act targeted plague, smallpox, 
and pestilential or malignant fever.83  The statute contained two parts.  The first focused on cordon 
sanitaire, the removal of individuals from towns, and isolation of the ill.  It authorized selectmen to 
remove and isolate any persons either ill or “late before have been visited” with plague, smallpox, 
pestilential or malignant fever, “or any other contagious sickness, the infection of which may 
probably be communicated to others.”84  A justice of the peace was to produce a warrant to secure 
housing, nurses, and other necessities.  Expenses, where possible, were to be paid by patient; 
otherwise, by the town in which the ill person lived. 
The second part of the statute focused on maritime quarantine.  The act empowered justices of 
the peace to prevent persons coming on shore from any vessel on which sickness was present.85  
Information about the sicknesses were to be transmitted to the Governor, or commander in chief, 
who was empowered “with the advice and consent of the council, to take such further orders 
therein as they shall think fit for preventing the spreading of the infection.”86 
Although the 1701 statute provided a general authority to quarantine individuals coming from 
places where plague was or had been present, the colony at times passed measures focused on 
certain countries or regions.  In 1714, for instance, the General Assembly passed an act specifically 
targeting all ships coming from France and other parts of the Mediterranean.87  In keeping with 
European standards of the day, upon arrival in Massachusetts Bay, the ships were to be isolated for 

OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES, VOL. II, A.D. 1680-1720, v-xl (W.L. Grant and James Munro eds., 1910) 
(discussing Privy Council’s relationship with the colonies from the earliest time through 1910); H. E. Egerton, The Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Century Privy Council in Its Relations with the Colonies, 7 J. COMP. LEGIS. & IN’L L. 3d Ser. 1 (1925) (looking at the Privy 
Council’s 17th and 18th C relationship with the colonies).  Some five hundred American colonial statutes disallowed by the Privy Council 
have been identified by scholars.  See, e.g., RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL 
109-202 (1915); Andrews, The Royal Disallowance, 24 AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y PROC., NEW SERIES 342 (1914); McGovney, supra. 
79 Acts of the Privy Council, 1613-80, p. 841, quoted in H. E. Egerton, The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Privy Council in Its 
Relations with the Colonies, 7 J. COMP. LEGIS. & IN’L L. 3d Ser. 1 (1925), at 7. 
80 The creation of the Lords of Trade and Plantations (more commonly referred to as the Board of Trade) in 1696 broadly coincides with 
the introduction of the quarantine provision and signals particular concern about trade and relations with the colonies.  See DICKERSON, 
AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, 1696-1765 (1912); BASYE, THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS, 1748-
1782 (1925); RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915). One of the purposes of 
the board was “to examine into and weigh such Acts of the [colonial] Assemblies…as shall from time to time be transmitted”, reporting 
on “the Usefulness or mischief thereof to our Crown, and to our Kingdom of England, or to the Plantations themselves.” Id., at 48.  
81 Disallowed by the Privy Council Oct. 22, 1700.  See BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 9.  “There is no such act as 
this (that we know of) in any other of his Majesty’s plantations; And by the uncertain interpretation that may be put upon 
the terms Contagious, Epidemical and Prevailing Sickness, we think it may be liable to great abuses; The penalties 
thereby inflicted seem to us too high.  And we are therefore humbly of opinion that the inconvenience thereby intended to 
be prevented may be better provided against by order of the Governor and Council from time to time than by any 
standing Act of the General Assembly.” Text quoted in Peabody, supra note 48, at 42. 
82 An Act Providing in Case of Sickness, June 25, 1701, Massachusetts Bay Colony, ch. 9, reprinted in BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, 
supra note 54, at 11. [LB GETTING §§1-3] 
83 Id., at §4. 
84 CHARLES V. CHAPIN, HISTORY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF DISEASE, IN A HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 134 
(1921). 
85 An Act Providing in Case of Sickness, ch. 9, (1701-1702), §4. reprinted in PROVINCE LAWS, VOL. 1, P. 469; ACTS AND RESOLVES OF 
THE PROVINCE OF MASS. BAY 467-70; BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 11. 
86 An Act Providing in Case of Sickness, ch. 9, (1701-1702), §4. in 1 PROVINCE LAWS 469 [NEED FULL CITE]; Acts and Resolves of 
the Province of Mass. Bay, at 467-70; BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 11. 
87 An Act to oblige all Ships and other Vessels coming from France, and other parts of the World Infected with the Plague, to perform 
Quarentine [sic], reprinted in ACTS AND LAWS OF HER MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 355-56 
(1714). 
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forty days.88  Severe penalties met any commander refusing to observe the period of quarantine:  
namely, death.89  Anyone coming ashore without express license from the Governor and council 
would be imprisoned for three years.90 
Prior to this time, the province of Massachusetts Bay had not maintained a quarantine 
hospital.91  Accordingly, on June 11, 1716, a committee began investigating where such a facility 
ought to be built.92  Five months later, the committee concluded that one was, indeed, necessary, 
and recommended a suitable site.93  The House of Representatives voted to purchase the land 
outright and to allot an additional sum of £150 to build the appropriate facilities.94  The measure 
proved to be controversial.  Inhabitants of Dorchester, Braintree, and Milton strongly objected to 
the erection of a facility for infectious disease in their midst.95  The House of Representatives thus 
withdrew its order to purchase the land, and in April of 1717 formed a new committee to consider 
anew where, exactly, such a facility should be located.96  By August the treasurer had conveyed 
£100 for the purchase of the southerly end of Spectacle Island.97   
Troubles continued to assault efforts to build a new hospital.  The project ran over budget.98  In 
the interim, passengers landed for purposes of quarantine burdened landowners and destroyed 
adjacent properties.99  But in 1717 new legislation continued to rely on quarantine to answer the 
threat of disease.100 To encourage complicity with the statute’s provisions, any informer would be 
granted one-third of the fines paid over to the Province.101   
The act, set to expire in May 1723, was to continue in force for five years.102  Upon expiration, 
however, the act was continued for a further five years, and in 1728 it was continued until 1738 
“and no longer”.103 In the interim, the province made provision for its judicial and legislative 
bodies to convene outside infected areas, in the event that smallpox took hold.104 
The 1717 act was not adequate to cover all circumstances—namely, those presented by plague.  
When the disease did appear, it fell subject to separate, and particularly harsh, measures.  The 

88 Id., at 355. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 12. 
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primary threat came from ships having contact with the Mediterranean.  Thus, in September 1721 
the General Court enacted a new statute that again required ships coming from France or the 
Mediterranean to undergo 40 days’ quarantine.105  As in 1714, failure to observe the rules carried 
the penalty of death.106  Any individual breaking quarantine would be imprisoned for three years 
without bail—considerably longer than the two months that operated under the non-emergency 
provisions.107  The penalty for unloading goods was £500, with half of the proceeds paid to any 
informer, plus an additional three years’ imprisonment without bail.108  The statute was to be in 
force for three years.109 
Massachusetts Bay, like many colonies, continued to maintain a quarantine hospital.  The 
location of the hospital, and the authorities extended to hospital and health personnel, shifted over 
time.110  Each time the hospital moved, new legislation outlined the appropriate authorities and 
penalties for violation, consistent with the acts of 1701 and 1718.111  Gradually, the quarantine 
provisions became more detailed, providing, for instance, for medical personnel for care of the 
sick.112  Although in most cases the measures were temporary, they tended to be renewed until 
made indefinite.113 
Massachusetts Bay also continued to pass new quarantine measures targeting vessels arriving 
from specific regions or particular diseases that caused concern.  These measures took on an 
intensely local character.  In 1739, for instance, the General Assembly passed an act to prevent the 
spreading of smallpox.114  This measure required any individual coming from any region where 
smallpox was rampant to report within two hours of their arrival to one or more Select Men or the 
Town Clerk.  Failure to do so carried a fine of £20.115  Smallpox presented a particular threat and 
was dealt with through temporary means.  In 1742, for instance, a similar statute, which was to 
remain in force “for the Space of seven Years, and no longer.”116  This statute, re-printed in 1746, 
gave the Justice of the Peace within the county, or the Select-Men of the Town, the power to obtain 
a warrant to remove any persons arriving from “infected Places”.117  
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As for individuals within the colony who fell ill, special duties were placed on the Head of the 
Family:   
[I]mmediately upon Knowledge thereof, the Head of the Family in which such Person is sick, shall acquaint the 
Select-Men of the Town therewith, and also hang out a Pole at least six Feet in length, a red Cloth not under one 
Yard long and half a Yard wide, from the most Publick Part of the infected House.118 
The flag was to remain in place “’till the House in the Judgment of the Select-Men is thoroughly 
[sic.] aired and cleansed, upon Penalty of forfeiting and paying the Sum of fifty Pounds for each 
Offence, one Half for the Informer, and the other Half for the Use of the Poor of the Town where 
such Offence shall be committed.”119  Refusal or inability to pay the fine was punishable by 
whipping, up to thirty stripes.120  In the event that more than twenty families in the town had 
contracted smallpox, however, the requirements were lifted.121 
 
2.  New York 
Other colonies – even from their earliest days – considered and adopted quarantine provisions.  
Like the Massachusetts Bay measures, these laws were intensely local in nature and became 
increasingly extreme over time. 
Secondary sources suggest that in 1647, under Dutch rule, New York took steps to adopt its 
first restrictive measures.122  Further orders appear to have been issued under English rule, by the 
Governor and Council.123  Municipal ordinances providing for quarantine appeared in East 
Hampton and Long Island in 1662, banning Indians with smallpox, and whites who visited them, 
from entering the town.124  New York passed a similar ordinance in 1663, forbidding anyone ill 
with smallpox from entering the city.125   
By the late-17th century concern throughout the colonies had expanded from smallpox to 
yellow fever. Epidemics of the disease broke out in Boston, Charleston, and Philadelphia.126  When 
yellow fever reached New York in 1702, isolation efforts proved unsuccessful.127 
Yellow fever, along with smallpox and other infectious diseases, proved formative in New 
York’s quarantine law.  In 1755 the legislature introduced a colony-wide maritime statute.128  The 
legislation required that any vessels with smallpox, yellow fever, or other contagious diseases 
anchor at Bedlow Island, and there be quarantined, with heavy penalties for disobedience.129  Any 
person coming ashore could be compelled to return to the vessel or “dispose[d] of…in some other 
Place, in order to prevent the Infection.”130   
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The following year the colony introduced a subsequent measure, to ensure that all individuals, 
regardless of how they had fallen victim to disease, could be treated in like manner.131  Similar 
provisions were continued in 1757, to be in continuance for five years.132  
 
3. The Province of Pennsylvania and County of New-Castle 
Like Massachusetts Bay and New York, from its earliest days the Province of Pennsylvania, 
granted to William Penn and his assigns, made use of quarantine.  The measures initially adopted 
though seem to have been somewhat softened by the views of the colony’s founder.133  
Nevertheless, close inspection shows a pattern consistent with the other colonies in regard to both 
the intensely local nature of the provisions and the increasingly stringent measures adopted.   
Penn himself had witnessed the savage destruction of disease as well as the devastating impact 
of strict quarantine law.  He was a student at Lincoln’s Inn when the great plague hit London.134  
Death rates rapidly escalated and commerce came to a halt.  “[T]he streets,” one historian recounts, 
“were filled with mournful cries—of the painfully stricken, the grief stricken…”135  The Crown’s 
Draconian quarantine measures served to increase the suffering: 
Families with plague cases were boarded up into their houses for forty days without sufficient resources.  Door 
upon door bore the great placard with its red cross and the plea, “Lord have mercy upon us!”  The spotted death 
swept through the city killing so many so rapidly that there weren’t enough burying grounds; great pits had to be 
dug wherever there was waste ground and bodies brought in great wagon loads.  The madness of pain and fever, 
mass hysteria ruled London life that summer…The Great Plague claimed an estimated seventy thousand 
Londoners before it receded. 
Penn saw the impact of quarantine laws on the poor, and witnessed the role played by Quakers in 
administering to those in need, despite continued religious persecution of the sect by the Crown.136 
His experience with disease continued:  on his first voyage to America, his ship, the Welcome, 
fell subject to smallpox, in the process losing one-third of those it carried.137  Penn, immune owing 
to childhood contact with the disease, cared for those aboard who fell ill.138  For the next two 
decades, Penn continued to help and financially support the sick.139  He felt it his duty, writing in 
his Reflections and Maxims, “They that feel nothing of charity are at best not above half of kin to 
the human race.”140 
In 1684 Penn returned to England.  In his absence, the provincial assembly grew in power, 
perhaps contributing to its later willingness to adopt broader laws.141  Penn himself found in 
London a healthy dose of realpolitik and returned to his colony in 1699—having escaped the 
Tower and barely gained the favor of William of Orange—determined to answer charges of failing 
to pass strong enough laws.142  His arrival coincided with that of the “pestilential fever”—a disease 
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believed to have been imported from the West Indies.143  Quickly dubbed the “Barbados 
distemper”, the yellow fever outbreak killed 6-8 people per day for several weeks.144   
To counter this dreaded disease, in 1700 the General Assembly at New Castle introduced An 
act to prevent Sickly vessels coming into this Government.145  The new provisions sought to 
minimize the devastation, but they did not go so far as to shut people in their homes, as the English 
measures to which Penn had been a witness—or, indeed, the Massachusetts Bay and New York 
measures—had done.  Instead, the statute focused on maritime provisions.  It prohibited “vessels 
coming from any unhealthy or sickly place whatsoever” from coming closer than a mile from land, 
absent a clean bill of health.146  Passengers or cargo could only come ashore with a permit from the 
local authorities.147 
As with all laws passed by the province, such measures had to be laid before the Privy Council 
within five years of their passage; upon receipt, the council had six months to declare such 
measures void.148  The council made liberal use of its veto power in regard to the private colony, 
disallowing in excess of fifty provisions within just a five year period (1700-1705)—including one 
measure requiring all masters and commanders of vessels to report at New-Castle.149  Such 
decisions appear to have been influenced in part by complaints emanating from the Board of Trade 
that Pennyslvania, one of the most important colonies, was engaged in illegal trade.150  Coupled 
with the colony’s failure to crack down sufficiently on piracy,151 trade concerns prompted the 
crown to retain control of all matters relative to military power, admiralty, and customs.152 
Despite its concerns, however, the Privy Council left the 1700 quarantine law intact.153  The 
statute remained in force for nearly three-quarters of a century, without amendment, until its repeal 
in 1774.154 That year, a new statute took its place.155   From 1755, similar provisions marked New-
Castle, Kent and Susssex, upon Delaware.156  Finally, upon the Declaration of Independence, the 
General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed a statute continuing all the laws in force on May 14, 
1776.157   
 
4.  Rhode Island 
The General Assembly of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at Newport also passed 
colonial quarantine measures that demonstrate the decidedly local nature of such laws.  The 
measures targeted contagious disease broadly.  They, too, steadily became more extreme.  And 
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they demonstrated a provincialism that would persist beyond the country’s founding, empowering 
local towns to exclude individuals from other American colonies based on the threat of disease.  
A 1719 act prevented any vessels carrying any contagious disease from anchoring within one 
mile of any landing place.158  The statute required license to land from the Governor of the Colony, 
or in his absence, from one or more justices of the peace, with failure to obtain such a license 
before landing carrying a penalty of £100.159  In the event that passengers or sailors came ashore, 
the Justice of the Peace was empowered to confine them “to any such Place, as to him shall seem 
convenient, for to prevent the spreading of any Infection.”160  Like the Massachusetts Bay act of 
1699 (rejected by the Privy Council), such individuals would be subject to a further fine of £20.161  
The statute empowered the Naval Officer became to send medical personnel aboard any ship 
believed to have sickness on board to investigate.162  The ship bore the responsibility of paying for 
any costs thus incurred.163 
Smallpox in particular continued to be a problem for Rhode Island—and not just when 
imported from abroad.  In 1721 the colony responded to an outbreak of smallpox in Boston by 
passing a statute that targeted goods and passengers from Massachusetts Bay.164  All goods, wares, 
and merchandise originating in the diseased colony was to be transferred to islands offshore to be 
exposed to the elements for six to ten days, before being permitted to enter the colony.165  Criminal 
penalties applied.166  The law also required innkeepers to report ill lodgers, the justice of the peace 
being authorized to remove the sick “to any such Place as they shall think needful to prevent the 
spreading of the same.”167  In 1722 the General Assembly continued this act.168 
Less than a decade later, the colony issued another statute to stem the spread of “Contagious 
Distempers”, preventing any vessels carrying smallpox, or originating in any region (including the 
Americas) in which contagious distemper “is brief or prevalent” to anchor their ship one mile from 
shore.169  Any person coming ashore without explicit license from the Justice of the Peace could be 
returned to the vessel or “to any such Place, as to [the Justice of the Peace] shall seem convenient, 
for to prevent the spreading of any Infection.”170  The person transferred would be required to 
reimburse the colony and to pay an additional £20 fine.171  The statute authorized Naval Officers to 
board vessels and to assign a doctor to do the same in the course of medical investigations.172  
Unlike the earlier law, the 1730 act also made provision for individuals initially allowed into the 
colony, who later took ill, to be removed by the local Justice of the Peace “to such convenient 
Place, as shall to them appear to be necessary, to prevent the spreading thereof.”173  The cost, again, 
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would be borne by the individual who fell ill, unless such person was a slave, in which case the 
owner would pay.174 
Despite these provisions, disease continued to plague Rhode Island generally and Newport in 
particular.  The laws came to be seen as too intricate and convoluted.  And their effectiveness left 
something to be desired: disease proved devastating for trade, deadly for the colonists, and 
expensive.175   
Accordingly, in 1743 the colony repealed and re-issued substantially revised quarantine 
provisions.176   No ship, from any port, with any person ill from any contagious disease would be 
allowed within one mile of shore.177  The standard penalty of £100 for the master of the vessel and 
£20 for any individual breaking the quarantine applied.178  The governor and justices of the peace 
had the authority to send medical personnel aboard any vessel to confirm the health of the 
passengers.179  Town councils would secure the vessel and control all communications with shore, 
as well as direct the goods and merchandise to undergo 6-10 days of cleansing in the islands off 
Newport.180  A full two-thirds of any penalty exacted for breaking quarantine would be given to 
any informers who alerted the authorities.181  All costs associated with addressing sickness on 
board the vessel—including the cost of ammunition for guns firing at the vessel to prevent it from 
coming into the harbor—was to be paid for by the vessel itself.182   
As for the health of the towns on shore, not only did the owners of public inns become required 
to report on the health of their inhabitants, whom the justices of the peace could then remove, but 
any individual ill with smallpox could be taken from their own home by a Justice of the Peace and 
placed in the local quarantine facility, “or any other convenient Place, in order to prevent the 
Spreading of the Infection, or otherwise at their Discretion, to place a Guard round the Dwelling 
House of the infected Person, as to them shall seem necessary.”183  This measure effectively 
established the mechanisms to impose geographic quarantine within the colony.  The restrictions 
went both ways:  not only were guards to be placed to keep those within the dwellings from 
leaving, but, under the law, no person could enter such homes without a license from the town 
council or two or more Justices of the Peace.184  A fine accompanied any infractions, with half to 
be paid to any informers.185 
The Newport colony also evinced concern about the deliberate spread of disease, reserving the 
post serious punishments for such acts.  It became a crime to willfully or purposely spread 
smallpox within the colony.186  Anyone found guilty of the offense would be put to death, without 
the benefit of clergy.187  Any attempt to spread disease would be countered by thirty-nine lashes, 
six months imprisonment, and hard labor.188   
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Despite having introduced a comprehensive statute, gaps in the law remained.  In 1747 the 
General Assembly introduced further provisions.189  The purpose appears to have been to provide a 
legal mechanism for the collection of debt associated with quarantine.  For those entering the 
colony from elsewhere, the statute gave the General Treasurer the authority to recover such costs 
by an Action of Debt at any inferior court of common pleas within the colony.190  For colonists 
themselves, the Town-Councils became empowered to set the cost of cleaning the dwellings of 
those removed.191  The following year the General Assembly passed further provisions, noting that 
although the 1743 law had empowered the government to employ doctors to investigated and 
respond to sickness, there were no penalties attached for physician or surgeons’ refusal to obey.  
Accordingly, in 1748 a new act provided for the Governor or Deputy Governor, or any two 
Assistants, Justices, or Wardens, or any Town-Council, to compel doctors “to do any Duty relating 
to prevent the Spreading of the Small-Pox, or executing any Part” of the statute.192 
 
B.  The Revolutionary War and its Aftermath 
Massachusetts Bay, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island were not unique in their 
introduction of quarantine provisions, despite the fact that many of the colonial quarantine 
initiatives were reactive, temporary, incomplete, and not particularly effective.  In part this was 
because some of the diseases at which the measures were directed were simply endemic to the new 
world.193   
Smallpox, in particular, continued to batter the colonies, becoming epidemic during the War of 
Independence, in the course of which more than 130,000 colonists died from the disease.194  
Historian Elizabeth Anne Fenn reports on the widespread belief at the time that the British 
deliberately engineered the outbreak. 
Many on the American side believed that the expulsion of the black loyalists was a deliberate British attempt to 
spread smallpox to the continental forces, the militia, and the civilian population.  Whig sympathizers had 
accused the British of utilizing biological warfare as early as the siege of Boston, and in Virginia it seemed that 
their fears were finally realized.  On June 24, 1781, the Connecticut soldier Josiah Atkins stated his opinion that 
Cornwallis had ‘inoculated 4 or 500 [blacks] in order to spread smallpox thro’ the country, & sent them out for 
that purpose.”…The eviction of pox-covered black loyalists from Yorktown in October drew similar charges.  
James Thacher, a surgeon’s mate in the Continental army, believed the terrified former slaves had “probably” 
been sent to the American lines “for the purpose of communicating the infection to our army.”195 
The charge that the British were using Smallpox as a weapon echoes in contemporary accounts.  
The Pennsylvania Gazette, for instance, wrote, “Lord Cornwallis’s attempt to spread the smallpox 
among the inhabitants in the vicinity of York, as been reduced to a certainty, and must render him 
contemptible in the eyes of every civilized nation.”196  Benjamin Franklin referenced the same in 
his Retort Curteous..197  Fenn writes, “It would be easy to dismiss these accusations as so much 
American hyperbole.  But evidence indicates that in fact, the British did exactly what the 
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Americans said they did.”198  Robert Donkin, for instance, a British officer in New York, explicitly 
directed the use of Smallpox as a weapon, writing “Dip arrows in matter of smallpox and twang 
them at the American rebels, in order to inoculate them; This would sooner disband thee stubborn, 
ignorant, enthusiastic savages, than any other compulsive measures.  Such is their dread and fear of 
that disorder!”199  Later in the war, General Alexander Leslie sent a letter to Lord Cornwallis, 
indicating his plan to distribute sick soldiers throughout the “Rebell Plantations.”200 
The colonies responded by issuing public statements meant to shame Britain in the eyes of 
other nations, and by introducing new measures to take advantage of what little was known, 
scientifically, about the disease.  In Massachusetts, for instance, laws were passed by the legislature 
to empower justices of the court of general sessions in any county to allow for inoculating hospitals 
to be established.201  A special statute focused on Boston:  after a certain period, those who had not 
contracted the disease were forbidden to enter, until Boston was declared free from the disease.202   
In Rhode-Island a similar statute permitted for widespread inoculation for smallpox.203  The 
disease was decimating the Revolutionary Army at a critical time.204  The new statute authorized 
the erection of one hospital in each country in the colony.  Guards would be placed two hundred 
yards outside such hospitals in every direction to prevent anyone from entering or leaving hospital 
grounds.205  Once admitted for inoculation, criminal penalties applied for leaving without a doctor-
issued certificate of health.  The physicians themselves would be held responsible for anyone 
leaving with a certificate, who subsequently spread smallpox to others (either by way of personal 
contact or through his or her belongings).206  Every item of clothing, linen, or sheets removed from 
the hospital also had to be accompanied by a certificate.207  The statute gave particularly broad 
authority to Towns establishing such hospitals.208  Any measure thus passed would have the same 
force and validity as if it had been enacted by the General Assembly.209 
Concern about the devastating affects of disease continued well beyond the Revolutionary 
War.  Major port cities, such as Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia warranted special 
attention.  The states in which these ports were located devolved broad authorities down to a local 
level, giving effect to two major legal frameworks:  quarantine and sanitation.  In both spheres 
public health trumped commercial considerations.  States and local governments became 
empowered to exclude all people and goods from elsewhere in the United States, solely on the 
grounds of public health.   
Closer examination of the four states governing the largest ports on the Eastern seaboard 
(Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania), coupled with Connecticut’s somewhat 
unique approach, provide an example of both the depth and breadth of the newly-minted country’s 
approach to disease.  They also illustrate the degree to which quarantine law lay at the heart of state 
police powers. 
 
1.  Maryland 
Following the Revolution, states transferred colonial regulations governing quarantine into 
state law – some going so far as to enshrine the authorities into their state constitutions.  Maryland 
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proves a good example.  The colony, which had introduced quarantine regulations in 1766, 
continued its measures in 1769, 1773, 1777, 1784, 1785, 1792, and 1799.210  Maryland also wrote 
quarantine authorities directly into its state Constitution.211   
Even with the carry-over, concern quickly arose as to whether its quarantine provisions were 
sufficient to meet any exigency that might arise.212  Subsequent legislation thus expanded the 
governor’s authority:  from 1793 the governor’s powers in regard to any malignant contagious 
disease included the authority not just to stop vessels, goods, or individuals from coming into port 
or reaching shore, but to prevent “all intercourse or communication”, over land or water, between 
Maryland and any region where such sickness was present—either in the United States or 
overseas.213  This effectively gave the governor the power to cut off relations with other states and 
localities.  Quarantine was not just outside the federal domain.  It was so decidedly local that it 
overrode national interests. 
Even as it established its broad authority to isolate the state from other cities and states, 
Maryland made arrangements for the appointment of a local health officer in Baltimore.214  The 
officer could impose quarantine of people and goods 10-20 days, with additional extensions of up 
to 10 days each.215  The penalty for masters violating quarantine was set at $1000, with any effort 
to conceal sickness on board the vessel set at $300.216  The statute further authorized the creation of 
a hospital for individuals placed in quarantine.217  Local ordinances rounded out the state 
authorities.  Thus, the City of Baltimore passed measures in 1797, 1798, and 1800, making 
extensive provision for both the authority to quarantine people and goods, as well as to establish a 
lazaretto to perfect the same.218 
 
2.  New York 
New York followed a similar pattern in responding to the threat posed by disease.  Like 
Maryland, the state legislature incorporated colonial provisions directly into law.  It then expanded 
its authorities, giving rise to two bodies law:  an increasingly robust quarantine establishment, and 
an ever more stringent sanitary regime.  Even as the two sets of authorities evolved within the 
broad limits set by the state, each remained decidedly local in character.  For the city of New York, 
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as for other port cities subject to significant human and commercial traffic, the state legislature 
passed special measures.  
Following the war, in 1784 the state legislature re-enacted and expanded colonial quarantine 
measures.219  Quarantine was to be performed wherever, and in whatever manner, the Governor 
directed.220  The governor became empowered to appoint a physician to inspect all vessels 
suspected of having disease on board.221  Any attempt to interfere with the physician in the exercise 
of his duties carried a penalty.222  The statute authorized the governor to take over Nutten Island—
also known as “Governor’s Island”—for quarantine purposes.223    
The end of the 18th century saw a sudden upswing in attention to disease.  In 1794 the New 
York legislature passed a measure giving the Governor the authority to build a hospital on the 
island.224  Then, starting in 1796 under John Jay’s governorship, the legislature passed six laws in 
six years, each focused on stemming the spread of disease.  These measures, local in nature, 
steadily expanded the coercive nature of state authorities and introduced further innovations related 
to geographic, seasonal, and merchandise-related quarantine.   
The series began in 1796 with legislation that repealed the earlier act.225  The new statute 
created a more robust regime, providing for the appointment of a health officer and health 
commissioners for New York City, authorizing construction of a lazaretto, enabling the governor 
and health officers to enact maritime and domestic quarantine, and eliminating nuisances.226  The 
law required that all vessels carrying forty or more passengers, having on board any person with a 
fever, arriving from a place where sickness where an infectious disease at the time of departure 
prevailed, or having lost anyone en route due to sickness, to undergo quarantine.227  The statute also 
gave the governor the authority to designate specific regions, such that any vessels arriving from 
these areas would automatically undergo quarantine until cleared by the health officer for entry.228   
Like Maryland, New York gave its governor the power to cut off commerce and travel 
connecting the state with the rest of the Union—again emphasizing the local character of 
quarantine.229  Full authority was given to the health officer to direct where quarantine would be 
performed, who would undergo quarantine, and what articles would be quarantined, cleaned, or 
destroyed.230  Failure to answer the health officer’s inquiries honestly amounted to perjury.231  The 
1796 statute also created a health surveillance system:  it required physicians to report any fevered 
patient considered to be infectious; a penalty of £50 accompanied each infraction.232  The statute 
also gave broad powers to the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty of the City of New York, 
convened in common council, to introduce sanitary provisions to alter any lots within the city, to 
clean streets, alleys, passages, yards, cellars, vaults, and other places, and to regulate a range of 
industries giving rise to sanitary concerns (e.g., glue, leather, soap, candles, and the like).233  
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Owners and businesses would be compensated for any losses; failure to reach agreement would 
result in the empanelment of a jury, within three weeks, to set the amount.234 
The year after passing this broad quarantine act, the legislature amended it to restrict the 
number of health commissioners from seven to three.235  Quarantine would henceforward continue 
“for as many days as the commissioners shall deem necessary.”236  It also established specific areas 
within which certain industries, involving starching, fermenting, melting fat or tallow, boiling soap, 
or curing hides, would not be allowed.237  No vessel arriving in the port of New York, which would 
otherwise be subject to quarantine, could be exempted by reason of having previously entered any 
other port in the United States, unless such ship had remained in port for certain number of days.238 
In 1798, the state passed a new omnibus law, expanding the commissioners’ authority and 
appointing a physician to serve as health officer for the city of New York.239  The statute dealt with 
urban nuisance and maritime quarantine, even as it explicitly reserved traditional remedies against 
nuisance under common law.240  To the Governor of the State or the Mayor of New York went 
further powers to issue orders relating to domestic quarantine.241  The act also provided for the 
construction of a lazaretto on governor’s island.242  Any persons or things within the city of New 
York, infected by or tainted with “pestilential matter”, could be sent by the health commissioners to 
the lazaretto.243  In 1799, the legislature designated Staten Island—six miles away—to be home to 
anchorage grounds and a new Marine Hospital.244  To the health officer was conveyed full 
authority to confine and release individuals from the medical facility.245  By 1801 the quarantine 
establishment was completed.  It remained there for 60 years.246  
New York law not only allowed the governor to discriminate against persons and goods from 
other countries or, indeed, elsewhere in the U.S., but it created an annual schedule for doing so.  
The 1799 statute introduced graduated geographic quarantine with seasonal constraints:  all vessels 
arriving from the East or West Indies, Africa, the Mediterranean, the Bermuda Islands, or any other 
place in the south Seas or south of Georgia, between the end of May and the end of October, would 
automatically be subject to quarantine and examination.247  All vessels arriving south of Sandy 
Hook from any other domestic port would be subject to quarantine from the first of June until the 
first of October.248 
In 1800 the New York legislature passed yet another measure, which directly targeted 
commercial goods.249  The statute straight out banned certain items (i.e., cotton, hides, coffee, or 
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peltry) from being brought into the city of New York between June and November.250  Any goods 
sent into the city in violation of the statute could be seized by the health commissioners, with the 
proceeds going to the benefit of the health office.251  (Indeed, all fines paid under the legislation 
would be used to offset the health office’s expenses.252) 
Finally, in 1801, the legislature passed provisions requiring that the health officer reside at 
Staten Island, the resident physician in New York City, and the other commissioner at or near the 
Marine Hospital or in the city.253  That act effectively completed New York’s quarantine system, 
which remained in place, with minor amendments, until 1850.254   
Having established broad state power, the legislature then began to push decisionmaking 
authority down to a local level.255  Commercial considerations paled in the face of public health.  
Section 3 of the 1850 act, for instance, gave local boards the power “To regulate and prohibit or 
prevent all communication or intercourse by and with all houses, tenements and places, and the 
persons occupying the same, in which there shall be any person who shall have been exposed to 
any infectious or contagious disease.”256 
From a constitutional perspective, the fact that state measures should so directly impact inter-
state commerce was of little consequence. Justice Grier explained in 1854 that internal police 
powers, which included every law introduced for the preservation of public health, “are not 
surrendered by the states, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States, and that 
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and 
conclusive.”257  No federal regulation could “supersede or restrain their operations, on any ground 
of prerogative or supremacy.”258  And quarantine, whatever its impact on commerce, lay at the core 
of state police power: 
[Q]uarantine laws, which protect the public health, compel mere commercial regulations to submit to their 
control.  They restrain the liberty of the passengers, they operate on the ship which is the instrument of 
commerce, and its officers and crew, the agents of navigation.  They seize the infected cargo and cast it 
overboard.  The soldier and the sailor, though in the service of the government, are arrested, imprisoned, and 
punished for their offenses against society….All these things are done not from any power which the states 
assume to regulate commerce or to interfere with the regulations of Congress, but because police laws for the 
preservations of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the public welfare must of necessity have full and 
free operation according to the exigency which requires their interference.”259 
The exigencies of the social compact required that such state laws “be executed before and above 
all others.”260  Thomas Cooley later explained, “Numerous …illustrations might be given of the 
power in the States to make regulations affecting commerce, and which are sustainable as 
regulations of police.  Among these,” he continued, “quarantine regulations and health laws of 
every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the 
extent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected with disease or otherwise 
dangerous.”261  Such regulations, at least with regard to Commerce Clause considerations, 
“generally passed unchallenged.”262 
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Where limits did apply, however, was in the local execution of state provisions.  For while the 
state authorities were broad, they constrained the extent to which local entities—operating on the 
basis of enumerated authorities—could act.  One of the most important New York cases on this 
point came in 1856, when Judge Birdseye entertained a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from 
an individual restrained under a local health regulation.263  While the ensuing decision limited the 
local exercise of public health law, it did not question the state’s authority to legislate in this realm; 
nor did it entertain the possibility of federal preemption, despite open acknowledgment of the effect 
of such provisions on commerce. 
The facts of the case proceeded thus:  the town of Castleton, having established a cordon 
sanitaire, forbade all persons from passing from within the enclosure to any other part of the 
town.264  One Peter Roff had apparently knowingly and willfully violated the relevant regulation.  
Facing criminal charges and lacking sufficient funds to post bail, Roff was jailed and filed a writ of 
habeas corpus to challenge his imprisonment.  Judge Birdseye examined the relevant provisions of 
the revised statutes, which provided that any two Justices of the Peace could remove individuals to 
whatever place was deemed appropriate for the preservation of the public health.265  Birdseye found 
that while the powers granted to the local authorities were Constitutional, the manner in which the 
board had exercised its authorities brought it into conflict with the state, thus voiding the local 
regulation.266  Specifically, the prohibition on passing from the quarantine enclosure into other 
parts of the town proved too sweeping:  north and east of Castleton lay the main channel of the bay 
and harbor of New York, making it hard to ascertain what portion of the lands and waters covering 
them, between the shore and the middle of the channel, fell within the enclosure.  Ships thus 
directed by the state officers to proceed through this channel would be acting in accordance with 
state measures, but fall afoul of local regulations.267 
Birdseye dwelled on the indefinite nature of “the public good” as a rationale for such severe 
measures—noting that allowing the definition to rest on the shoulders of a handful of people in 
every town risked bringing state public health mechanisms—and, indeed, commerce—to a 
standstill.268  Those working in the hospital or reporting to the quarantine officers upon arrival 
would be prevented from entering Castleton.269  Yet the state statute required their movement, in 
order to fulfill their obligations under the law.270 The problem was also one of precedent:  “And 
where shall this state of things stop?  Clearly, if it may exist in Castleton, it may in every town 
between that and Canada.  The result shows the entire absurdity of the attempt to assume such 
powers.  It shows that the decision of the proper officers in Quarantine is final and conclusive.”271 
Birdseye turned then to rights considerations—not on federal commerce clause authorities—as 
a limit on the exercise of quarantine itself: 
[The local] regulation sentences all persons, well or sick, whether exposed to infection or not, to an unlimited 
imprisonment.  That imprisonment, too, it may be added, is not such a one as any quarantine law can adjudge to 
be valid.  For it is one where the restraining power does not take, and cannot by possibility take, any measure 
whatever either to support the life or improve the health of the party confined, or to free him from infection; that 
at some future period he may again enjoy the privileges of a member of society.272 
The local approach stood in stark contrast to that adopted by the state, which had demonstrated a 
commitment to the comfort of patients and attention “to their prompt restoration to sound health 
and to their duties in society.”  The local approach was “at war with the whole policy of the State 
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from its foundation.”  To sustain the assumptions of the local ordinances would be “to create in 
every town in the commonwealth an irresponsible tribunal, whose only rule of action shall be what 
in their opinion ‘the public good requires.’”  Birdseye explained, 
The public health is doubtless an interest of great delicacy and importance.  Whatever power is in fact necessary 
to preserve it, will be cheerfully conferred by the Legislature, and carried into full effect by the Courts.  But it 
can never be permitted that, even for the sake of the public health, any local, inferior board or tribunal shall 
repeal statutes, suspend the operation of the Constitution and infringe all the natural rights of the citizen.273 
Limits existed in the local exercise of quarantine law; but those very limits were established by the 
states, thus underscoring the extent of state sovereignty in this public health domain. 
 
3.  Massachusetts 
A decade after the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts introduced legislation to provide 
for maritime quarantine and the domestic removal and isolation of any sick persons by the 
Selectmen of the town.274  Removal had to be given effect in the “best way” possible, “for the 
preservation of the inhabitants, by removing such sick or infected person or persons, and placing 
him or them in a separate house or houses, and by providing nurses, attendance, and other 
assistance and necessaries for them.”275   
Like Maryland and New York, Massachusetts drew a line between the state and the rest of the 
country.  Towns could require out-of-state visitors coming from infected regions to report to the 
Selectmen within two hours of their arrival, under threat of a $100 fine.276  Justices of the Peace 
could return visitors to the state whence they arrived, with a $400 penalty in the event that the 
individual returned without permission.277  Any inhabitant who entertained a visitor for more than 
two hours after the warrant to depart had been issued would be fined $200.278  Massachusetts gave 
similar powers to local authorities to prevent any diseased goods from entering, or remaining 
within, local bounds.279  Inter-state commerce figured not at all in the legislature’s calculus.280 
Massachusetts emphasized the importance of local authorities with regard to quarantine and, 
like Maryland and New York, passed special measures for its largest port city.  The newly-formed 
board of health in Boston was to inquire into all nuisances “and such sources of filth as may be 
injurious to the health of the inhabitants of said town.”281  After obtaining a warrant, members of 
the board could forcibly enter dwellings to carry out their duties.282  The manner of quarantine was 
left entirely in the board’s hands.283  Criminal penalties for failing to abide by the board’s 
determinations applied.284  The statute further required that keepers of lodging houses report sick 
travelers to the Board of Health within twelve hours of them falling ill.285 
While Boston warranted special attention, Massachusetts extended similar authorities to 
Salem.286  Soon powers of both maritime and domestic quarantine extended to the selectmen of 
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other seaports and towns.287  Similar penalties for refusing to acknowledge local ordinances 
applied.288   
 
4.  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania took a course similar to New York.  Most of its measures contained sunset 
clauses, but more often than not, the state legislature simply reintroduced—and expanded—the 
relevant authorities.289  By 1799 the state had created a detailed quarantine regime and sanitary 
framework, targeted at preventing smallpox and yellow fever from taking hold.290  Like 
Massachusetts, the state created a robust board of health, as well as health commissioners and a 
quarantine master.291  The board was to govern the marine hospital and to create a new lazaretto for 
the performance of quarantine.292   
Like the city of New York, Philadelphia created a temporal maritime regime, requiring every 
ship arriving between April and October to submit to examination.293  All vessels carrying 
contagious disease became required to obtain a certificate of health before passengers and goods 
could come ashore.294  To the physician and the quarantine master were given the broad authority 
to detain and purify both passengers and cargo.295  Far from avoiding any impact on inter-state 
commerce, to the Board of Health was given further authority to make regulations preventing the 
transport of specified commercial goods into the city of Philadelphia—regardless of their origin.296   
Quite apart from the port city’s regime, the state itself maintained a geographic maritime 
quarantine, requiring all vessels arriving from specified places, between mid-May and early 
October, to discharge their cargoes and ballast, together with the bedding and clothing, to be 
cleaned and purified.297  In parallel provisions, Pennsylvania did not distinguish between foreign 
and domestic travelers and goods.  Between specified dates, all persons, goods, merchandise, 
bedding, and clothing entering the state was to undergo at least 30 days quarantine, under penalty 
of $500 and forfeiture of goods and merchandise, with half of the resources thus obtained to be 
given to the informer.298   
Pennsylvania, again like New York, instituted a public health surveillance system, further 
requiring the board of health to inquire into any outbreaks of contagious disease in the United 
States, or on the continent of America, and to report their findings to the Mayor of Philadelphia.299   
Gone was William Penn’s more measured approach.  Citizens could be shut up in their own 
homes, refused any visitors, and removed at the board of health’s discretion.300  Substantial criminal 
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penalties applied.301  All fines thereby obtained would be used to finance the board of health.302   
The statute explicitly addressed the potential conflict of interest that might arise:  no citizen would 
be disqualified from sitting as judge or juror, or from giving testimony, in cases that might arise 
under the act “by reason of his, her or their common interest in the appropriation of the sum or 
penalties imposed for such offence.”303  Pennsylvania also established sanitary provisions, dealing 
with “all nuisances which may have a tendency [in the opinion of the board of health] to endanger 
the health of the citizens.”304  The statute provided for the construction of a new lazaretto, which 
would be supported by a new tax.305 
 
5.  Connecticut 
Some state measures went well beyond the quarantine laws introduced in Maryland, New 
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.  Connecticut provides a good example and merits brief 
discussion, if for no other reason than it illustrates the seriousness with which the new states treated 
the threat of disease.   
In 1794, for instance, the state legislature passed An Act Providing in Case of Sickness, 
empowering the Selectmen of any town, with a warrant from two justices of the peace, to remove 
sick or infected persons.306  The statute applied to any person who “may justly be suspected to have 
taken the Infection” of Smallpox or any other contagious sickness, where such infection “may 
probably be communicated to others.”307  Where suitable “nurses or tenders” might not be present, 
a warrant could issue from the infected town to other towns in Connecticut, requiring them to 
provide the necessary assistance.308  Refusal to nurse individuals back to health carried a fine.309  
Whenever any individual within the state became infected with smallpox, or any other 
contagious disease, it became the duty of the head of the family, or master of the vessel, to mount a 
white cloth signaling the presence of disease.310  Such signal could only be removed by a Justice of 
the Peace or a Selectmen of the town.311  Domestic pets received their fair share of attention:  the 
state went so far as to require, wherever infectious disease raged, that “all owners of Dogs shall 
destroy their Dogs or cause them to be killed; and in Neglect thereof, it shall be lawful for any 
person to kill the said Dogs.”312  Any person bringing goods, wares, or merchandise infected with 
disease into any town in Connecticut, either by land of water, would be fined.313  It fell entirely to 
the Selectmen to determine the length and manner of airing all commercial items.314 
The 1794 act also criminalized the direct or indirect transfer of Smallpox between individuals, 
even as it shifted the burden of proof to the individual thus accused.315  The statute allowed, 
however, for the accused to counter the accusation by swearing to the court that he or she did not 
voluntarily, directly, or indirectly give or receive the infection.316 Smallpox inoculation required a 
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certificate from the civil authority—but such programs first required a two-thirds vote of the 
selectmen to begin.317 
In summary, while some states, like Connecticut, took public health measures to an extreme, 
the salient point is that following the Revolution, public health was firmly in the hands of state 
legislatures.  Like Maryland, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, 
Delaware,318 South Carolina,319 Rhode Island, and Virginia320 introduced quarantine laws.  The 
state legislatures, in turn, delegated considerable authorities to the local entities, in whose hands lay 
not just the decision to quarantine individuals entering their bounds (either by land or sea), but the 
contours of how to give effect to quarantine.  While some state provisions limited the extent of 
criminal culpability for breaking quarantine, they almost universally left the prosecution and 
operation of quarantine in the hands of local towns and municipalities.  Local authorities were so 
firmly in the lead, that many states gave cities and towns the authority to cut off all communication 
and commerce with any part of the United States.321   
C.  Federal Forays 
With the strong local character of quarantine in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that the federal 
response to the yellow fever epidemic at the end of the eighteenth century (particularly when it hit 
Philadelphia) was to duck.  The 1794 statute authorized the President to convene Congress outside 
of the capitol, in the event that “the prevalence of contagious sickness” or “other 
circumstances…hazardous to the lives or health of the members” should occur.322  (This statute is 
still in effect). 
In other words, Congress’ first response to the devastating epidemic was not to take charge or 
even to act in the realm of public health.  Indeed, that same year, in accordance with Constitutional 
restrictions on the states, Congress acquiesced in the appointment of a health officer in Maryland 
for the Port of Baltimore and approved the levy of a tonnage tax for a limited period to allow 
Maryland to offset the cost.323  But it was a state appointment, keeping public health firmly in the 
state domain.  Federal involvement was limited to the revenue questions thereby incurred.   
It was not until twenty years after the Revolution that Congress introduced a federal statute 
addressing quarantine.324  Repealed three years later, the legislation subordinated the federal 
government to state authority:  it merely empowered the President to offer assistance to states in 
enforcing quarantine, if they requested it.325  The legislation was preceded by much hand wringing 
in Congress about the extent of states’ rights and concerns about giving too much authority to the 
Executive.326   
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The offensive language that sparked the debate would have created a “National Executive 
power to locate all quarantine stations.”  Members of the House strongly objected to taking such 
authority away from the states.327  The question was not the role quarantine played role in 
commerce, but the impact it had on public health.328  
[T]he regulation of quarantine had nothing to do with commerce.  It was a regulation of internal police.  It was 
to preserve the health of a certain place, by preventing the introduction of pestilential diseases, by preventing 
persons coming from countries where they were prevalent.  Whether such persons came by land or by water, 
whether for commerce or for pleasure, was of not importance.  They were all matters of police.329   
And practical reasons undergirded leaving such authority in the hands of the states.  Georgia, for 
instance, 
was one thousand miles from the seat of Government, and from their situation with respect to the West Indies, 
they were very subject to the evil of vessels coming in from thence with diseases; and if they were to wait until 
information could be given to the President of their wish to have quarantine performed, and an answer received, 
the greatest ravages might in the mean time, take place from pestilential diseases.330   
It was precisely because of such practical concerns that states had long been “in the habit of 
regulating quarantine, without consulting the General Government.”331  States, on the front line of 
defense, were “better calculated to regulate quarantine.”332  Such power was akin to the states’ right 
to self-preservation.333  And history proved instructive:  the very fact that the states had already 
acted in this area demonstrated that quarantine was a state power.334  Representatives were uneasy 
at the prospect of the Executive overriding state decisions as to where and when to execute 
quarantine and the manner in which it would be implemented.335 
The few Representatives that spoke in favor of stronger independent federal authorities located 
quarantine within Congress’ commerce powers.336   
Gentlemen might as well say that the individual States had the power of prohibiting commerce as of regulating 
quarantine:  because, if they had the power to stop a vessel for one month, they might stop it for twelve months.  
This might interfere with regulations respecting our trade, and break our Treaties.337   
For them, only the federal government had the coercive authority—and resources—to enforce such 
measures.338  In the end, the House of Representatives decided 46-23 to strike the “National 
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Executive power” language, requiring instead that the federal government act in aid of the States in 
their performance of quarantine.339   
The federal government’s subservient approach continued.  Two years after the national 
executive power controversy, President John Adams signed a law creating the first hospital as part 
of the U.S. Marine Hospital Services.340  The legislation placed the hospitals under local control.341  
In 1799 Congress repealed the Act and gave the Secretary of the Treasury the power to direct that 
officers of the United States abide by rules and assist in executing quarantine laws consistent with 
State health laws.342 Subsequent orders issued by the Secretary of the Treasury reiterated that 
Marine Hospital Service Officers, customs officials, and revenue officers were to cooperate in 
enforcing local quarantine law and regulations.343 
With the federal government clearly in a support role, debates in Congress did not revolve 
around states’ rights.344  Instead, new measures focused on areas where the federal government 
exercised plenary power.  The 1799 statute specifically noted, for instance, that any changes with 
regard to duties of tonnage would require Congressional approval.345  It also created a federal 
inspection system for maritime quarantine.346  This system allowed the federal government to begin 
gathering information about illness. Treasury provided financial assistance and direction. The 
statute empowered the federal government to purchase and erect warehouses to examine goods and 
merchandise entering any port.347  Five years after granting the same powers to the legislature and 
Congress, the legislature ensured that the federal government could remove federal officers, 
prisoners, and executive and judicial officers, and re-locate them, in the event of epidemic.348 
 
1.  Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Efficacy Concerns 
However much quarantine powers might be central to the state’s ability to protect the health 
and welfare of its citizens, the economic impact of quarantine—as a domestic matter and as a dent 
in U.S. foreign trade (particularly when other countries imposed quarantine on U.S. vessels)—
could hardly be ignored.  Faced by foreign retribution, Federal interest in expanding its role in the 
quarantine realm grew.  
The states’ failure to stem yellow fever towards the end of the 18th Century, for example, 
prompted a series of orders in England targeted at U.S. vessels.349   These measures significantly 
disrupted foreign trade.  In 1793, for instance, the Privy Council issued an order imposing two 
week quarantine on all ships arriving from Philadelphia, Delaware and New Jersey.350  Soon seen 
as unnecessary, the Council subsequently revoked the order.351  In its place, England adopted 
sanitary measures, requiring airing and cleansing of the vessels and the destruction of the personal 
effects of any person who died during the voyage.  The following year, the Privy Council again 
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of quarantine; but, without the aid of the United States, they could not carry them into effect.  They may direct, by their Governor and 
board of Health, quarantines to be performed, but they could not force any vessels to observe their directions, without the aid of the 
General Government.”) 
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responded to the American yellow fever epidemic with 14 days’ quarantine for ships arriving from 
Baltimore.352  As the yellow-fever scare subsided, the Council revoked the order.353  Thus began a 
pattern that continued through 1799:  in response to outbreaks of disease in the U.S., the Privy 
Council would issue orders targeting certain ports and delaying or destroying the transport of U.S. 
goods.354 
New legislation specifically targeted at the United States rode the crest of these regulations and 
entered into law.  The problem was the nature of the disease:  the application of existing English 
law to yellow fever was questionable.  The governing statutes authorized orders to be issued in 
response to “plague”, the definition of which had to be substantially relaxed to incorporate different 
diseases.  The Privy Council sought to avoid a conflict by simply referring in their orders to a fever 
“of the Nature of the Plague.”  Initially, this sleight-of-hand did not cause much concern.  As one 
historian explains, “the national mood was to put the health of the public before ambiguities of 
language.”355  But when the Master of an American ship, Thomas Calovert, under letter of the law, 
answered in the negative as to whether plague was onboard, the Law Officers of the Crown 
indicated to the Privy Council that they could not enforce penalties against him:  “A paradoxical 
situation had therefore been reached in which quarantine regulations were justified by virtue of the 
vague meaning of ‘plague’, but that same imprecision provided a perfect defence against 
allegations that the rules had been breached.”356 
The Privy Council immediately wrote to George Rose, secretary to Treasury, requesting that 
Parliament entertain a bill that would widen the definition of diseases against which quarantine 
might be enforced.357  Accordingly, on April 5, 1798 the government introduced new quarantine 
legislation specifically to meet American yellow fever concerns.358   
The United States complained loudly and frequently to England about the use of quarantine 
against American ships.  Britain remained unmoved:  the country did not trust American bills of 
health.  The government had received reports that people traveling from the West Indies to 
Philadelphia had been allowed to land, while possibly diseased vessels were quickly turned around 
and sent toward Britain.359 
Congress thus confronted two problems:  first, as a matter of foreign relations, friction with 
European powers as to whether domestic provisions were sufficient to stem the spread of disease—
with significant economic costs to the country.  Second, on the domestic front, the continuing 
yellow fever epidemics demonstrated the gross inadequacy of state quarantine regulations.360  
Members of the House began to lament the tendency of local entities to assume that disease was 
imported, and never native in origin.361  They denounced state authorities as provincial and 
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scientifically-backwards.  Illness on board vessels had more to do with sanitation than with where 
the ships might have visited on their travels.362   
Considering the magic influence of names, it were to be wished that the term quarantine should be erased from 
the statute books of the Union, and of each particular State.  Regulations, precise and explicit, should, in the 
opinion of your committee, be formed to prevent foul and infectious vessels, with sickly crews, from entering 
our ports, or proceeding on any voyage in that situation.363   
The solution was not to allow each state to respond in the manner they deemed most expedient, but 
to establish uniform federal regulations which ensured that all sea vessels be subject to sanitary and 
hygienic procedures, thus greatly reducing incidents of disease—and preempting foreign actions 
against U.S. trade.364   
Thus far, in the Constitutional realm, police powers had trumped commerce.  But quarantine, 
and proper sanitary provisions, cost money.365  Treasury was to prove the thin end of the wedge, as 
Congress steadily allocated ever-greater resources to stop the spread of disease.366 
 
2.  The Growing Debate 
Even as Treasury began to direct more resources towards stopping the spread of disease, 
disagreement about whether quarantine should be in state or federal hands grew.367  Consistent with 
the earliest debates in Congress, states claimed quarantine authority under their police powers, 
while federal authority derived from its authority to regulate interstate commerce.368  Federal and 
state courts initially weighted the scales in favor of state power.  Thus, in 1824, Chief Justice 
Marshall famously enumerated quarantine as at the heart of those authorities reserved to the state:  
That immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to 
the general government:  all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.  Inspection 
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a 
State…369  
Marshall’s position in Gibbons v. Ogden came to dominate the federal interpretation of state police 
powers.  Indeed, five years later, when the Secretary of the Treasury asked the Attorney General, 
John M. Berrien, whether Treasury could itself issue quarantine regulations, Berrien replied that, 
under Gibbons, it could not.370  Until the close of the Civil War, this position remained 
unchallenged.  State judicial bodies shared Marshall’s view.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 
for instance, focusing on the City of Rockland’s quarantine provisions, held that while the town 
officers could not appropriate a vessel and turn it into a hospital, it was entirely within their 
authority to place it in quarantine.371 
As a practical matter, a number of local boards of health controlled quarantine. Philadelphia 
(1794), New York (1796), and Boston (1799) provide salient examples.372  But not all localities had 
boards.  Between 1800 and 1830, for instance, there were only five permanent boards of health.  
Nevertheless, the trend had begun.  By 1873, more than 30 boards of health had formed, with the 
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power to exercise quarantine, mitigate nuisances, and pursue sanitary reform.373  Sped by the 
writings of prominent medical reformers such as Benjamin Rush, dirt and disease became 
increasingly linked.  Accordingly, states began integrating sanitary reform into law.  The 
Massachusetts Public Health Act of 1797 became a model for other states—almost none of whom, 
at the close of the 18th Century, had public health organizations.374  For the next seventy-five years, 
municipal cleanliness was seen as the key to public health.375  
Miasmic theories of disease transmission paralleled the sanitary reforms.376  Nevertheless, the 
use of quarantine—and the enforcement of local quarantine provisions—did not disappear.  They 
continued to be an automatic (and reactive) response to public health emergencies.  In 1804, for 
instance, New Orleans appointed a board of health.377  When the emergency ended, the state 
abolished the board.  In 1818 New Orleans re-constituted the board, again giving it the power to 
impose quarantine.378  Abolished in 1819, the board resurrected in 1821 to counter yellow fever.  
By 1825 the city’s business lobby had again succeeded in obtaining the board’s dismissal.379 
The local boards of health were not above using their powers to target other cities and ports in 
the United States—and, based on dubious scientific understandings, were often unsuccessful in 
their efforts to stem the advance of disease.  In 1821, for instance, Andrew Jackson established a 
Board of Health at Pensacola “’to take active oversight of the quarantine and health 
regulations.’”380  The following year, the Pensacola Board of Health announced the existence of 
yellow fever, and warned “’all inhabitants to remove, to retire to the country.’”  The Pensacola 
Floridian cited the “[e]xposure to the sun, consumption of green fruit, and intemperance” as 
“among the causes for the fever cases originating locally.”  In addition, the paper indicated that 
“fear itself was the most contributing cause of fever.”381  By 1825, the Pensacola Board of Heath 
had imposed quarantine measures against all vessels arriving in the port from Mobile and New 
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Orleans.382  By October 1825, yellow fever was rampant in the region.383  Further outbreaks in 
1830, 1846, and 1847 occurred.384 
The system, of questionable effectiveness and significant cost, could not be sustained.  A series 
of National Quarantine and Sanitary Conventions accompanied the march to Civil War.385  The 
purpose of the conventions was to reform the current system of quarantine.  The question was what 
direction to take. 
The two principal reform groups at the time, otherwise diametrically opposed, shared a strong 
interest in establishing a national quarantine system.  Contagionists, believing that disease spread 
by contact between individuals, sought a more uniform, national system to halt public exposure.386  
Anti-contagionists, believing that disease spread by other means and that sanitation was far more 
important, sought an end to what were perceived as ineffective, and possibly harmful, local laws.387  
Both looked to the federal government for the final word.  The Commerce Clause provided a hook.  
Reporting in 1860, the Committee on External Hygiene explained: 
We consider that quarantine from its close connection with the U.S. Revenue Department, and the important bearing 
which it has upon commerce (which Congress alone can regulate) and upon travellers soon to be disperse throughout 
different and distant States of the Union, is a national, rather than a State concern, and we cannot conceive that a 
uniform system of quarantine can be established throughout the Union unless it be organized…as a national 
institution.388 
Of particular concern was the politicization of local measures.  Lamenting the state of New York, 
one reformer argued  
They all tend in one direction; they all look towards the increase of perquisites, and the increase of that personal and 
political power which is sure to be abused.  …Our Quarantine laws are inconsistent, they are more than barbarous; 
they are oppressive; they are not arranged, in any respect, with reference to the exact and absolute necessities for 
sanitary protection, much less for commercial and public convenience.389 
Before the reformers could enter the political arena to advance their cause, however, the Civil War 
broke. 
The course of the war underscored the extent to which the states were dependent on other 
localities to stem the tide of disease.390  Naturally-occurring disease, however, was not the only 
threat.  Reports suggest that Confederate forces attempted to use disease against soldiers and 
civilian populations.391  In 1862-63, plans to use bodies and garments infected with Yellow Fever 
to spread disease among the northerners emerged.392  Other plots involved infecting clothing with 
smallpox and then selling the clothes to the Union soldiers.393  On several occasions Confederate 
forces contaminated wells and ponds with poisons and dead animals.394  The northern forces 
refused to follow suit:  War Department General Orders No. 100, issued in 1863, stated, “The use 
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of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern 
warfare.”395 
The war underscored the country’s vulnerability to disease as well as the difficulty of 
amassing, at a state level, the resources necessary to combat it.  When cholera hit in 1865, New 
York failed in its effort to obtain assistance from the Secretary of the Navy.396  A number of states 
refused to introduce quarantine.  And so a wartime bill took the bull by its horns, seeking the 
transfer of quarantine to federal hands.397  The bill would have empowered the Secretary of War, 
with the assistance of the Secretaries of the Navy and Treasury, to enforce quarantine at all ports of 
entry, as well as to establish cordon sanitaire in the interior.398   
Senators balked.  Henry B. Anthony (R-RI) pressed Senator Zachariah Chandler, chair of the 
Commerce Committee, on the extent of the Secretaries’ authorities to enforce quarantine.  “[A]ll 
the powers at their command may be used if necessary,” Chandler replied.399  Shocked, Anthony 
asked if they could impose martial law.  Chandler answered that they could “use any power 
requisite to stop the cholera.”  Anthony protested, “I would rather have the cholera than such a 
proposition as this.”400   
Even in the wake of war, with the enemy forces employing disease as a weapon, legislators 
proved reluctant to transfer state authority to the federal government.  For despite calls for more 
vigorous national action, as Historian Les Benedict explains, “most Americans still regarded 
general police regulation—the ordinary day-to-day legislation affecting crime, health, sanitation, 
personal property, etc.—to be the responsibility primarily of the states.”401  State quarantine 
authority existed separate and apart from Congress’ enumerated powers.402  Lot M. Morrill (R-ME) 
adopted the prevailing view, “All sanitary regulations touching the health of this country within the 
jurisdictional limits of the several States are matters of police regulations.”403  The Civil War thus 
may have marked an important shift in the development of American federalism, but it was not one 
immediately reflected in the quarantine realm.  
 
D.  Shifting Federal Role 
Immediately following the Civil War, the national government still had to walk a fine line.  It 
remained constrained by state police powers, but it nevertheless began to expand into the realm of 
infectious disease and to begin drawing on its spending power to encourage states to turn over 
quarantine facilities to federal control. 
In 1878 Congress introduced a new statute, for the first time creating federal authorities with 
regard to infectious disease.404  The statute gave the Marine Hospital Service the power to adopt 
rules and regulations to govern vessels arriving from overseas.405  Such measures must still defer to 
state law.406  The statute also created a worldwide surveillance system, requiring consular officers 
to send weekly reports on the state of health in foreign ports and to inform the Supervising Surgeon 
General of any infectious or contagious diseases abroad.407  The statute further reflected the 
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growing emphasis on science prevalent in the reformers’ movements:  Congress made 
appropriations for “investigating the origin and causes of epidemic diseases, especially yellow 
fever and cholera, and the best method of preventing their introduction and spread.”408 
The following year, Congress repealed the sections of the statute empowering the Marine 
Hospital Service to make rules and regulations independent of state boards.409  The repeal, 
however, was scheduled to sunset after four years, at the close of which the repealed provisions of 
the 1878 act went back into effect.410  The 1879 statute created criteria for sanitation on board ships 
and expanded the number of federal quarantine stations.411  It also created a national board of 
health.  Again, its powers were circumscribed:  the members were to cooperate with and to help the 
local and state boards of health—not supplant them.  Their remit was limited to cholera, smallpox, 
and yellow fever, for which they were to consider the need for a national quarantine system.  A 
subsequent resolution freed up resources for the federal government to take a stronger national 
lead:  it required that the Secretary of the Navy place vessels not required for other purposes at the 
disposal of the commissioners of quarantine, when requested by the National Board of Health.412  
The statute also authorized the appointment of medical officers to overseas consulates and to 
supervise the enforcement of sanitary measures for ships leaving for U.S. ports.413 
Perhaps most importantly, quarantine stations were expensive to operate and maintain, and 
following the Civil War, few states had extra resources at their disposal.  The solution was at once 
elegant and powerful: the 1879 statute made it possible for local ports to relinquish their quarantine 
facilities to the federal government—which would then reimburse them and take responsibility for 
preventing the importation of disease.  This provision proved central in paving the way for the 
transfer of state power to federal hands.  The statute also gave the federal government the authority 
to make additional rules regulating inter-state quarantine, in the event that local regulations were 
found to be inadequate.  In 1882, Congress further enabled federal expansion in this area, creating a 
fund for state and local entities to obtain assistance for suppressing epidemics.414  The President 
could, at his discretion, respond to an actual or threatened epidemic by appropriating up to 
$100,000.415   
With these changes, the federal government found itself in a new role, which it appeared to 
perform better than could the states acting alone.  The Marine Hospital Service (MHS) proved a 
rising star, with a series of highly visible successes.  In 1882, for instance, Texas found itself 
threatened by a yellow fever epidemic.  MHS provided assistance to maintain a cordon sanitaire 
around Brownsville, calming concerns in the bordering areas.  Widely hailed as a success, in 1883 
the service established quarantine stations for the detention and treatment of infected ships at Ship 
Island (for Gulf Quarantine) and Sapelo Sound (for South Atlantic Quarantine).416  It expanded in 
1887 to build a laboratory on Staten Island—an institution that gradually morphed into what is now 
the National Institutes of Health. 
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1.  Regional Initiatives 
Regional initiatives soon emerged with a goal of standardizing quarantine laws and ensuring 
notification across state and international lines. These conferences played a key role in developing 
a broader consensus about the form quarantine ought to take and the appropriate role for the federal 
government.  Their occurrence was aided by the ascendancy of the theory of contagion and 
growing agitation within the medical community for better standards. 
One of the earliest meetings took place in 1886, when the International Conference of the 
Boards of Health met in Toronto, Canada and resolved that each state and provincial board of 
health, and where no state board of health existed, the local board, would notify the other boards in 
the event of cholera, yellow fever, or smallpox.417  Responding to concerns that accurate reporting 
might be influenced by commercial interests, the conference resolved that, where rumors suggested 
the presence of pestilential disease in any State or Province, and definite information one way or 
the other could not be obtained from the proper health authorities, “the health officials of another 
State are justified in entering the before-mentioned State or Province for the purpose of 
investigating and establishing the truth or falsity of such reports.”418  The following year the 
International Conference of State Boards of Health met in Washington.419  This meeting reaffirmed 
the Toronto principles, further resolving,  
That in the instance of small-pox, cholera, yellow fever and typhoid fever, reports be at once forwarded, either 
by mail or telegraph, as the urgency of the case may demand; and further, that in the instance of diphtheria, 
scarlatina, typhoid fever, anthrax or glanders, weekly reports, when possible, be supplied, in which shall be 
indicated, as far as known, the places implicated, and the degree of prevalence.420 
In 1889 Alabama similarly called for a regional conference to harmonize southern quarantine 
laws.421  The meeting took place in the shadow of a recent, devastating yellow fever epidemic in 
Florida.422  Alabama invited delegates from Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois.423  With the Civil War fresh in the 
minds of participants, papers prior to conference evinced concern about preserving state rights.424  
But the papers also expressed concern that the southern states were particularly vulnerable:  
inconsistent laws and commercial corruption blighted the system.  Variation in maritime measures 
resulted from politics—not geography, climate, or science.425 
Geographic quarantine and enforced isolation generated particularly heated debate.  There was 
little patience for giving the government the authority to take people from their own homes.  
Further, efforts to depopulate entire areas might lead to panic.426  Accordingly, the conference 
resolved:   
In the beginning of an outbreak of yellow fever there is no need of depopulation at all, except of infected 
houses, or infected districts; but if people who are able to afford the expense desire to leave they should do so 
quietly and deliberately, and no obstacles should be placed in their way; and those who leave healthy districts 
of the city or town should go wherever they please, without let or hindrance.427   
Those departing should only be allowed to leave “under such restrictions as will afford reasonable 
guarantees of safety to the communities in which they find asylum.”428  Where depopulation may 
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be necessary, detention should be limited to ten days.429  To address corruption, the conference 
shifted the emphasis from local authorities to state authorities.430  And it adopted standard rules for 
regulation of railroads, balancing the interests of commerce against the demands of public health.431   
Finally, the conference made specific demands of the Federal government:  first, that the 
Federal government disinfect all mail.432  Second, that the Secretary of the Treasury increase 
revenues for the patrol service on the coast of Florida to the extent necessary to prevent 
smuggling.433  Third, the conference requested that the U.S. government enter into negotiations 
with Spain with view towards placing U.S. sanitary inspectors at Spanish ports with such legal 
jurisdiction as would be necessary for the enforcement of health regulations.434  Delegates were 
particularly concerned about the threat of yellow fever from Cuba, the “fountain head” of the 
disease.435 
In concert with regional meetings, calls for federal regulation began echo within the fields of 
medicine and industry.  Discoveries by Louis Pasteur, Ferdinand Cohn, and Robert Koch gave birth 
to modern microbiology, in the process verifying the germ theory of disease.436  These advances 
propelled quarantine from being seen as a reactive, politically-sensitive model, to one driven by 
rationality.  Attention expanded to those who had come into contact with the ill.  Prominent 
medical personnel argued that by aligning detention to the incubation period of the disease, and by 
instituting sterilization of medical tools, efforts to contain sickness would obtain more success.437  
In 1888 the Philadelphia College of Physicians issued an influential report, asserting that a 
national system of maritime was the only way to secure the United States against the importation of 
disease.438  Resources mattered:  “Such necessary uniformity can be obtained by no other 
arrangement, for the reason that the National Government is alone able to defray the expense of 
complete quarantine establishments at every port, according to the requirement of each and without 
regard to the revenue derived from the shipping of any.”439 
The College of Physicians identified a number of problems with the current system. First, as 
both a substantive and a procedural matter, the rules were reactive:  “They have seldom or never 
been drafted with a full recognition of the need of adequate and constant protection of the health of 
the general public.”440  The national government, moreover, depended upon states requesting 
assistance, which meant that they did not become involved until the middle of an emergency—
rather late in the game to prevent an epidemic.441  Second, health laws were focused on local 
interests and corrupted by “the commercial interests of rival ports, the partisan struggles of 
opposing political factions, and the heedless parsimony with which money has been doled out for 
the execution of such health laws as exist.”442  Third, the failure of ports of entry to stop disease 
ended up hurting the inland areas the most—which meant that the ports did not have any direct 
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incentive to observe strict measures.443  Fourth, the current federal authorities were inadequate.  
While sanitation mattered, it was also insufficient.  Reference to the United Kingdom would be 
misplaced:  Great Britain had fewer people, a smaller territory, significant resources, fewer 
immigrants, and atmospheric conditions not favoring disease.444   Fifth, as for the commercial 
impact, the problem in America was people, not cargo.445  Much would be gained by detaining the 
“immigrant classes”, who, in light of the advantages they were about to receive—could hardly 
begrudge the small sacrifice.446 
It is important to note here that in the communities most affected by quarantine provisions, the 
United States differed greatly from the United Kingdom.  In England in particular, the primary 
concern had historically been with plague—a disease carried by wool, silk, and other goods.  Thus 
it was the merchant class, not the immigrant class, which was most affected by restraints on travel 
and trade.  Resultantly, the English shipping industry took a strong interest in the question of 
quarantine and, as soon as it was constitutionally viable, lobbied national quarantine authority out 
of existence.  In contrast, no organized lobby stood ready to defend immigrants arriving in the 
United States.  Indeed, the almost redemptive quality of cleansing came to justify and reinforce 
quarantine at the borders. 
The College of Physicians noted the advantages of a national approach.  A federal system 
would create uniformity and distribute the costs evenly among the states.  In this manner, the 
federal government could afford better training.  By stopping disease at the ports, a national system 
would prevent inter-state quarantines, which hurt trade in the interior.  The government could shift 
resources between ports when necessary, in the process freeing quarantine from local politics.447  
The physicians were not unaware of state concerns about federalism, but necessity overrode the 
traditional police powers reserved to the states.448  Congress must pass new legislation.449 
Industry, like the medical community, came to support the shift, and gradually the states, too, 
began to come around.450  Many of them had already begun transferring their quarantine stations to 
federal control.  A paper from New Orleans, circulated to the Southern states, explained:  “[T]he 
time has come when Federal Resources and Federal power should be organized and exercised to 
regulate and control Inter-state as well as foreign quarantine, and to prevent the introduction and 
extension of contagious and infectious diseases in the United States.”451  Congress should pass 
legislation for the appointment of a Chief Commissioner of Health, charged with the collection and 
distribution of infectious disease information.452  A new federal health commission would divide 
into six sections, each focused on the prevention of a different disease:  yellow fever, cholera, 
typhoid, scarlet fever, small-pox, and diphtheria.453 
The Federal Government quietly drove the discussion, encouraging regional agreement and 
standardization.  The Alabama conference, for instance, may have been technically organized by a 
state—indeed, only state delegates had a vote.  But the role of the Surgeon General could hardly be 
ignored:  it was he who set the agenda.454 
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2.  Judicial Reflection:  Morgan’s Steamship 
In the midst of these developments, a timely case led the courts to uphold quarantine as within 
state police powers, but it also raised the possibility of federal preemption.  The case stemmed from 
the Louisiana legislature’s decision in 1882 to authorize the construction of a quarantine station in 
New Orleans.  A subsequent statute required vessels and passengers entering the Mississippi River 
through the station to pay a fee and undergo examination.455  Morgan’s Steamship Company 
challenged the statute, saying that it violated the Constitution by imposing tonnage duties and 
interfering in the federal regulation of commerce.456 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The precautions taken by Louisiana were “part of and inherent 
in every system of quarantine.”457  They differed “in no essential respect from similar systems in 
operation in all important seaports all over the world, where commerce and civilization prevail.”458  
Justice Miller, writing for the Court, added, “If there is a city in the United States which has need 
of Quarantine laws it is New Orleans.”459  Not only was the city on the front line of defense, but 
New Orleans served as a funnel through which trade to the interior flowed.  While quarantine laws 
impacted interstate commerce, it was better to reserve such matters to the states—at least until 
invalidated by Congress: 
[I]t may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide for the commercial cities of the 
United States a general system of quarantine, or shall confide the execution of the details of such a system to 
a National Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all State laws on this subject will 
be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.  But until this is done, the laws of the State on this 
subject are valid.460  
The court noted that for nearly a century, Congress had refrained from directly regulating 
quarantine; nor had it passed “any other law to protect the inhabitants of the United States against 
the invasion of contagious and infectious diseases from abroad.”461  Nevertheless cholera and 
yellow fever raged. 
During all this time the Congress of the United States never attempted to exercise this or any other power to 
protect the people from the ravages of these dreadful diseases.  No doubt they believed that the power to do 
this belonged to the States.  Or, if it ever occurred to any of its members that congress might do something in 
that way, they probably believed that what ought to be done could be better and more wisely done by the 
authorities of the States who were familiar with the matter.462 
The Court found it unlikely that this practice, widely accepted for a century, violated the 
Constitution.463  While the states might still have quarantine authority, however, the possibility of 
federal preemption now presented itself. 
 
3.  Federal Legislation in the wake of Morgan’s Steamship 
For the next five years, federal quarantine measures followed Morgan’s Steamship, almost on 
an annual basis.  The first one, in 1888, was relatively minor:  it simply introduced penalties for the 
violation of quarantine laws and regulations.464  In 1890, however, Congress began to flex its 
muscles, passing a statute that authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to develop rules and 
regulations to prevent the interstate spread of disease.465  Hitherto such authorities applied only to 
the nation’s ports.  The statute specified cholera, yellow-fever, small-pox, and plague, stating that 
whenever the President was satisfied as to its presence, “he is hereby authorized to cause the 
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate such rules and regulations as in his judgment may be 
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necessary to prevent the spread of such disease from one State or Territory into another…”466  The 
concentration of these authorities in the Secretary of the Treasury underscored the nexus between 
commerce and disease.  The statute made it a misdemeanor for any officer or agent of the U.S. at 
any quarantine station, or any other person employed to help prevent the spread of disease, to 
violate quarantine laws, with a fine of up to $300 and imprisonment up to 1 year upon 
conviction.467  Common carriers were treated more severely, with any violation earning a fine of up 
to $500 or imprisonment for up to two years.468 
In 1891 a new Immigration Act expanded border inspection and quarantine authority.469  The 
following year, with the Chicago Exposition rapidly approaching, cholera arrived in American 
seaports and a potential epidemic loomed.  The President sent a telegram to the Department of 
Justice, inquiring about the extent of federal authority to issue quarantine regulations.  The 
Solicitor General replied the following day, saying that under the 1878 statute, the federal 
government was prohibited from interfering with State or municipal quarantine authorities.  This 
did not, however, mean that the national government could not introduce new regulations where 
none existed; nor did it mean that Federal regulations could not be more stringent than local 
regulations.470  Stricter measures would not, in the Solicitor General’s view, “conflict with or 
impair” local sanitary regulations:  
A State might be without the machinery to enforce a safe quarantine; its officer might through mistaken 
opinions or corrupt motives fail in his duty.  It is not to be tolerated that an entire people possessing a 
government endowed with the powers I have enumerated should be exposed to the scourge of contagion and 
pestilence through such causes.471 
So, where state measures were found inadequate, the federal government could act. 
Accordingly, in 1893, Congress repealed the 1879 legislation, expanded the Marine Hospital 
Service responsibilities and provided for further federal authorities in support of state quarantine 
efforts.472   The supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service became required to 
examine all state and municipal quarantine regulations and, under the direction of the Secretary of 
Treasury, to cooperate with and help state and municipal boards of health in the execution and 
enforcement of their rules and regulations—as well as Treasury’s rules and regulations—to prevent 
introduction of contagious and infectious diseases into the United States or between U.S. states or 
territories.  All quarantine laws in force would be published. 
The 1893 statute neither eliminated nor took over the state role, but it gave the Secretary of the 
Treasury the authority to enact additional rules and regulations to prevent the introduction of 
diseases, foreign and interstate, where local ordinances either did not exist or were inadequate.  The 
regulations must apply uniformly.  State and local officers would enforce federal measures where 
they were willing to act; if they refused or failed to do so, the federal government would assume 
control.473  Warehouses, purchased by Treasury, would be used for merchandise subject to 
quarantine “pursuant to the health-laws of any State”.474  The Secretary of Treasury could prolong 
the period of retention, subject to State law.475  As in earlier legislation, where contagious disease 
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raged and presented a danger to officers of the revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury had the 
authority to remove them to a safer location so they could continue their duties.476 
The 1893 statute was the first national legislation to require a bill of health from all vessels 
arriving in the United States—centuries after the same had been required in England. Failure to 
arrive with a clean bill of health carried a fine of up to $5,000 per ship.  Subsequent regulations 
required that bills of health be obtained for vessels arriving from European, Asiatic, African, South 
American, Central American, Mexican, and West Indian ports.477  (They exempted domestic 
vessels engaged in trade on the North American coast and inland waters, as long as the ports were 
free from infection.478)  The bills were somewhat detailed, although not as specific as their 
corresponding British regulations.479  Inspection had to be conducted within six hours of 
departure.480 
The statute also strengthened the country’s international disease surveillance program, 
requiring consular officers to make weekly reports to Treasury on the state of disease abroad—
instead of only reporting epidemics once they had taken hold.481  The consular reports would, in 
turn, be provided to home ports.482  When infected vessels arrived in the United States, Treasury 
could remand the vessel, at its own expense, to the nearest quarantine station.483  The President 
obtained the further power to designate countries gripped by infectious or contagious disease, and 
to prohibit the introduction of persons or property from such regions.484  Finally, the legislation 
further smoothed the material transfer of quarantine structures to the federal government, 
authorizing Treasury to receive buildings and disinfecting apparatus and to pay reasonable 
compensation to the state.485 
 
D.  Police Powers, Preemption and the Spending Clause 
By the turn of 20th century, the federal government had made some advances into the quarantine 
realm, but it had yet to preempt the states.  State quarantine was alive and well.  In December 1899, 
for instance, plague broke out in Chinatown and other parts of Honolulu.  Eventually, the city of 
Honolulu was placed under quarantine and, at one point, the local board of health ordered that an 
entire city block, facing the trade winds, be burned.  The quarantine did not end until May 1900.486 
 Efforts to challenge state authority on constitutional grounds fell short, with the judiciary 
further underscoring its position in Morgan’s Steamship.  In 1898, for instance, in the face of a 
yellow fever epidemic, the Louisiana State Board of Health issued an order declaring New Orleans 
and other parts of the State under geographic quarantine.  The board prohibited entry of all persons, 
whether “acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune.”487   Shortly before the order was issued, 
the French liner Brittania arrived in New Orleans with 408 passengers and a clean bill of health.  
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Before the passengers could disembark, however, the board of health directed the ship to leave 
Louisiana—threatening to extend quarantine to any place the ship landed.  After days of dispute, 
the liner sailed to Pensacola, Florida, and the company brought suit on the grounds that the State 
Board of Louisiana had violated the Act of February 15, 1893.488 
Compagnie Francaise v. Louisiana State Board of Health reiterated the key findings in 
Morgan’s Steamship.  Justice White, writing for the court, held that the state had the authority to 
enact and enforce laws “for the purpose of preventing, eradicating, or controlling the spread of 
contagious or infectious diseases.”489  The Louisiana Board of Health had, with this purpose, 
passed a resolution preventing anyone from entering a place in the state where quarantine had been 
declared.  “[T]hat from an early day the power of the states to enact and enforce quarantine laws 
for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has been recognized by Congress, 
is beyond question.”490  But like Justice Miller in Morgan’s Steamship, White left open the 
possibility Commerce Clause preemption: 
[W]henever Congress shall undertake to provide…a general system of quarantine, or shall confide the 
execution of the details of such a system to a national board of health, or to local boards, as may be found 
expedient, all state laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.491   
Until Congress exercised its power, however, “such state quarantine laws and state laws for the 
purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, 
are not repugnant to the constitution.”492 
Three years later, the court again underscored state authority to legislate in the realm of public 
health.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts centered on compulsory vaccination.  Justice Marshall Harlan 
upheld state authority to enact such laws, explaining, “Upon the principle of self-defense, of 
paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease 
which threatens the safety of its members.”493  Like quarantine, compulsory smallpox vaccination 
was legitimate exercise of state’s police power to protect public health and safety.494  Local boards 
of health had been the ones to determine whether or not mandatory vaccination was required.  
Their decision had therefore been neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.495   
State legislatures and courts continued to regard quarantine law as firmly within the state 
domain.496  By 1913, however, the shifting tide had begun to gain momentum.  That year, the 
Supreme Court recognized that states were free to adopt quarantine regulations that did not conflict 
with Federal statutory or regulatory initiatives.497  The subtle undertones of the decision suggested 
not that the states had the ultimate authority, but that it was only by leave of Congress that they 
could act in this area.   
During this period, the Federal government continued to assist the states, while quietly 
accepting transfer of authority and equipment in what one mid-20th century scholar referred to as “a 
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process of accretion and erosion.”498  In 1921, the last state transferred its holdings and the 
authority to regulate them, to the federal government, bringing the total to approximately 100 
quarantine stations.499  The Surgeon General reflected: 
The transition of a quarantine system, composed of units operated by the municipal or state authorities, to a 
compact federal organization has been gradual, but persistent.  One after another cities and states have 
transferred their quarantine stations to the national Government, so that, with the passing of the New York 
Quarantine Station from state to national control on March 1, 1921, the Public Health Service now 
administers every station in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands.500 
At that point, the federal government was inspecting some 2 million passengers and crew, and 
20,000 vessels each year.501 
 Centralized control brought with it a number of advantages.  As reformers anticipated, it 
allowed maritime quarantine to be uniformly administered, so as not to favor one port over another.  
It generated a higher quality of quarantine officers, as the United States could now create a trained 
corps which could be moved between stations. It also allowed for greater cooperation between 
medical authorities, customs, and immigration services.  It placed the country in a stronger position 
to comply with its international treaties (and to demand that foreign countries reciprocate).  It 
ensured that the costs would be distributed among the states, all of whom benefitted from 
preventing the introduction of disease at the ports of entry.  Perhaps most importantly, it pulled 
quarantine from the grasp of local politics, and placed it in the hands of qualified medical 
personnel.502  Surgeon General Hugh Cumming proclaimed it as the triumph of science over 
politics.503 
E.  Contemporary Quarantine Authorities 
In 1939 the U.S. Public Health Service moved from Treasury to the Federal Security Agency.504  
Five years later, Congress introduced the Public Health Service Act, which became the first of two 
pillars on which current federal quarantine authority rests.505  The other is the 1988 Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.506   Following Hurricane Katrina, 
Congress passed new authorities, but in the face of strong state opposition, the legislature 
subsequently withdrew the new powers.  
 
1.  Public Health Service Act of 1944
Consistent with Commerce Clause considerations, the 1944 Public Health Service Act limits 
federal quarantine authority to disease introduced at ports of entry or inter-state movement of 
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goods or services.  The statute gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) the 
authority to make and enforce any regulations as in her judgment may be necessary “to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the states 
or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.”507  Quarantine 
is limited to the communicable diseases in Executive Order 13295.  Since 1983, this list has 
included cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and viral 
hemorrhagic fevers.  In April 2003 the Bush Administration added SARS and the following year 
influenza causing, or having potential to cause, a pandemic.508  The HHS Secretary has the 
authority to apprehend and examine any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a 
communicable disease in a qualifying stage and (1) moving or being about to move between states, 
or (2) a probable source of infection to individuals who may be moving between states.509  If, after 
inspection, an individual is found to be infected, the Secretary of HHS can detain the individual for 
such a time, and in such as manner as may be reasonably necessary.510 
In 2000, authority transferred from the Secretary of HHS to the Director of the CDC, 
authorizing her to take whatever measures may be necessary to prevent the spread of 
communicable disease from one state to any other state where local health authorities have not 
taken adequate steps to prevent the spread of the disease.511  (As an institutional matter, foreign and 
inter-state quarantine is now generally overseen by the CDC’s Division of Global Migration and 
Quarantine).  Regulations prohibit infected people from traveling across state lines without explicit 
approval or a permit from health officer of the state, if applicable under their law.512  Further 
restrictions can be placed on individuals who are in the “communicable period of cholera, plague, 
smallpox, typhus or yellow fever, or who having been exposed to any such disease, is in the 
incubation period thereof.”513   Regulations also establish CDC control over foreign arrivals.514 
The authority claimed in 1921 to be obsolete—i.e., executive power to prohibit persons or 
goods from designated areas from entering the United States—continues to be in effect (the 
authority has not been delegated to the Surgeon General).515  And special quarantine powers apply 
in times of war, whereupon the HHS Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General, may 
indefinitely detain individuals reasonably believed to be infected or a probable source of 
infection.516  Unlike peacetime authorities, it is not necessary for an individual to be in a qualifying 
stage of infection. 
The Surgeon General exercises control over all U.S. quarantine stations and can establish 
additional stations as necessary.517  The consular reporting requirements have been retained under 
such rules as established by the Surgeon General.518  U.S. Customs and the Coast Guard must assist 
in executing federal quarantine law.519  Bills of health continue to be required for all vessels 
entering or leaving U.S. water and air space.520  Violation of general federal quarantine provisions 
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is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000, or by imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.521  
Violations of specific federal quarantine or isolation orders is a criminal misdemeanor, punishable 
by a fine of up to $250,000, or one year in jail, or both.  Organizations violating such orders are 
subject to a fine of up to $500,000 per incident.522  Federal District Courts may enjoin individuals 
and orgs from violation of CDC quarantine regulations.523 
Most recently, the Centers for Disease Control have proposed the adoption of new regulations 
that would, inter alia, impose stronger reporting requirements on airlines and ships regarding their 
passengers.  Figure 1, below, outlines the proposed information to be collected from all travelers 
prior to embarkation.  The proposed regulations also require travel permits for qualifying diseases.  
The detention of carriers and the screening of any passengers considered ill are also included, as 
are measures for imposing “provisional quarantine”.  This last measure targets individuals who 
refuse to be quarantined, and would be authorized by the CDC Director of Global Quarantine for a 
period of three business days. 
 
Figure 1 
The proposed regulations demonstrate the key role science has come to play:  the length of 
detention is determined by the incubation period of each disease.  An opportunity to contest 
quarantine would be provided by administrative hearings.  These proposed regulations have yet to 
be passed; they remain in the consultative phase. 
In 1963 challenge to the federal authority to quarantine was brought.524  At that time, the World 
Health Organization had declared Stockholm to be a smallpox-infected area.  When a passenger 
from Stockholm arrived in the United States and was not able to produce documentation proving 
prior vaccination, the Public Health Service quarantined the passenger for fourteen days.  The 
District Court, upholding the detention, noted that the federal government had acted in good faith, 
that the individual had had a history of unsuccessful vaccinations, and that detention during the 
incubation period was required to determine whether the individual had been infected. 
Other judicial challenges to the current federal quarantine provisions have not arisen; however, 
there are a number of issues ripe for consideration.  The courts, for instance, have yet to rule on 
whether federal cordon sanitaire would withstand constitutional challenge.  Following United 
States v. Lopez, it appears that the courts are willing to recognize some limits on the Commerce 
Clause authorities.525  And, as discussed throughout this article, quarantine law has historically 
been regarded as at the core of state police powers, reserved through the 10th Amendment.  On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Comstock raises question about 
whether a necessary and proper claim could equally well uphold federal action in this realm.526  
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and four other justices, compared the civil commitment statute 
upheld in Comstock to medical quarantine.  At least two justices, however, Justice Alito and Justice 
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Kennedy, who voted to uphold the law, did not adopt the breadth of Breyer’s decision.  Kennedy, 
in particular, stated that the majority did not give the Tenth Amendment due weight. 
Due process challenges might also surface, particularly in regard to whether the procedures and 
the grounds for quarantine are sufficient; for while due process standards have evolved over the 
20th and into the 21st century, the legislative framing for quarantine has remained relatively 
constant.  The proposed regulations would tailor the period of quarantine more carefully to each 
disease, as well as provide for an administrative hearing to contest quarantine.  Whether these are 
sufficient is merely speculative, as they have yet to be adopted.  They do improve, however, upon 
the system in place since 1944. 
 
2.  Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relieve and Emergency Assistance Act 
The second pillar of federal quarantine authorities is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act.527  This legislation provides federal assistance to state and local 
governments in the event of an emergency.  The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 amended the 
Stafford Act to include to further encourage state, local, and tribal areas to coordinate disaster 
management planning and implementation.528  Like the early Congressional initiatives in the 
quarantine realm, the legislation places the federal government solely in a supportive capacity.529   
There are two main types of Stafford Act declarations:  (1) a major disaster declaration under 
Title IV, and (2) an emergency declaration under Title V.  A major disaster declaration is 
predicated upon a formal request by the Governor for federal assistance.530  The type of incident 
that qualifies is limited:  it may only be used in response to “any natural catastrophe…or, 
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion.”531  In other words, it does not apply to non-
natural incidents (e.g., criminal activity, terrorist attacks, or acts of war).  It would, however, cover 
any fire, flood, or explosion arising from such incidents.  To obtain federal assistance, the state 
must have a mitigation plan in place, creating an incentive for increased coordination and 
integration of mitigation activities.  The President is not required to grant the state’s request, but, 
instead, is given the option of responding.  Although the statute does not directly mention 
quarantine, it authorizes the President to provide health and safety measures (which would, 
presumably, include medical detention).532  The statute does not provide a cap for the amount of 
monetary assistance available to an affected area under a major disaster declaration. 
In contrast to the major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration, which falls under Title 
V, may be made either pursuant to the request of a State Governor, or the President may 
unilaterally declare an emergency for an incident involving a primary Federal responsibility.533  As 
with the major disaster declaration, the President retains the discretionary authority of deciding 
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when to act.  For an emergency declaration pursuant to a state governor request, “any occasion or 
instance” may suffice.  The process for making the request is substantively similar to the request 
for a major disaster declaration.534  But unlike major disaster assistance, emergency declaration 
response is capped at $5 million, unless the President explicitly determines a continuing need.  The 
emergency declaration is thus both broader (covering a wider range of incidents) and narrower 
(owing to financial limits) than a major disaster declaration.535 
Where an emergency involves matters of federal primary responsibility, the President is free to 
act absent a governor’s request.  The statute, though, does not define “primary responsibility”; 
instead, it provides a broad category:  “subject area[s] for which, under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and 
authority.”536  Typically, emergencies declared pursuant to the primary responsibility clause 
involve incidents on federal property, such as the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing or the 2001 attack 
on the Pentagon (although in both of these cases, later requests from state governors commuted 
them to major disaster declarations).  Financial and physical assistance is then provided directly 
through FEMA, arguably sidelining the DHS Secretary to no role whatsoever in the response. 
 
C.  Continued Expansion in the Federal and Military Realm 
While the Public Health Services Act and the Stafford Act provide the pillars for the current federal 
quarantine structure, the areas continues to be in flux.  To a significant extent, these changes have 
been influenced by the bundling of pandemic disease and biological weapons—highlighted at the 
start of this article.  Along with this shift has come growing attention to the role of the military in 
enforcing such provisions.   
HSPD 10, for instance, considers the military to be central to U.S. strategy.537  In large measure 
this stems from the biological weapons component of the threat.  In enacting the 2002 Homeland 
Security Act, Congress explained,  
[B]y its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of  the Armed Forces for a range 
of domestic purposes, including  law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act 
of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s 
obligations under the constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or  other serious emergency. 
[…] Existing laws, including [the Insurrection Act and the Stafford Act] grant the President broad powers that may 
be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass 
destructions, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public 
order. 
Such broad language suggests that the federal government could use the military in response to any 
national emergency, including natural disasters. 
Congress contemplated a similar role for the federal government—and the military—following 
Hurricane Katrina.  The storm hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005 and precipitated the 
destruction of the levees surrounding New Orleans.  The 2007 Defense Authorization Act 
subsequently addressed the role of the military in the event of natural disaster, pandemic, or 
biological weapons attack (again, coupling pandemic disease and the biological weapons threat).538 
One of the chief criticisms levied against the federal government was that they had dragged their 
feet in mounting an appropriate response:  thirty-six hours after the hurricane hit, Michael Chertoff, 
Homeland Security Director, finally issued a memo declaring it an “incident of national 
significance”, shifting the responsibility to FEMA.539  President Bush wanted to federalize the 
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Louisiana National Guard, but Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco refused.  The President 
considered and rejected a proposal to federalize the Guard over her objection.540 
To clarify federal authority in the future, in 2006 the Administration convinced Congress to 
amend the Insurrection Act for the first time in more than 200 years, re-naming it “Enforcement of 
the Laws to Restore Public Order.”541  The new language expanded the statute, almost exclusively 
used in the past to restore civil order, to cover instances of “domestic violence” where public order 
was disrupted due to a “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, 
terrorist attack or incident, or other condition.”542  The statute authorized the President to use 
federal troops to “restore public order and enforce the laws of the United State” without a request 
from the governor or legislature of the state involved, in the event s/he determines that local 
authorities are unable to maintain public order where either equal protection of the laws is impeded 
or the execution of federal law and related judicial process is obstructed.  The legislation required 
that the President notify Congress as soon as practicable, and every fourteen days thereafter, until 
ordinary law enforcement was restored.  Congress passed the bill over the strong objection of all 
fifty-one governors.543   
The governors objected to giving the President the authority to impose martial law in the event 
of a public health crisis or biological weapons attack, without any contact or collaboration with the 
states.544  In one fell swoop, the legislation overturned more than two centuries of practice.  The 
locus of the new powers were both legislative and executive war powers—not commerce clause 
considerations.  The way in which the provisions had been introduced proved particularly 
concerning.  The New York Times pointed out that the new powers had been “quietly tucked into 
the enormous defense budget bill without hearings or public debate.  The president,” moreover, 
“made no mention of the changes when he signed the measure, and neither the White House nor 
Congress consulted in advance with the nation’s governors.”545   
The following year Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Christopher Bond (R-MO) introduced a 
bill to repeal the changes to the Insurrection Act, returning it to its original form.546  An impressive 
list of state interests lined up in support:  the National Governors Association, National Sheriffs’ 
Association, Enlisted Association of the National Guard, Adjutants General of the United States, 
National Guard Association, national Lieutenant Governors Association, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, and Fraternal Order of Police all sought a return to the Insurrection Act.547  
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544 Letter from Co-leads on the national guard, Governors Michael F. Easley and Mark Sanford, to the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. 
Senate and the Hon. Christopher “Kit” Bond, U.S. Senate (Feb. 5, 2007). 
545 Editorial, Making Martial Law Easier, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007. 
546 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on Legislation to Repeal Changes to the Insurrection Act, Feb. 7, 2007, available at 
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Leahy and Bond attached their rider to the National Guard Empowerment Reform Bill, passed by 
Congress Dec. 14, 2007 and signed into law by President Bush Jan. 30, 2008.548 
Despite the restoration of the Insurrection Act language, use of the military—Title 32 troops 
and Title 10 forces—to respond to public health crises has Congressional and academic support.549  
Even without the statute, the deployment of military in Katrina was largest military deployment in 
domestic bounds since Civil War.550  And the policy documents currently in place support the use 
of the military to enforce quarantine.551  Such use of the military feeds into the broader issue of the 
role of the military on domestic soil—an area that has attracted increasing attention post-9/11.552 
There are practical reasons for the current state of play.  At the most basic level, the link 
between biological weapons and pandemic disease makes sense:  it may be very difficult to 
determine, at the outset, whether emerging disease is natural, biologically engineered, or the result 
of deliberate attack.  Regardless of origin, natural or engineered diseases may have equally 
devastating consequences and require similar response mechanisms to limit their spread.  
Mitigation measures may equally be required – and effective. Isolation and quarantine, in turn, may 
be the only defense the government has against either emerging disease or engineered weapons.  
As for the use of the military, biological weapons research has historically been in the purview of 
the armed forces, making it perhaps the most prepared and effective entity in responding to such 
attacks.  It may also be the only agency with the necessary technologies, resources and manpower 
to be able to respond in the event of an emergency, regardless of whether it results from an attack 
or from natural causes.   
But practical explanations aside, these provisions raise troubling questions relating to state 
police powers, federalism, individual rights, and the use of the military on domestic soil.553  They 
also run directly counter to the experiences of the United Kingdom where quarantine authorities 
initially were exercised by the king, using the military.  As the Constitutional structure changed, 
however, first the Privy Council and then Parliament gained control, at which point commercial 
interests lobbied national quarantine law out of existence, pushing it down to a state and local level. 
 
III. THE DEVOLUTION OF QUARANTINE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
British history is punctuated by devastating bouts with disease, the most feared of which were 
referred to as the “three exotics”:  plague, yellow fever, and cholera.  Of these, plague, caused by 
bacillus Pasteurella pestis or Yersinia pestis, is the oldest.554  It also was the most influential in 
shaping Britain’s approach to disease.  Records show that as early as 1349 plague hit England, 
killing approximately one-third of the country’s population.555  Over the next 400 years epidemics 
swept through Europe, with profound political, social, and economic effects.556 
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33095, HURRICANE KATRINA:  DOD DISASTER RESPONSE, Sept. 19, 2005; Sciarrino, Part III, supra note 49, at 426. 
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551 See, e.g., Influenza Implementation Plan, supra note 11, at 12. 
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554 Yellow fever only appeared in late 18th century Europe, cholera some four decades later.  PORTER, supra note 47,   
555 DEREK FRASER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH WELFARE STATE:  A HISTORY OF SOCIAL POLICY SINCE THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 33 (3d ed., 2003); and PORTER, supra note 46, at 40. 
556 See, e.g., JOHN F. D. SHREWSBURY, A HISTORY OF BUBONIC PLAGUE IN THE BRITISH ISLES, (1971); Alan D. Dyer, The Influence of 
Bubonic Plague in England 1500-1667, MEDICAL HISTORY (1978), 308-326; PORTER, supra note 46. 
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  The nature of this threat shaped English quarantine law in three important ways.  First, plague 
was seen as an import, not bred in Britain or, for that matter, on the Continent.557  Resultantly, 
maritime provisions, and authorities focused on the ports and borders, provided the country’s 
primary defense.558  England placed considerably less emphasis on domestic measures until yellow 
fever and cholera appeared.  Second, concern about outbreaks abroad encouraged the government 
to make extensive use of its international network to obtain advance notice of inbound disease.  
The empire thus established global disease monitoring significantly prior to the United States. 
Third, and most importantly, although it was not known at time that fleas carried plague, observers 
noted that the disease tended to be transferred via porous goods.  Orders thus tended to target wool, 
silk, cotton, and animal hides, subjecting them to weeks of repeated submersion in ocean water 
followed by airing.  The shipping industry bore the expense.  Individuals, moreover, could come 
into contact with others suffering from plague and not contract the disease. The contagion theory of 
transfer thus stood in great doubt—creating an opportunity for reformers to replace quarantine with 
an improved sanitation regime.  A very different situation thus confronted England than that faced 
on the American side of the Atlantic. 
 
A.  Early English Provisions 
English trade with the Mediterranean ports heralded an increased risk for disease.  In 1511 England 
began trading in the Levant seas.559   Within seven years, the first recorded quarantine orders issued 
under Henry VIII—or, more accurately, Thomas Wolsey, the Lord Chancellor of England, in 
whose hands the king, at least initially, left matters of state.560  
 In keeping with the order, local authorities toed the line.  Sir Thomas More, for instance, 
instituted the king’s orders in Oxford, insisting on street cleaning and forbidding others from using 
the clothes and bedding from infected houses.  More tried to prevent the transfer of disease by 
isolating the sick and marking those who were infected.  Other towns followed suit.  In provincial 
districts, plague houses were established outside town walls or victims were segregated in pest-
houses.  By 1550, such practices had become widespread.561 
 In 1576, another plague outbreak took place.  Eighteenth century historian George Hadley 
attributed the spread of the disease to the authorities’ failure to enforce quarantine laws, suggesting 
that such laws, at least, were in place.562  Much attention was drawn to the ports.  In 1580 the Lord 
Treasurer ordered the Port of London to prevent Portuguese ships from Lisbon, where there was a 
plague outbreak, from coming up river until they had been properly aired.563  The Privy Council 
requested that the Lord Mayor of London help the port authority to prevent similarly diseased ships 
from proceeding into the country.564  More orders almost immediately followed.565  
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 Such orders must be assessed within their political and constitutional framework.  The Privy 
Council played a central role in governing the Tudor state.  Henry VII, who came to the throne 
when Richard III was slain during the Battle of Bosworth, established the Committee of the Privy 
Council as an executive advisory board, and the Star Chamber as a means to involve the Crown 
more deeply in judicial affairs.566  Parliament may have been the supreme authority, “[b]ut 
Parliaments came and went.”567  The Privy Council managed the legislature by influencing 
elections and directing parliamentary business.   
 The Privy Council had direct control over areas central to quarantine.  Matters related to 
foreign relations, defense, and public safety, were reserved to the Council—as were concerns that 
impacted the state’s coffers.568  For “[t]he essential prerequisite for the effective exercise of royal 
authority was the improvement of the Crown’s position.”569  The crown’s financial strength was 
determined by land, feudal dues, and, most importantly, customs, making the Council’s control 
over external trade unquestioned.  Monopolies and charters thus came within the Privy Council’s 
control.  It gradually annexed even internal trade from local merchant courts—leading to friction 
with Parliament and common law.570  Added to this, were the Tudors’ interest in maritime affairs 
and the declining importance in the 15th century of the Court of Admiralty, which led to the transfer 
of maritime matters to the Council.   
 It was unquestioned that the Privy Council would issue quarantine regulations.  Henry VIII, 
and later, Elizabeth I, were particularly sensitive to England’s position vis-à-vis Europe, where 
quarantine was linked to social and political sophistication.571  To take their place among civilized 
nations meant, in part, to have quarantine laws.  Elizabeth I thus ordered her chief minister, 
William Cecil, to adopt European plague controls and, via the Privy Council, to issue a new set of 
orders.572  She similarly directed that the Privy Council issue the first order to compel sick persons 
to be confined.573 
 Proclamations, designed to communicate the monarch’s commands, provided the main device 
via which the Privy Council exercised their authority.  Issued under the Great Seal, such 
proclamations could be used to address deficiencies in common law and statutory law, which were 
neither sufficiently strong nor swift enough to address emerging issues faced by the state.  The 
Privy Council thus supplemented the existing statutory and common law, “using for the purpose a 
prerogative which none denied or was concerned to seek limits for.”574  Such proclamations had the 
full force of law, and, while they could not contradict an Act of Parliament, the lex regia of 
England rapidly expanded and had to be obeyed.575  To the Council thus fell the responsibility of 
acting swiftly and directly in the public interest. 
 During the Tudor reign, only the Privy Council issued quarantine provisions.  The 
proclamations tended to be inconsistent, in no small measures due to the competing interests 
pulling the council in different directions.  Such orders reflected the tension between maritime law, 
war powers/national security, domestic police powers, and commercial/economic matters.  And 
these orders had profound implications for distribution of power within the state, as the Privy 

566 See A.F. Pollard, Council, Star Chamber and Privy Council under the Tudors. II.  The Star Chamber, 37 ENGLISH HISTORICAL 
REVIEW (1922), at 530; and CORA L. SCOFIELD, THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER, 27 (1900). 
567 SIR DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485 113 (9th ed., 1969). 
568 See HOLDSWORTH, IV., 70-105 for examples of work done by the Privy Council. 
569 KEIR, supra note 567, at 10.  
570 HOLDSWORTH, I, supra note 568, at 141. 
571 PORTER, supra note 46, at 41. 
572 The orders issued in 1578 and remained in place until the mid-17th century. Id. 
573 RUSSELL, supra note 557, at 478.  The order issued in 1592.  Id. See also MACLEAN, supra note 559, at 434. 
574 KEIR, supra note 567, at 115. 
575 In face of the rapid expansion of Royal Proclamation under Henry VIII, the 1539 Statute of Proclamations sought to clarify the 
relationship between the King’s Orders and statutory provisions.  See E.R. Adair, The Statute of Proclamations, 32 ENGLISH HISTORY 
REVIEW 34; and Elton, The Statute of Proclamations. 75 ENGLISH HISTORY REVIEW 208. 
 54
Council’s jurisdiction gradually expanded to include maritime matters, as well as all internal and 
external trade.576   
 The evolution of quarantine measures marks the shift from medieval to modern England.  The 
use of Royal Prerogative generally—and quarantine in particular—did not just reflect England’s 
constitutional structure. It shaped the constitutional conventions.  The proclamations undermined 
the role of Parliament.  They undermined the role of the courts.  And they undermined local 
administration—which, during the time of Tudor England, was really a function of its judicial 
organization.  The Privy Council relegated many local bodies “almost entirely to the conduct of 
administrative business.” 577  Simultaneously, the Privy Council helped to centralize power.  While 
the monarch’s authority was at its height when measures proceeded through Parliament, frequently, 
in case of quarantine, the Council did not deem it necessary.  As the Council persisted in exercising 
its authority outside of Parliament, it became stronger, and Parliament was gradually, sidelined.578  
In this manner, liberty of action for the public good became preserved outside of common law or 
the Parliament via Royal Prerogative—implemented through the Privy Council.579  
 Under the Stuarts, the conventions changed.  During the final years of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, 
her Royal Prerogatives regarding monopolies were increasingly called into question.580  James I, 
having ruled the northern kingdom almost since birth, came to the Crown with a fully-developed 
theory of kingship—a form of enlightened absolutism.581  Under his control, quarantine provisions 
became more coercive, codified in statute.   
 In 1603 a major plague outbreak occurred in England.582  Seen as a threat to social stability, the 
disease caused panic and hunger and mass disruption of local communities.583  James I immediately 
issued a detailed Order in Council to combat the spread of infection.584  It was clear that, even then, 
the contagion theory of disease with respect to plague was being questioned:  Article 16 strictly 
prohibited “all ecclesiastics, and others, from publishing an opinion that the plague was not 
infectious, or that it was a vain thing not to resort to the infected.”585  In concert with the order, the 
Privy Council directed that quarantine provisions established by London’s Lord Mayor be 
published.586   
 James I did not stop with the Order in Council.  In 1604 he followed it with a new statute, 
which marked the first time that royal regulations on quarantine had been supported by an express 
legislative instrument.587  The bill passed, following opposition and amendments in the House of 
Lords to exempt Universities from being subject to its provisions. The legislation empowered the 
head officer of every town within England to confine individuals with plague to their homes and to 
set a watchman to guard the ill.588  It indemnified the watchmen should any harm come to the 
plague victim if he or she tried to escape.589  And it made it a felony to be found overseas with an 
infectious (meaning contagious) sore—although it was not clear what proof was required or who 
would judge it to be so.590  The Act required the Justices of the Peace to meet every three weeks 
during an epidemic to report on the progress of the disease, and it allowed local authorities to raise 
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taxes to take care of the sick.591  All clothes and bedding of the plague victims was to be burned, 
and funerals were to take place at dusk (to reduce the number in attendance).592  Any criticism of 
orders issued, isolating individuals, was to be punished.593   
 The Act was initially limited to the first session of the following Parliament; however, it was 
subsequently continued and, during Charles I’s reign made permanent “from thenceforth until some 
other act of parliament be made touching its continuance or discontinuance.”594  Far from stemming 
the advance of disease or quieting the unrest that had swept the country, these provisions 
stimulated violent opposition and contributed to increasing disorder.595 
 
B.  The Politicization of Quarantine 
When James I’s son, Henry, died, Charles I became successor to the throne.  He was an ardent 
believer in the divine right of kingship.596  Charles responded to mounting opposition by acting 
outside the common law and Parliament, and by making more extensive use of Royal Prerogative.  
Opponents emphasized that the crown’s authority derived from Parliamentary sanction.  The 
subtleties of the Tudor era lost, and “[u]nable to agree amicably as to the working of their 
government, men began to debate its very foundations.”597 
 Quarantine provisions during this time became less formalized.  At times the Privy Council did 
not even issue an order or proclamation; instead, it would simply write a letter directly to the 
farmers of the customs, directing them not to land goods, allow people to come ashore, or permit 
vessels to land.598  At other times, formal orders in accordance with the Royal Prerogative issued.  
It was through such a device that in 1635 the Crown established the first stated period of 
quarantine.599  Plague had broken out at The Hague, Amsterdam, and Leyden, prompting the 
Council to issue a proclamation regarding vessels from France and Holland, arriving from infected 
ports.600  For twenty days, they were to remain isolated.601 
 At the time, eighty percent of all of England’s foreign trade traveled through London.602  
England, moreover, was a key economic player worldwide.  This meant that what England did with 
its trade restrictions mattered.  Equally important was what other ports did to England.  
Accordingly, Charles II quickly realized that quarantine could undermine free trade—and be used 
as a devastating political weapon.  The Spanish, for instance, 1662-63, claimed that plague had 
emerged at Tangier, where English ships were trading.  Spain subsequently refused to allow 
English ships to land in Spain.  Afraid that similar steps would be taken in other, more important 
ports—like Leghorn and Genoa, England had to work vigorously through its Venetian ambassador 
to counter the rumors. 603  Money exchanged hands.604 
 The Dutch, in turn, considered English quarantine provisions to be an over-reaction—just 
another English ploy against the Dutch, with whom England did not have great relations.  It is hard 
to deny their allegations.  On March 30, 1664, for instance, the States General sent a resolution to 
Charles asking for repeal of quarantine.  The English ended up increasing length of detention from 
30 to 40 days.605  The Dutch ambassador protested that the ships were being stopped “under 
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pretence” of infection, but actually to obstruct trade:  “He insisted that the strictness be relaxed.  
Charles replied expressing sorrow for the affliction, but pointed out that England had been the last 
neighbor of the United Provinces to make restrictions, and commerce would now have to be 
suspended altogether.”606   Diplomatic tension, not medical necessity, drove the decision. 
 In 1665 another devastating plague epidemic, famously described in the Diary of Samuel 
Pepys, again hit England.607  In London alone, more than 70,000 people died—while all other 
diseases combined claimed fewer than 40,000 lives.608  The toll eclipsed earlier outbreaks of 
plague, with more than twice the number succumbing than died during the 1625 epidemic.609  The 
House of Commons appointed a committee to prepare new legislation to close gaps left by the Act 
of 1604.  The effort failed:  although the bill passed the House of Commons, the House of Lords 
inserted amendments to protect their special interests. (The Lords wanted to prevent pest houses 
and burying grounds from being stationed near their homes, and they sought a special exemption to 
prevent peers’ homes from being shut up at the discretion of constables.)  The Commons refused to 
agree to the changes and, following several conferences between the two houses, the end of the 
session terminated further consideration of the bill.  In its place, the internal regulations from the 
1604 statute remained in force.  It was later proposed that the wealthy who took ill should simply 
retreat to their country homes.610  
 Playing on the political power of quarantine, a proposal to create a permanent quarantine 
office, from March 1665, began circulating.  Arguments supporting it echoed one of the chief 
concerns of the Tudors:  to adopt procedures that existed in “most other well governed Kingdomes 
and Republicks professing Christianity.”611  But the proposal was ultimately about power and 
control.  Of chief concern was not the medical benefit of such provisions, but the contingent (read: 
political and economic) advantages.  Good relations between a quarantine office and the farmers of 
Customs would help to ensure that duties were paid.  Importers would no longer win simply by 
being first to arrive; instead, by making it known which ships and cargoes were in detention, the 
Crown could control both importers and prices.  The measures also would allow the Crown to more 
closely monitor individuals arriving in England, giving the state the ability to distinguish more 
readily between spies and regular travelers.612 
 Continental Europe, too, began wielding quarantine as a weapon.  The Spanish stopped all 
trade with England, Scotland, and Ireland.613  France prohibited all commerce with England.  
Britain retaliated in 1668, quarantining ships from parts of France with Plague.  As historian John 
Booker observes, “the hard lesson was being taught, if not learnt, that in a state of war disease 
found various ways to side with the enemy.”614 
 The manner in which the Crown exercised quarantine reflected and contributed to serious 
constitutional questions:  Did the law limit the monarch’s discretionary power?  Could the Crown’s 
authority be abridged by statute?  Could the King sidestep the Common Law courts on matters 
relating to Royal Prerogative?  What were the limits of the crown’s prerogative in regard to foreign 
policy, maritime law, and both internal and external trade?615  Sir Edward Coke came to see some 
of the most prominent cases of the time as seeking an answer to these crucial questions.616  The 
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English Restoration, starting in 1660, fell back upon the compromise that marked the Tudor 
regime:  “A Crown reinvested at least in its essential prerogatives, a Parliament confirmed in its 
sovereignty and its privileges, once more appeared as the indelible marks of the English 
governmental system.  But the conciliar authority which had so long held the central position in the 
State had been irreparably destroyed.”617  English Constitutional historians generally describe this 
period a battle between Parliament and the courts of Common Law.  But equally repugnant to both 
was the discretionary authority of the Crown—perhaps nowhere more apparent than in quarantine. 
 
C.  Constitutional Limits 
The abolition of the conciliar courts confined the power of legislating by Proclamation within the 
limits imposed by the Case of Proclamations:  “[T]he King cannot change any part of the common 
law, nor create any offence, by his proclamation, which was not an offence before, without 
parliament.”618  Sir Edward Coke, then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas explained, “the King 
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.”619  Constitutional scholars 
reflecting on this period conclude that “English constitutional law was therefore bound, sooner or 
later, to assume a bias, appropriate to the Common Law tradition, in favour of individual rights and 
property, and on the whole adverse to the claims of the State to a freedom of action determined by 
considerations of public policy.”620  Indeed, the Bill of Rights of 1689 required that in certain 
matters the Crown obtain the consent of the governed through Parliament.621  The Triennial Act of 
1694 secured a more active role for the legislature, requiring it to meet annually and hold elections 
once every three years.622  And the Act of Settlement of 1701 established Parliamentary authority 
over succession to the throne itself.623  
 Quarantine authorities sat uneasily in this context, and from 1642 forward, the Privy Council’s 
unfettered discretion in this realm became more limited.  The Privy Council continued to be 
involved in the intimate details of quarantine, but it turned to statutory validation.   
 In 1709, for example, plague erupted in the Baltic region.  The disease quickly reached Danzig 
(East Prussia), a town with which England had frequent commercial exchange.  By the end of 1710 
the epidemic extended to Stralsund, with reports that it had broken out on the German North Sea 
cost, near Hamburg.624  The Privy Council responded with a series of orders.  In August 1709, the 
council an order preventing any goods, seamen or passengers from Danzig being landed in London 
or in English outports “until they be under the Care of the Officers of the customs who are to take 
Care…according to the Intention of this Order.”625  The following month, the Privy Council issued 
a second order saying that landing could only occur at places “provided for airing the…Persons and 
goods for 40 Days appointed for performing their Quarantain”.626  Nine days later, the council 
issued a third order—designating infected area as the “Baltick Seas”.627  A fourth order followed on 
September 16, 1709, specifying where ships were to be held, stating that after 40 days, if no disease 
had presented itself, passengers could alight at the Customs officers’ discretion, and, after a week, 
the goods could be released.628  Suspicious articles had to be reported to the Privy Council to await 
further instruction.629  The same day, a fifth order issued.   
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 It soon became clear that quarantine was not being performed correctly:  those who had been 
quarantined were ignoring the orders, and local villages and authorities were refusing to allow the 
establishment of quarantine stations near their homes and businesses.630  The Privy Council 
responded by issuing a proclamation in November 1709, threatening that failure to conform to 
orders would be treated with utmost severity of the law.  It lamented that some of those detained, 
“have Presumed to come on Shoar, and have Appeared in the Publick Streets, and Mingled 
Themselves with Our Subjects”—others had been selling the goods that ought to have been aired.  
The order threatened that those refusing to conform would do so “upon Pain of being Proceeded 
against wth the utmost Severity that the Law will Allow…”   
 The difficulty with the Privy Council’s threat is that it had no teeth:  the law did not carry 
severe penalties.  Indeed, there was no statute at the time that would have made it an offense to 
break Privy Council orders regarding quarantine.  The council was thus driven to seek 
parliamentary support.  The importance of Parliament as a check at the time ought not to be over-
emphasized:  the bill’s passage took but three days, from its introduction in the House of Commons 
to Royal Assent.631  In light of the Whig and Tory battles that marked political discourse, though, 
and the statute’s provisions—which essentially acknowledged Royal Prerogative—the result was 
remarkably swift:  quarantine would be “in such…places for such time and in such manner as hath 
been or as shall be from time to time be directed…by Her Majesty or her successors.”632  It speaks, 
perhaps to the great fear of disease and the newness of limits on royal prerogative.633   
 The resulting legislation became Britain’s central quarantine statute.  It did not address matters 
internal to the country, instead expressly relating to cases of foreign infection.634  Writing at the end 
of the 18th century, Russell suggested that statute strengthened Privy Council’s hand: 
Considering the circumstances under which the bill was drawn up, it is the less to be wondered that it should 
have been very defective; but by expressly empowering the Crown, in case of any foreign places being 
infected, to issue such orders for quarantine as might appear necessary, it, at least, conferred a sanction in 
future on the Royal Proclamations, relating to quarantine, which they had not before; and rendered the breach 
of orders more immediately an object of legal punishment.635 
Indeed, there were advantages to be gained by leaving the operation of quarantine in the hands of 
the Privy Council.  Disease might require a swift and efficient response—one more likely to be 
gained through the council than through a parliamentary body.  The sanctions created in the statute 
also increased the likelihood that people would comply with the council’s directives. 
But while the legislation, in some ways, placed the Privy Council in a stronger position, its 
existence underscored growing parliamentary power in the constitutional evolution of the British 
state.  It suggested that the Privy Council could not act without legislative sanction.  Parliament 
held the purse strings.  And punishment could not be taken too far:  doing so would risk courts 
refusing to enforce the measures.  The Attorney-General, for instance, wanted to make breaking 
quarantine a capital crime, for which the death penalty would be imposed.  (Mediterranean ports at 
the time had adopted this approach.)  The Privy Council strongly objected on the grounds that with 
such severe penalties, no one would be prosecuted for the offence.  Parliament instead prescribed 
imprisonment and a fine for any violation.636  Captains allowing passengers to come ashore would 
forfeit the vessel.637  Customs officers fell subject to a fine of £100, with half the amount allocated 
to informers.638  Anyone visiting the vessel during quarantine would be required to remain for the 
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balance of the time allotted.639  The legislation also required a 24-hour watch system to be 
established by the local magistrates, with the airing of goods to be governed by proclamation.640 
 
D.  Commercial Interests Take Hold 
Ironically, in strengthening the impact of quarantine orders, the Queen Ann Act heralded an end to 
the quarantine regime.  The provisions, and their enforcement, earned the enmity of Britain’s 
commercial interests as well as its trading neighbors abroad, helping to generate momentum to 
dispense with such provisions.  Glimmers of this began to emerge soon after the passage of the 
statute.   
In the Baltic crisis, for instance, merchant adventurers trading with Hamburg began lobbying 
the Privy Council to repeal a new proclamation that extended quarantine measures to Hamburg.641  
Soon thereafter, the Eastland Company, trading with Danzig, began lobbying the Privy Council 
(with the help of some Members of Parliament) to repeal the order.  Although plague had 
disappeared, the Privy Council issued a new order in August 1713.  Finally, in April 1714, after 
diplomatic representations to the Queen, and further lobbying, the Privy Council lifted the 
restrictions.642 
Part of the problem was that the Privy Council was out of its depth:  it was not a scientific 
body.  From 1720 to 1723, the Marseilles Plague, for example, proved devastating.  Almost half the 
population of Marseilles died from it.643  What made this extraordinary was that Marseilles’ 
measures were considered amongst the most sophisticated in all of Europe.  But French efforts to 
establish a cordon sanitaire failed.  Disquiet spread.  The Privy Council, slow to respond, then 
issued frenzy of orders and proclamations, followed by three new statutes. 
News of the epidemic hit London on August 10, 1720.  King George I, who was in Hanover at 
the time, directed customs to give “proper directions” to the outports to stop any Mediterranean 
ships from putting ashore.644  This bought time to draft a proclamation.645  With French provisions 
having failed to stem the tide of the disease, the Privy Council sought professional advice.  The 
council consulted with Dr. Richard Mead, a prominent physician.646  The Lords Justice requested 
that he publish his thoughts on the history of the plague and make recommendations for the best 
means of preventing its introduction into England.   
Mead’s writings became a mainstay in the British quarantine system.  He posited that porous 
and fibrous materials were more likely to carry plague and argued that it could be transmitted 
between humans through the air.647  For ships carrying the more virulent form of plague, Mead 
recommended burning everything on board, as well as the ship.648  Smuggling presented a 
particular concern.649  Once an outbreak occurred, treatment should emphasize “compassionate 
care”, not discipline and punishment.650  The worst course of action, Mead suggested, would be to 
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shut up houses, thus creating “seminaries of contagion.”651  Cordon sanitaire, on the other hand, 
would be acceptable—but not to prevent all people from leaving a city, as it had been exercised in 
France.  Mead saw this as “an unnecessary Severity, not to call it a Cruelty.”652  Instead, after 
twenty days’ quarantine, citizens should be allowed to leave.653  
Within a year, seven editions of Mead’s Discourse had been published.  The eighth, with 
further additions, came out the following year.654  This work proved highly influential.  The 
advantage of publishing it in conjunction with the Privy Council orders was that it added medical 
weight to their decisions.  The drawback of basing the quarantine system on it, however, was that 
other medical personnel might disagree with Mead.  Indeed, the treatise opened an intense and 
contentious public debate on contagion that continued for more than a century.  George Pye, for 
instance, almost immediately responded with his own discourse, announcing that quarantines were 
useless, that they gave smugglers an incentive, and that they imposed “a very great Injury to a 
trading Nation”.655  Their social impact could hardly be ignored, he noted, for they “propagate and 
keep up Fears and Frights amongst the People.”656  Patrick Russell, a prominent 18th century 
physician and naturalist, and Gavin Milroy, a well-known, early 19th century physician and 
epidemiologist, also were sharply critical of Mead.657  Thomas Hancock pointed out Mead’s many 
contradictions.658  Others attacked Mead’s insistence that air, and not contact alone, spread plague, 
as well as the role of cotton in carrying the disease—which raised question as to why there had not 
been outbreaks of plague previously, with significant amount of cotton coming to England from the 
Levant.659 
As for the immediate concern, the Marseilles’ plague, consistent with Mead’s analysis, the 
Privy Council resurrected the orders issued during the Baltic Crisis and expanded the goods for 
which special permission would have to be sought for importation.660  Sufficiently concerned about 
the threat posed by this particularly virulent epidemic, the Privy Council issued documents 
inveighing that its orders be taken seriously.661  The Council quarantined all ships arriving from the 
Mediterranean, the Levant, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, announcing that anyone 
assisting smugglers would incur the King’s “Highest Displeasure” and severe penalties.662 
The incident brought to the surface a gap in the Privy Council’s authority.  The Queen Anne 
Act only related to infection coming from abroad—not disease on domestic soil.  The Privy 
Council, however, also wanted to stop plague from spreading once it reached Great Britain.  This 
gap forced the Privy Council back to Parliament.663   
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In December 1720, the Attorney General and the Solicitor-General jointly introduced a new 
bill, which temporarily replaced the Queen Anne Act as the main quarantine statute.664  The 
legislation extended quarantine authorities to domestic infection, giving the Crown the power to 
remove people from their homes and to draw lines around infected areas.665  Neighboring parishes 
became equally responsible for patrolling the lines.666  Violence could be used to recover 
individuals breaking quarantine, with penalties for violation to include death without clergy 
present.667  
The merchants, strongly opposed to the bill, lobbied hard against it.  The Levant Company 
submitted a petition “To the honorable the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled”, 
drawing attention to the adverse impact quarantine would have on domestic trade.668  Quarantine 
applied to all ships from Turkey, regardless of whether the port from which they departed was 
infected.669  The petition suggested that where HM ambassador at Constantinople gave the ship a 
clean bill of health, the vessel should not be placed in quarantine—particularly where journey took 
a minimum of three months, often even more than that, and sickness had not broken out on 
board.670  It further pointed out that the law affected goods of interest to Parliamentarians.671  The 
Crown largely ignored the representations as biased:  the company was too interested a party in the 
outcome. 
The Levant Company, though, was not the only opposition.  The city of London also petitioned 
against the bill.672  The impact on individual rights and the economic costs drew particular 
concern.673  The House of Lords, however, rejected the city’s petition by a vote of 63 to 22, leading 
to a fight in Parliament.674  That it was a city of London’s stature, whose petition was being 
rejected, particularly rankled.675  The rights involved were of great consequence.  Such flippant 
dismissal of petitions, moreover, might discourage future representations to Parliament, with long-
term implications for the rights of British subjects.676  And cordons sanitaire were simply 
impractical:  they would take too many soldiers to enforce, particularly around London and 
Westminster.677   
The Lords subsequently introduced a bill to repeal the clauses in the Quarantine Act that 
empowered the Crown to impose cordon sanitaire and to remove individuals from their homes.678  
Of particular concern was the role the military, not civil magistrates, were to play: 
Because such Powers as these are utterly unknown to our Constitution, and repugnant, we conceive, to the Lenity of our 
mild and free Government, a tender Regard to which was shewn by the Act Jac. I which took care only to confine infected 
Persons within their own Houses, and to support them under that Confinement, and lodg’d the Execution of such Powers 
solely in the Civil Magistrate; whereas the Powers by us excepted against, as they are of a more extraordinary Kind, so 
they will probably (and some of them must necessarily) be executed by Military Force: And the violent and inhuman 
Methods which on these Occasions may, as we apprehend, be practiced, will, we fear, rather draw down the Infliction of a 
new Judgment from Heaven, than contribute anyways to remove that, which shall then have befallen us.679 
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Worse yet, such methods were being copied from France, “a Kingdom whose Pattern, in such 
Cases, Great Britain should not follow; the Government there, being conducted by Arbitrary 
Power and supported by Standing Armies.”680  Even in France, the measures had been “as 
unsuccessful as they were unprecedented.”681  Removing such authorities would not leave the 
Crown without any options; other authorities existed.  The offending clauses, however, would do 
untold mischief, not least in keeping “the Minds of the People perpetually alarm’d with those 
Apprehensions under which they now labour.”682 
The Lords ultimately resolved the question in the negative, 39 to 20, leaving the interim 
measure intact.683  Within a month, a similar motion was introduced into the House of Commons, 
which divided 115 to 95, in favor of giving leave to allow a bill to be brought forward to repeal 
portions of the previous act.684  The bill passed in January, receiving Royal Assent on February 12, 
1721.685  It recognized that “the execution of the powers and authorities mentioned in the said 
recited clauses” had been found “very grievous to the subjects of this kingdom.”686  Concern about 
implications of the law for the rights of British subjects endured.  A century later, anti-contagionist 
crusader Dr. Charles MacLean opined, 
The arbitrary power of shutting sick people up in their houses, given by the act of James I., and that of 
removing them by compulsion from their habitations, conferred by the 7th of Geo. I., were equally a violation 
of the principles of public liberty, and of the British constitution, which would have been unjustifiable if 
contagion had been proved to exist, and these measures had been proved to be a remedy.  Such a despotism 
no circumstances could justify.  But, to enact laws so arbitrary, without previous proof of the existence of the 
alleged evil, or of the efficiency of the proposed remedy, must be admitted to be the most extraordinary 
legislation.687 
In his Discourse on the Plague, Richard Mead emphasized not just human-to-human 
transmission of the plague, but its transfer via goods.  The Crown consequently sought greater 
authority in the commercial realm.  A statute passed on the same day of the repeal of §§2 and 4 of 
the quarantine act gave the King the authority, for one year, to prohibit commerce with any country 
infected with plague.688  Its purpose was to allow the country to respond quickly to any resurgence 
of plague in France.  The legislation was extreme and attracted strong opposition from shipping 
interests.  It essentially gave the Crown, through the Privy Council, an almost unlimited power over 
trade.689  In return, Parliament limited the provision to one year and attached a rider, which shaved 
a year off of the general quarantine law that had been passed in 1721, ensuring that the authorities 
would cease as of March 1723—a full year before originally decreed.690 
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Mead’s emphasis on smuggling also took statutory form.  After the House of Lords rejected a 
similar bill, the Crown managed to push temporary provisions through the House.691  The new 
statute, in addition to increasing the penalties associated with smuggling, increased tonnage duties, 
expanded penalties to including burning the ship or selling the products on board, and prevented 
the importation of alcohol.692  Its effect was to strengthen the Privy Council’s hand with respect to 
Parliamentary sanction. 
While this legislation was evolving, the Privy Council took steps to use the powers at their 
disposal.  The council gave warships to Customs officers to command and stationed guards along 
the coastlines.693  When the council ordered two ships from Cyprus to be burned, the matter—
which quickly evolved into a major diplomatic row and threatened trade with the Levant—reached 
Parliament.   
The Levant Company increased their pressure on the political representatives.  Commercial 
entities frequently had to petition to get their wares out of quarantine.  The administrative burden 
on them was not insignificant:  the Privy Council required bills of lading, bills of health letters of 
advice, invoices, and business correspondence; where such documents could not readily be 
produced, the goods would be send to the airing houses where damp conditions often ruined the 
cargo.694  Under such pressure, there was little impetus to continue to support the more stringent 
provisions.  All three of the statutes introduced in response to the Marseilles plague were 
temporary.  Upon their expiration, Queen Anne’s act came back into force.695   
 
E.  The Beginning of the End 
Within a few years, the Privy Council again faced the threat of plague.  Accordingly, in May 1728 
the Privy Council issued an order, requiring 40 days’ quarantine of all ships from the Ionian Islands 
and Morea, and within five days, a new bill was before Parliament.696  The legislation revived 
many of the same clauses from the Marseilles statutes, with a few alterations:  the power of 
prohibiting commerce for one year was included directly in the statute, as was the authority of the 
Crown to prohibit British subjects from trade with specific countries or regions.697  Violations 
would be considered a felony, with ships and goods forfeit and importers fined thrice the value of 
the ship or goods received.698  Although intended to be temporary, an ongoing threat of plague 
forced their renewal in 1733.699 
The hold of the merchants over Parliament was growing.  This statute was the last act to insist 
that goods be opened and aired for a period of quarantine; it also omitted any mention of 
enumerated goods.700  Nevertheless, Privy Council Proclamations and Orders in July of that year 
listed quarantinable items.701  It is not clear whether these orders were ultra vires the governing 
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legislation, or whether Parliament was simply trying to dodge political bullets—i.e., leaving it to 
the council to make unpopular commercial decisions.  Merchants were particularly unhappy about 
the Privy Council’s orders.  Petitions for relief to minimize the length of quarantine and airing of 
cargo followed.  There was particular concern that British trade was being crippled, leaving its 
rivals free to profit.  The Levant Company thus petitioned for an end to quarantine for ships with 
clean bills of health, so that trade “may be upon as easy terms as that of our Neighbours”—i.e., the 
Dutch.702  Despite deep suspicion of the accuracy of such bills of health, the Privy Council caved, 
issuing an order in February 1730, allowing all ships with clean bills to be released from 
quarantine.703 
As for the statutory authorities, the renewal act of 1733 was the last time that Parliament gave 
the monarch the authority to prohibit contact with infected regions.  The authority was never 
used.704  It is notable here that, in contrast, this period coincides with the beginning of the 
introduction and use of such authorities in the American colonies. 
The following decades witnessed continued outbreaks of plague, in the context of which the 
1710 statute provided the base and sporadic Privy Council orders issued.705  In 1752 Parliament 
again turned to discussion of quarantine, as the House of Commons resolved to form a committee 
“to consider the most proper and effectual manner of performing Quarantine.”706  This was the first 
time that quarantine measures had been considered by Parliament outside the demands of an 
immediate emergency.707 
In January of 1753 Viscount Barrington and five other Members of the House of Commons 
were appointed to bring forward a quarantine bill.708  Barrington’s role, in particular, could hardly 
be overlooked:  as a commissioner of the Admiralty, his interest signaled concern that the Navy 
might be less than satisfied with the Privy Council’s actions.  The statute focused on the foreign 
importation of disease—not its domestic spread.709  It required that infected ships dock in the Isles 
of Scilly, whence customs would contact the mainland.  The ship would remain there until released 
by the Crown, under penalty of death.710  The statute limited the impact on commercial goods, 
ensuring that there would be no airing subsequent to quarantine and imposing treble damages, as 
well as the full costs, on any officer who “shall embezzle, or shall willingly damage, any goods 
performing quarantine under his discretion.”711  Further, the act’s implementation was delayed one 
year, to allow companies the time necessary to obtain the documentation required to avoid 
quarantine, where applicable.712  Accompanying parliamentary consideration of the bill, moreover, 
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was a second initiative, which sought to relax conditions for the Levant Company, without 
throwing trade open entirely.713 
With the monarch and the Privy Council forced to work more closely with Parliament, it was 
perhaps inevitable that British shipping interests—well represented in the legislature—would carry 
ever-greater sway in subsequently diminishing the impact of quarantine regulations.  By the 1763 
Peace of Paris, England had “undisputed command of the seas”.714  Quarantine provisions ran 
directly counter to the country’s economic interests.  “All that prevented trade from growing,” 
merchants argued to the Board of Trade, was “the quarantine imposed in Britain.”715  Subsequent 
measures sought to address the problem.716 
Parliament was sensitive to the political and economic repercussions of limiting trade.  The 
advent of free market ideals, promulgated through the writings of Adam Smith and others, brought 
ever more attention to trade restrictions.  But disease presented a very real threat—one that had 
decimated the country in earlier times.  Giving the Privy Council full reign, however, raised the 
specter of Royal Prerogative.  Parliament’s short-term response was to split the difference:  to issue 
governing statutes, thereby establishing its authority and the limits of Royal Prerogative, while 
granting the Privy Council the flexibility necessary to respond to disease—and, in the process, 
dodging any political fallout that may ensue.  
 
1.  Gradual Transformation of the Quarantine Regime 
Quarantine provisions themselves came to reflect the Enlightenment ideals that shaped the 18th 
century, as society began questioning the traditional institutions.  In contrast to the Tudor age, 
when quarantine was seen as the height of European political sophistication, it gradually came to 
be seen as backwards.  Two treatises in particular had a profound influence.  The first, by John 
Howard, pointed out how politics interfered with the execution of quarantine.717  His work 
underscored the expense and injustice that permeated British trade with the Mediterranean.718   
 The second, by Patrick Russell, carefully dissected the clinical aspects of plague, the method of 
cure, the doctrine of contagion, and operation of lazarettos.719  Russell argued that, as a domestic 
matter, the constitutional authorities were unclear:  the line between Royal Prerogative for 
international ships arriving and Parliamentary control for the spread of the disease blurred.  Russell 
contemplated the role of the civil magistrate.720  He looked carefully at the police powers to be 
exercised in relation to the different stages of plague, calling for the establishment of a Council of 
Health, with discretionary authority.721  Such a body would resolve many of the weaknesses of the 
Privy Council, pushing the decision to quarantine down to a local level and providing a greater 
medical and scientific basis for the decision.722  It also would be superior to the current quarantine 
regulations used by shipping companies—who could hardly be considered disinterested.723 
 Russell’s recommendations reflected the broader movement towards the professionalism of 
advice rendered to the government, as well as the growing role of medical personnel in setting 
policies affecting public health.  In 1799 Parliament passed a statute to allow the Privy Council to 
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convene a body of experts to consider and prepare regulations to govern quarantine.724  The body 
reported in 1800, recommending that a Board of Health be established, which could consult with 
all British consuls in foreign parts and which should have original responsibility for any domestic 
measures.725   
The Privy Council adopted many of the committee’s recommendations, but it rebuffed the 
proposed creation of a board of health to which its quarantine authorities would be transferred.726  
Instead, the committee would continue in a consultative capacity.  By insulating the committee 
from the commercial interests that had provided a check on the Privy Council, though, its 
recommendations became heavily weighted towards public health—in effect, prompting even more 
extreme measures.727  In 1806, the Board of Health, having had no real authority, dissolved.728 
 In the interim, Parliament expanded the statutory base for quarantine to include diseases other 
than plague.  Of chief concern was the advent of yellow fever, occasioned by trade with the 
Americas.729  In moving the 1805 bill, George Rose explained that while the 1800 act had been to 
impose quarantine on ships coming from plague regions, “other epidemical diseases…might be 
dangerous to the health of this county.”730  The Privy Council developed questionnaires to obtain 
information from each vessel arriving in the United Kingdom.731  Ships coming from regions where 
such diseases raged, even if they carried clean bills of health, would be required to perform 
quarantine.732 
As in the United States, theories of contagion were not universally accepted.733 Charles 
MacLean argued that no disease attack individuals twice—a position formally rejected in 1818 by a 
Select committee of the House of Commons, as well as the Royal College of Physicians.734  
Undeterred by the Parliamentarians’ skepticism, MacLean began his Remarks on the British 
Quarantine Laws, “The code of Quarantine laws in England, and of Sanitary laws in the nations of 
the continent of Europe, is, perhaps, without exception, the most gigantic, extraordinary, and 
mischievous superstructure, that has ever been raised by man, upon a purely imaginary 
foundation.”735   
The ensuing debate was fierce.  Non-contagion theory was dangerous:  it put the nation at 
risk.736  Foreign powers would refuse trade with an infected country.737  Pamphlets ridiculed 
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MacLean.738  He replied with the none-too-subtle:  Evils of Quarantine Laws, and Non-Existence of 
Pestilential Contagion.  (MacLean’s position was somewhat weakened when, within five days of 
arriving in the Levant, he fell subject to the plague.739) 
The fact that England was primarily concerned about plague proved crucial.  It was not clear 
that plague transferred between individuals.  Although it was not known at the time, the disease 
was carried by fleas (and rodents) and transferred when the animals bit the individual.  This 
explained why there were various instances in which individuals had come into contact with each 
other and the disease had not transferred—incidents sufficient to call into question whether 
airborne human-to-human transmission occurred.  It also explained why immersing goods in water 
and then placing them in the open air diminished their contagiousness:  it killed the fleas, thus 
preventing individuals who subsequently came into contact with the furs, fabrics, and other 
materials from contracting the disease. 
 Even as contagionists and non-contagionists captured the public debate, a series of works 
began to show the connection between dirt and disease.740  The real problem, scientists argued, was 
sanitation: 
It must surely be manifest, that foreign contagion, now usually considered the substantial germ, without with 
the most fearful combination of indigenous causes, famine, filth, misery, corrupt food, vitiated air and sickly 
seasons, can never produce a pestilence, dwindles in national important almost to a shadow in comparison.  
And it can scarcely be doubted that the attempt to defend ourselves by quarantine regulations, while such 
causes existed, would be like binding in chains a ferocious animal at a distance, when another ten-times more 
fierce was fondled at our doors, and suffered to roam about at pleasure.741 
These scientific positions created an alternative to quarantine:  i.e., if quarantine was detrimental to 
the economic health of the country, while being questionable in its effectiveness—as highlighted in 
the contagionist debate; and if there were alternatives available which might be more effective—
without the detrimental impact on trade—then Parliament needed to consider it. 
Accordingly, on March 10, 1825, the House dissolved itself into a committee to consider all 
acts in force related to quarantine.742  John Smith, one of MacLean’s supporters, was given leave to 
read a petition from MacLean that attacked the quarantine system, calling for a withdrawal of all 
quarantine laws—or an investigation into pestilential contagion.743  The House passed a new 
statute, which included many of the previous powers, but softened the penalties associated with 
violations of the law, commuting, for instance, capital punishment to a £100 fine.744  Most 
importantly, it allowed ships with a clean bill of health and healthy crew, upon arriving from 
Mediterranean or any African or Turkish ports, to be released immediately upon docking, after 
formalities were observed.745 
Within five years Britain was to face yet another epidemic, but this time from a new disease:  
cholera.  Diplomatic intelligence reported that it had swept through the Volga valley.  Accordingly, 
On November 11, 1830, the Privy Council introduced an order quarantining ships arriving in 
Britain from Russia.746  Merchants saw these provisions as troublesome and, instead of petitioning 
the Privy Council directly (an act that historically had been a colossal waste of time) they went 
straight to Parliament.747  Agitation in the commons was quickly followed by new Orders in 
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Council, requiring that quarantine laws be strictly enforced.748  The Privy Council announced the 
formation of a new consultative Board of Health to respond to the crisis. 
The board, chaired by the President of the College of Physicians, again demonstrated the 
insertion of science and medicine into the quarantine debate and the professionalization of advice 
provided to the government.  But just because scientists were now being consulted did not mean 
that the advice they would provide would be accurate.  The Lancet, a revolutionary medical journal 
launched in 1823, lamented, “It is probable that a set of men more ill-informed on the subject upon 
which they will be called upon to report, could not be found in the ranks of the profession.”749  And 
the board’s advice, when it did come, was not particularly welcome to the Privy Council:  it 
recommended the creation of a system, constructed from the Local Boards of Health, by which the 
compulsory evacuation of the sick would be carried out, and the isolation of the upper classes 
ensured.  Historian John Booker reflected, 
For the Privy Council, these recommendations were hardly welcome, raising all manner of questions 
including constitutional authority, overlap with subsisting parochial and municipal government, social 
discrimination, and the liberty of the individual.  Furthermore, the council’s own powers of control and 
coercion beyond the imposition of quarantine could only legally take effect once an epidemic had erupted.750 
In October 1831 British subjects began dying within hours of the onset of symptoms.  The 
Privy Council immediately issued regulations imposing strict quarantine at the ports—including, 
for the first time since the 16th century, between ports within England.751  It determined though that 
a cordon sanitaire around North-East England was neither practicable nor judicious.752  Parliament 
acquiesced by passing an emergency law to give the Privy Council more leeway.753  The council 
went after quarantine with abandon:  between 1826 and 1829, there had been 772 ships from 
foreign ports quarantined, but in 1831 alone, some 2,556 found themselves so restricted.754   
Despite their severity, these measures proved unsuccessful.  Upwards of 30,000 British 
subjects died in the first wave.755  Their failure put another nail in the coffin of quarantine as an 
effective response to disease.  William Fergusson, the Inspector General of Hospitals, roundly 
denounced the practice:  “[W]e might as well pretend to arrest the influx of the swallows in 
summer, and the woodcocks in the winter season, by cordons of troops and quarantine regulations, 
as by such means to stay the influence of an atmospheric poison.”756  The solution instead lay 
in our moral courage, in our improved civilization, in the perfecting of our medical and health police, in the 
generous charitable spirit of the higher orders, assisting the poorer classes of the community, in the better 
condition of those classes themselves, compared with the poor of other countries, and in the devoted courage 
and assistance of the medical profession every where…757   
It would be ludicrous to use quarantine to step epidemic catarrh or influenza; so why should it work 
for other diseases?758 
Thomas Forster, writing contemporaneous with Fergusson, considered the failure with regard 
to cholera to tilt the scales against quarantine writ large: 
A question of great importance has for some years divided the opinion of medical as well as commercial 
men, respecting the source of Pestilence and the utility of Quarantine.  The point at issue seems to be this—
Whether pestilential diseases, such as Cholera Morbus, Plague, and others, be of such a nature that 
Quarantine and Sanitary Cordons can constitute a defence against their introduction into any county; or 
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whether, on the contrary, they depend on morbidic conditions of the air, which, during particular seasons, and 
for certain limited portions  of time, visit various countries, like other atmospheric phenomena, and are 
incapable of being arrested by any human means?  I am strongly of the latter opinion, and though under 
certain circumstances diseases may be extended to predisposed persons, by confinement in close apartments 
with those who are already infected; yet it seems to me, that facts do not warrant the belief that travelers, 
ships, or bales of goods, can convey such diseases into ports or countries where the specific malaria does not 
exist.759 
Medical treatises began calling for the abolition of quarantine law altogether.760   
Outbreaks of the disease in 1832, 1848, 1854, and 1866 followed.761  The last, in particular, 
killed seven in every 10,000 people.762  Quarantine again proved ineffective, leading the formal 
government report to denounce lazarettos as superstitious—“as contemptible in the eyes of science 
as they are injurious to commerce.”763 
The government responded to the devastation and what appeared to be a growing scientific 
consensus against the use of quarantine by asking John Bowring, a medical doctor, to examine the 
operation of quarantine in the Levant—the nexus of British quarantine policy for centuries—and to 
consider the impact of quarantine regulations on Britain’s international relationships and 
commercial interests.764  Bowring’s findings proved devastating: 
The pecuniary cost may be estimated by millions of pounds sterling in delays, demurrage, loss of interest, 
deterioration of merchandise, increased expenses, fluctuations of markets, and other calculable elements; but 
the sacrifice of happiness, the weariness, the wasted time, the annoyance, the sufferings inflicted by 
quarantine legislation—these admit of no calculation—they exceed all measure.  Nothing but their being a 
security against danger the most alarming, nothing but their being undoubted protections for the public health 
could warrant their infliction; and the result of my experience is not only that they are useless for the ends 
they profess to accomplish; but that they are absolutely pernicious—that they increase the evils against which 
they are designed to guard, and add to the miseries which it is their avowed object to modify or to remove.765 
Even worse was the degree to which quarantine measures had become a tool of diplomacy and 
state policy.  “Under the plea of a regard for the public health,” Bowring wrote, “all letters are 
opened—all travelers are arrested and imprisoned—all commodities are subject tot regulations the 
most unintelligible, costly and vexatious.”766  He was not unaware of the threat posed by disease.  
Indeed, of the threat posed by the weaponization of disease.  He reported information related to 
Turkish use of plague as a means of war.767  But transfer of disease by animals also occurred 
without any intent behind them.  And the power of the lazarettos sat uneasily in a democratic state 
dedicated to the rule of law.768  
Across Europe, governments were beginning to discuss significant modifications to their 
quarantine laws.769  In 1838 the French proposed to Britain to promote the creation of a Congress 
of Delegates from Europe, with the Mediterranean port.  Like the regional conferences in the 
United States, the purpose was to construct a uniform system of quarantine regulations.  England 
readily agreed.770  Bowring’s conclusion received support from British diplomats in Malta and 
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elsewhere.771  The report was not without its critics.772  But it found fertile ground in a Parliament 
besieged by commercial interests and doubtful as to the effectiveness of quarantine law. 
 
2.  Broader Context 
At the risk of gross oversimplification, a handful of factors can be emphasized in looking at the 
complex economic and political conditions that helped to shape British quarantine law in the late 
18th and early 19th century.  A sudden surge in agricultural productivity helped to drive the 
industrial revolution.773  This meant the greater movement of people and goods and an increased 
emphasis on economic growth.  Transportation flows accelerated, and the population flocked to the 
cities.774  The resultant population density brought issues of sanitation to the fore.  Calls for reform 
proliferated.775 
 Simultaneously, democratic changes swept the country.  The reforms of 1832 targeted the 
abuse of “influence” and sought to eliminate the Crown’s control over Parliament.776  The king 
could no longer choose ministers at his discretion, and the House of Lords lost its ascendancy.  The 
electorate grew in strength.  Personal sovereignty, then parliamentary sovereignty, yielded to the 
sovereignty of the people.777  Larger and less manageable constituencies began determining the 
outcome of elections.  The government was thus increasingly forced to address not just national 
defense and foreign relations, but a range of issues that accompanied urbanization.778  New 
demands arose for local administration, as well as political equality.  Expensive, antiquated 
institutions and procedures fell from favor and became the target of critique:  “The opinions which 
became fashionable in this age required that every institution should justify its existence on 
practical grounds.”779  
 Further influencing the transition were the ideas of Adam Smith, who, in the Wealth of 
Nations, emphasized that national greatness required minimum restraints.  Thus, under William 
Huskisson (President of the Board of Trade, 1825-1827) and then William Gladstone (President of 
the Board of Trade, 1841-1845), the board took a leading role in the tariff revisions required for 
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free trade.  As competition from abroad heightened, Britain needed “plentiful supplies of raw 
material, cheap food, and unimpeded access to every part of an expanding world-market where 
they might buy and sell as widely as possible…”780 The country had to be able to compete more 
effectively.   
 Quarantine stood in the way.781  And, as already recognized, there was substantial question 
about the scientific grounds for using such regulations.  Thus Gavin Milroy wrote of the body of 
quarantine law in 1846, 
The absurdly foolish and most ridiculous principles which they embody, the vexatious and oppressive 
restrictions which they impose, the wretchedness and suffering which they almost necessarily give rise to, 
and the great increase of mortality which, we have reason to believe, they often occasion, are surely sufficient 
grounds for the scrutinizing investigation that is so generally demanded.”782 
The government, however, could not just destroy the old quarantine regulations.  They had to be 
replaced by something that would help the state to counter the threat of disease.  The answer came 
in the form of sanitary laws.  The Registrar-general explained, “internal sanitary arrangements, and 
not quarantine and sanitary lines, are the safeguards of nations’ against the invasion of epidemic 
diseases.”783  Better sanitation, not archaic quarantine, was befitting of an enlightened age.784  
Since the 16th century, there had been calls for better sanitation.785  It was not until the 19th 
century, however, that the call for reform took hold.  Edwin Chadwick lead the charge:  “[T]he 
annual loss of life from filth and bad ventilation,” he wrote, “are greater than the loss from death or 
wounds in any wars in which the country has been engaged in modern times.”786  Poor water, poor 
sewage, and poor ventilation lay at the root of disease.787  The Royal Commission on the Health of 
Towns endorsed Chadwick’s account, while reports of the Metropolitan Sewers Commission drew 
a bleak picture: 
I have…seen in such places human beings living and sleeping in sunk rooms with filth from overflowing 
cesspools exuding through and running down the walls and over the floors…The effects of the stench, 
effluvia, and poisonous gases constantly evolving from these foul accumulations were apparent in the 
haggard, wan, and swarthy countenances, and enfeebled limbs, or the poor creatures whom I found residing 
over and amongst these dens of pollution and wretchedness.788 
The solution to filth and disease was better sanitation.  The General Board of Health, seen as the 
solution to the latter, became firmly opposed to the use of quarantine, considering it “a barbarous 
encumbrance, interrupting commerce, obstructing international intercourse, periling life, and 
wasting, and worse than wasting, large sums of public money.”789  Southwood Smith, a prominent 
voice in the sanitation movement, similarly rejected quarantine.  In 1866 he wrote: 
The sanitary regulation of the ships themselves—a measure of the utmost importance to the seafaring classes 
of the community—would accomplish far more than could be hoped for or pretended to be accomplished by 
any known system of quarantine, and would have, moreover, a beneficial effect upon popular opinion by 
removing the fallacious appearances which favour the belief in imported disease, while they divert attention 
from the true causes of disease, the removable and preventable causes that exist on the spot.790 
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Thus, in 1868 when a severe smallpox epidemic and a renewed threat of cholera swept the 
country, the government appointed a Royal Sanitary Commission to look into public health.  The 
Commission recommended a complete overhaul of the country’s administration, and the formation 
of a responsible public health authority in each district, controlled by a central department under a 
minister.  Eventually, the Local Authorities would take over quarantine responsibilities in the 
ports.791  Legislation in 1866, 1871, 1872, and 1875 defined the constitution of the central and local 
authorities—the last laying down the rules that still form the foundation of public health law in the 
United Kingdom.792  The 1871 Act established a “phantom” board, called the Local Government 
Board and provided a salary for its president.793  Its purpose was to place the supervision of all the 
laws relating to public health, the relief of the poor, and local government, into one body.  The 
1872 act created an alternative system of port prophylaxis; quarantine would be maintained for the 
“exotics”, while the new sanitary system extended to endemic diseases.794 
 The statutory authority of the Privy Council in regard to quarantine continued.  But as a 
practical matter, dual policies had evolved:  quarantine could either be administered via the central 
government through the Privy Council, or it could be conducted by medical inspection run by local 
authorities with the support of the Local Government Board.795  The Privy Council had 
substantially reduced its footprint:  by 1878, all but one of the quarantine grounds had been 
abandoned.796  At times it acted, but it did so to much derision.  In March of 1879, for instance, the 
council, having wind of a fresh outbreak of plague, suddenly issued an Order imposing quarantine 
on all arrivals from the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Sea of Azoff, and the Sea of Marmara.  The 
Lancet crowed that the “epidemic lunacy” of Europe had resulted “in reviving obsolete methods of 
quarantine, maritime and inland, against the compromised country [Russia], and against the 
uncompromised countries of each other.”797  It announced the proposal “absurdly impracticable.”798 
 However archaic and impractical the authority might have been, as a legal matter, the Privy 
Council still had jurisdiction over the United Kingdom and the Local Government Board 
maintained domestic authority in England and Wales.  The question was one of overlapping 
authority at the ports.  The Law Lords ruled in November 1887 that the Local Government Board 
had no power over customs functions.  The question would have to be put to Parliament.  The 
resulting Public Health Act of 1896 repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825 and removed the Privy 
Council’s involvement in the same.799  In its place, Westminster retained authority in the Local 
Government Board—in part to head off criticism from abroad that Britain had left itself without 
any defense. 
 
F.  Rejecting Quarantine:  20th Century 
Britain’s concern about the impact of quarantine law on trade did not end with the elimination of 
domestic provisions.  At the turn of the century, English ships still ruled the seas.  Approximately 
64% of all pilgrims arriving in the Hedjaz by sea were carried on British vessels.800  The ships 
carried Indian, Afghan, Turkish, Chinese, Persian, Somali, African, Yemeni, Arab, and other 
pilgrims, thus gaining for Britain insight into the happenings at many ports.801  When plague broke 
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out and Jeddah imposed quarantine, the British shipping industry balked.  Such provisions were 
considered “senseless.”802  British emissaries made repeated representations to the Ottomans, 
protesting the use of quarantine.803 At the same time, diplomats sent dispatches to the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, describing the state of the disease in each port; he who would forward the 
dispatches to the President of the Local Government Board.804  The system kept even the local 
authorities abreast of global health developments.  
Quarantine, rejected for plague—which had been its raison d’etre—was viewed as even more 
inapposite for other disease.  Thus the leading medical doctor, Arthur Hopkirk, wrote in 1913,  
There is really but little to be said as to the possibility of preventing influenza epidemics, because experience 
has shown that the disease invariably starts from some mysterious and undiscoverable nidus, and also that, 
once started, little can be done to prevent is dissemination, partly on account of the general predisposition of 
human beings to the malady, and partly because of the rapidity with which the infection is carried along all 
available lines of human intercourse.”805  
The solution instead would be to focus on teaching schoolchildren about personal and domestic 
cleanliness.806 
 When the Spanish Flu hit English shores in 1918-19, the United Kingdom did not resort to the 
use of quarantine.807  The decision did not depend upon the disease being a civil, not a military 
concern.  Indeed, Lord Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, initially suspected that the disease was a 
biological weapons attack.808  And the death toll was substantial:  within 46 weeks, some 3 ½ 
million cases had erupted.809  According to the Registrar General, in the course of the epidemic 
nearly a quarter of a million died; many were young adults.  Even these statistics are considered 
low.810  But quarantine was eschewed as impractical and ineffective.811 
 Throughout the inter-war period, the United Kingdom continued to be extremely concerned 
about Russian and German development of biological weapons.  The threat prompted the political 
establishment to generate its own weapons program, enlisting the aid of senior scientists.  But the 
National Archives yield no evidence to suggest that at any point in the 20th century the political 
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establishment contemplated the re-introduction of broad national quarantine authority as a way to 
respond to either to naturally-occurring disease or to biological weapons.812 
 
G.  Current Quarantine Law 
Britain removed an explicit quarantine power from its public health laws in 1896, when the Public 
Health Act of 1896 repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825.813  The law remained largely unchanged 
until the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 and the Public Health (Infectious Disease) 
Regulations of 1988.  These provisions emphasize the local nature of quarantine.  They allow for 
local authorities to obtain orders from a Justice of the Peace to order the medical examination of an 
individual or group of persons, and the removal of an individual or group to a hospital, if that 
individual is reasonably believed to have a notifiable disease, or, if not ill from the disease, to be 
carrying an organism that causes the disease.814   The Justice of the Peace can then order that 
person to be involuntarily detained where permitting him to leave would endanger public safety.815    
 The Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act of 1984 initially included six notifiable diseases:  
cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and food poisoning.816  The Public Health 
(Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 added 25 more.817  Under the 1984 statute, a local officer 
can request that an individual refrain from going to work, require that children exposed to infection 
to be excluded from school, and place restrictions on places of child entertainment.  Criminal 
offences apply for exposing others to the risk of infection.818  This legislation does not include 
detention powers for new or emerging disease. 
 For health laws at ports of entry, three sets of regulations issued under the 1984 legislation.819  
Here again, local authorities—not the central government—bear the main responsibility.820  In 
March 2006, a major review of ports, airports, international train stations led the Health Protection 
Agency (HPA) to agree to take the lead to provide medical input into arrangements for port 
health.821  The costs are shared by local authorities, the National Health Service, and HPA, with 
audits conducted by the Healthcare Commission. 
 Additional medical examinations are possible under the Immigration Act of 1971, which 
allows the government to refuse entry on medical or public health threat grounds.822  Where entry is 
granted, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides a statutory basis for 
information regarding sickness to be transferred to the NHS or HPA.823  HM Customs’ 
longstanding policy is to refer individuals for medical examination whenever they seem unwell, 
give health as a reason for coming to the UK, claim asylum, or come from a country that is high-
risk for tuberculosis (TB) and are seeking entry for more than 6 months.824  Approximately 270,000 
people per year fall within the last category, which has prompted at least two airports (Heathrow 
and Gatwick) to install x-ray machines to check for TB at the time of arrival.825 
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812 Statement based on author research at the National Archives, London. 
813 Public Health Act, 1896, supra note 33. 
814 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984, §§35, 36. 
815 Id., at §37. 
816 Id., at §§10, 11.
817 Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988, No. 1546, Sept. 6, 1988, §§6, 9. 
818 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984, §11.
819 Public Health (Aircraft) Regulations 1979; Public Health (Ships) Regulations 1979; Public Health (International Trains) Regulations 
1994. 
820 But note that medical personnel are provided for local authorities by the Health Protection Agency. 
821 Health Protection Agency, Port Health and Medical Inspection Review Report from the Project Team, Mar. 2006, available at 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1197021714421. 
822 Immigration Act of 1971, c. 77. 
823 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, c. 41, §133.
824  Health Activity Relating to People at Ports, Airports and International Train Stations in England, Department of Health, Health 
Protection Agency, Home Office, August 2006, at 3-4, available at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4137781.pdf 
825 Id., at 4. 
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1.  Health and Social Care Act of 2008:  England and Wales 
 Recently, the Public Health Act of 1984 was subjected to extensive review.826  In 2008, Part 2 
of the statute was repealed/replaced by the Health and Social Care Act of 2008.827  The changes 
suggest that there may be some movement with regard to quarantine, but the fundamental control 
of domestic measures remains in local hands.   
 This statute amended the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984, by authorizing the 
creation of regulations that designate how and when the quarantine of persons may be conducted.  
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of State created Regulation #9 of The Health Protection 
(Part 2A) Regulations 2010, which briefly mentions quarantined persons.828  In regard to 
international travel, regulations can relate to preventing danger to public health from vessels 
arriving in or leaving England or Wales.  The Secretary has the authority to include provision for 
medical examination, detention, isolation, quarantine of persons, provision of information from 
those persons, inspection/retention, destruction of things.829  On the domestic side, regulations can 
impose duties on registered medical practitioners and others to record certain illnesses and to notify 
the government as to their appearance.830  With regard to the domestic realm, regulations can 
restrict persons, things or premises where public health is threatened.831  Such acts may include 
excluding a child from school, prohibiting events or gatherings.832  The Secretary can further 
impose special restrictions, such as requiring an individual to undergo decontamination, wear 
protective clothing, or undergo health monitoring.833 
 Unlike the provisions that apply to international travel, however, the regulations may not 
require that an individual submit to medical examination, be removed to or detained in a hospital or 
other suitable place, or be kept in isolation or quarantine absent an Order from a Justice of the 
Peace on application from a Local Authority.834  Such orders are referred to as Part 2A Orders, 
enforceable by criminal prosecution.835  In other words, Part 2A orders are grounded in the local 
domain, and they reflect more than a century of placing such authorities in the hands of local 
government. Where considered “necessary”, Part 2A orders may be issued without notice.836  
The statute establishes the standard required:  the Justice of the Peace must be satisfied that (i) the 
person/thing in question is infected/contaminated; (ii) infection or contamination presents/could 
present significant harm to human health; (iii) risk of infection or contamination to other humans 
exists; and (iv) it is necessary to make the order to remove or reduce the risk.837 
 Parliamentary scrutiny of the Regulations takes place either via affirmative resolution or 
annulment by negative resolution; but prior Parliamentary approval is not required where the 
person making the instrument considers it necessary to make the order prior to a draft having been 
laid.  Such orders are subject to annulment after 28 days, unless approved by each House of 
Parliament for England or the National Assembly for Wales.838 
 The statute broadly defines the diseases to which Part 2A Orders apply: “Any reference to 
infection or contamination is a reference to infection or contamination which presents or could 
present significant harm to human health.”839  Commentators suggest that this does include 
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826 See www.dh.gov.uk. 
827 Health and Social Care Act of 2008, July 21, 2008, c. 14. 
828 Specifically, §129 inserts §§45A-45T into the 1984 statute.  §§45B and C confer powers on Secretary of State to make provision by 
Regulations with respect to health protection measures for international travel [§45(B)] and domestic affairs [§45(C)].  Id. 
829 Health and Social Care Act of 2008, July 21, 2008, c. 14, §§45B(1) and (2). 
830 Id., at §45C(4). 
831 Id., §45(c)(3)(c). 
832 Id., §45(c)(4). 
833 Id., §§45G(2)(e)-(k), 45(H)(2) and 45(I)(2). 
834 Id., §45(d)(3). 
835 Id., §45(O)(1)-(2). 
836 Id., §45(M). 
837 Id., §45(G)(3) and (H)(1). 
838 Id., §45R. 
839 Id., §45(A). 
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pandemic influenza.840  The statute adopts a flexible approach for amending the list of diseases in 
the future. 
 While the scope of the provisions is considerably wider than what Britain previously 
maintained, it is also more complex.  The statute also focuses on response once the threat has 
become clear, not prior to threat.  As one scholarly article explains, “While there are provisions for 
monitoring and notifying outbreaks, there is far less consideration for joined-up working beyond 
the very local response.”841 
  
2.  Public Health Etc. (Scotland) Act 2008 
 The Health and Social Care Act of 2008 does not apply to Scotland, which passed its own 
Public Health Act prior to Westminster’s adoption of the statute.842  The main purpose of the 
Scottish statute was to modernize the legislative framework governing health protection, since most 
of the statutory authorities dated back to late 19th century.843  The Scottish Executive convened the 
Public Health Legislation Review Group to consider the legislation and whether new provisions 
were necessary.  The review group released its proposals in October 2006, with an analysis 
subsequently published in March 2007. 
 The legislation clarifies the roles and responsibilities of Scottish Ministers, the NHS boards, 
and local authorities.844  It also devises a new system of statutory notification for diseases 
(notifiable diseases, notifiable organisms and health risk states—including offences in regard to 
notifiable organisms).845  The act provides a framework for public health investigations, giving 
health officials powers related to entry to premises, the power to ask questions, the authority to 
issue public health investigation warrants.846 As perhaps would be expected, given the long and 
contentious history of quarantine, debate during consideration of the bill focused on how such 
measures would be given effect.  Transparency in the issuance of compulsion, exclusion, and 
restriction orders,847 mechanisms for appeal in the case of compulsory medical examinations,848 and 
the manner in which orders could be altered all received heightened scrutiny during the debates.849 
 Much of the statute’s focus is administrative:  it clarifies, for instance, the public health 
functions of the health boards, specifying their duty to give explanation, medical examinations, 
exclusion orders and restriction orders, quarantine, removal to and detention in hospital, quarantine 
and detention, variation and extension of orders, review of orders, compensation, recall of orders 
granted in absence, appeal, and breach of orders and offences.850  It also lays out the public health 
functions of the local authorities.851  Other sections deal with mortuaries, international travel, sun 
beds, and statutory nuisances.852 
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840 Graeme T. Laurie and Kathryn G. Hunter, Mapping, Assessing and Improving Legal Preparedness for Pandemic Flu in the United 
Kingdom, 10 MEDICAL LAW INTERNATIONAL 111 (2009). 
841 Laurie et al., supra note 840, at 111. 
842 Introduced in Parliament Oct. 25, 2007; bill passed following Stage 3 parliamentary debate, 12 June 2008.  Scottish Parliament 
Information Centre, Public Health etc (Scotland) Bill, available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/bills/03-
PublicHealth/PublicHealthetcScotlandBill.pdf. 
843 Indeed, the statute repealed in whole the Infectious Disease (Notification Act 1889 (c. 72)); Cleansing of Persons Act 1897, c. 31; 
Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (c. 38); Public Health (Scotland) Amendment Act 1907, c. 20; Public Health (Scotland) Act 1945, c. 
15.  Also repealed in part, inter alia, the Health Services and Public Health Act 1968, c. 46. 
844 Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008, asp 5, Part 1, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2008/pdf/asp_20080005_en.pdf.  
845 Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008, asp 5, Part 2, Schedule 1(1). 
846 Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008, asp 5, Part 3. 
847 Amendments 58-64, 72, 74, 80, 81, 86, 92 & 93.  SPHSC, 2008b, col 826-830.  See also Amendments 130 and 134 (addressing the 
appeal of such orders when made in the absence of the target). 
848 SPHSC, 2008b, col 830-833. 
849 Amendments 99, 102, 119 and 123. See also Amendments 104, 109, 116-118, 120-122, 124-129, 132, 133 and 135 (regarding the 
extension of quarantine and hospital detention orders).  Concern also accompanied obstruction offences.  See Ammendments 152-156, 
238, 243, 246, 158, and 159. 
850 Id., at Part 4. 
851 Id., at Part 5. 
852 Id., at Parts 6-9. 
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3.  Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 
It might be possible for the British government to implement quarantine under its more general 
emergency powers.  The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 provides the main vehicle for managing 
emergencies.  The legislation repealed previous civil defense measures and replaced them with 
modernized provisions meant to take account of contemporary threats, such as terrorism, 
environmental degradation, and pandemic disease.853  Recourse to this legislation, however, is 
considered a last resort.854 
The first part of this statute addresses domestic preparedness concerns, creating a framework 
for local responders’ roles and responsibilities.  The second part establishes a framework for the 
use of special legislative measures.  The trigger is what constitutes an “emergency”, defined as: 
(a)  An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in the United Kingdom or in a 
Part or region 
(b) An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of the United Kingdom or of a 
Part or region, or 
(c) War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom855 
The scope of the emergency contemplated by Parts 1 and 2 differs.  For the former, the event must 
threaten “serious damage to human welfare or the environment in a place in the United 
Kingdom.”856  This provision is designed for first responders.  For the latter, the language “of the 
United Kingdom or of a Part or region” refers to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland.  This is a 
higher threshold to meet, as it applies not just to any town or city, but to a larger geographic area.857 
Both Parts 1 and 2 consider an event to threaten damage to human welfare where it involves, 
causes or may cause:  loss of human life; human illness or injury; homelessness; damage to 
property; disruption in the supply money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of systems of 
communication; disruption of facilities for transport; or disruption of services related to health.858 
For Part 2 powers, the Queen, or in extraordinary situations a Senior Minister,859 has an almost 
unrestricted power to make emergency regulations provided that it would not be possible without 
serious delay to arrange for an Order in Council, and that s/he is satisfied that certain conditions are 
met:  (a) an emergency has occurred or is about to occur, (b) the regulation is necessary to prevent, 
control or mitigate an aspect of the emergency, and (c) the provision be urgent.860  A Senior 
Minister of the Crown includes the Prime Minister, any of her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of 
State, and the Commissioners of her Majesty’s Treasury.  In defining the scope that these 
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853 See CABINET OFFICE, CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT:  A SHORT GUIDE (REVISED), available at 
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/media/ukresilience/assets/15mayshortguide.pdf. 
854 http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/response/emergencypowers.aspx (UK Resilience explains that use of the statute is “…a last resort in 
the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way.  If the situation or event is 
so serious as to warrant consideration of use of the powers then the deciding factor will be whether existing powers, that could be used 
to deal with it, are insufficient or ineffective.  If they are sufficient then emergency powers cannot be used, no matter how serious the 
emergency.”)  See also Update of Emergency Response and Recovery (consultation paper, closed in April 2009 (writing, “There must be 
no expectation that the Government will agree to use emergency powers and planning and response arrangements should assume that 
they will not be used.”) 
855 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 §19(1).   (Emphasis in the original).  See also Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Program, 
Update of Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance, Paper E, Consultation Report, issued in June 2009, and available at: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/231587/err-consultation-report.pdf; and ongoing updating of this statute via the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme (CCAEP), Program Initiation Document, Oct. 24, 2008, 
available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131900/ccaep_pid.pdf. 
856 Civil Contingencies Act 2004, c. 36, §1. 
857 See explanatory notes to the CCA. 
858 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, c. 36. 
859 If it would not be possible to obtain an Order in Council from the Queen, without a delay that might (a) cause serious damage or (b) 
seriously obstruct the prevention, control or mitigation of serious damage, then a Senior Minister of the Crown can declare an 
emergency. Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, § 2 (a)(b) & § 4(a)(b).  Note that in practice, the decision to use emergency powers under 
Part 2 falls to the UK central government and the relevant Lead Government Department; under §1(4)(a) (Part 1), a Minister of the 
Crown or, in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Ministers, are to provide by Order that a particular event or situation comes within (or 
does not come within) the definition of emergency.  See Laurie, supra note 840, at 113.  
860 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, c. 36, §21 (2)-(4); Conditions laid out in Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, c. 36, §21. 
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emergency regulations can take, the Act provides as non-exclusive examples that regulations can 
restrict movement to or from specified places or restrict travel at specified times.861 
Current government policy is to rely in the first instance upon voluntary compliance with 
governmental advice, with recourse to emergency powers only if necessary.  It is unlikely that the 
act would be used to impose quarantine.  Not only would it be a stretch of the current legal 
authorities, but, as discussed in the introduction of this paper, government policy documents 
repeatedly make it clear that quarantine itself is not a viable option.   
 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMING 
 
The United States and United Kingdom frame the threat posed by pandemic disease and biological 
weapons within a national security rubric.  For both countries, the threats are linked in terms of 
institutions and response.  But the United States and the United Kingdom have very different 
approaches, as a matter of law and policy, when it comes to the central government’s imposition of 
quarantine and isolation in response to the twin threats.  
 This article has suggested one explanation for this divergence is deeply historical.  And it 
reflects important constitutional differences that continue to shape the two countries’ approaches.  
American colonists routinely employed quarantine provisions to respond to epidemic and pandemic 
disease.  Such measures tended to be temporary, reactive, and local in nature.  At times they ran 
afoul of England’s commercial interests, in which case the Privy Council simply disallowed them.  
The colonies nevertheless persisted.  Following the Revolutionary War, states integrated quarantine 
authorities into their statutes and (in some cases) constitutions.  Some measures were so local that 
they authorized towns to exclude individuals and goods from anywhere in the United States.  Those 
who fell ill could be forcibly kept in their homes (or removed) by local authorities.  Congress and 
the Supreme Court, in turn, considered quarantine well within the police powers of the state.  Inter-
state and U.S. foreign relations commerce might be implicated, but more important were the states’ 
ability to defend its citizens from disease.  The failure of some states to ensure the health of vessels 
leaving U.S. ports, however, earned America the enmity of key European trading partners.  
Congress began to pay more attention to what states were doing—or failing to do—and the 
consequent economic effect on the country as a whole.   
Smallpox proved devastating during the Civil War, in the course of which Confederate soldiers 
and sympathizers used the disease as a weapon.  But in the aftermath of the war, authority did not 
immediately shift to the federal government.  Instead, Congressional initiatives expanded federal 
power within narrow limits—namely, the Marine Hospital Service, and consular reporting 
overseas.  In a critical innovation, the legislature empowered the federal government to assume 
control of ports, where states were willing to sell.  Quarantine facilities were expensive.  Thus 
began the quiet transfer of state ports and, with them, state authorities, to the federal domain.  
Immersed in their new role, the federal government appeared to do a better job of stemming disease 
than the states.  Regional initiatives, seeking uniform standards between states and along the U.S. 
border, broadened the call for a national approach to quarantine.  In concert with the regional 
meetings, the medical and industrial fields began to call for federal regulation.   
Into this mix stepped the courts:  while quarantine fell firmly within state police powers, 
Congress might have room to preempt state law where commerce bore the cost.  Encouraged by 
Morgan’s Steamship, the legislature gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to develop 
rules and regulations to prevent the interstate spread of disease.  An important Solicitor General 
determination spurred Congress to act not just inter-state, but, where state or local measures were 
deemed ineffective or non-existent, at a state or local level.  New measures required bills of health 
to be obtained by all vessels sailing for the United States from abroad, and a stronger 
epidemiological surveillance program required U.S. consuls abroad to make weekly reports. By the 
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861 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, c. 36, §21(3)(d)-(g) 
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early 20th century, while the federal government had made advances in the realm of quarantine, it 
had yet to preempt the states.  Indeed, states still regularly exercised their quarantine authorities. 
Direct confrontation, however, proved unnecessary.  The Spending Clause paved the way for 
federal control of local ports.  In 1944, Congress empowered the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to make and enforce any regulations to prevent the introduction of disease into the United 
States, or the transfer of disease between the states.  Broadly conceived, these provisions have yet 
to fall subject to Constitutional challenge.  The Stafford Act, in turn, empowers the federal 
government to act subject to a Governor’s request.  Efforts to continue to expand federal authority 
continue, with the discussion now contemplating the precise manner in which the military could be 
used to impose quarantine in the event of either pandemic disease or terrorist attack. 
The United Kingdom has followed almost the opposite trajectory—one deeply influenced by 
the constitutional structure of the state and the realities of responding to plague.  The Tudors issued 
orders through the Privy Council, using the military to enforce them.  Under the Stuarts, 
conventions changed, with quarantine provisions becoming both more coercive and increasingly 
political.  The abolition of the conciliar courts restricted the broader contours of Privy Council 
proclamations, tilting English common law towards greater protection of individual rights and 
increased skepticism towards the exercise of Royal Prerogative—a context within which the Privy 
Council’s exercise of quarantine became more constrained.  It had to first obtain Parliamentary 
imprimateur, via statute, before being considered a valid exercise of the Crown’s authority.  
Parliamentary authorization, however, brought with it a greater impact—which, ironically, helped 
to bring about the demise of the Privy Council’s involvement.  Commercial interests, increasingly 
organized and displeased with the Privy Council’s orders, began making their case to Parliament.  
They were considerably helped in their efforts by medical treatises that began questioning the 
contagion theory of disease—specifically in relation to plague.  The broader context also played a 
role:  the increasing professionalization of the British civil service and the deference granted to 
science proved critical.  Simultaneously, the greater attention played to sanitation offered a viable 
alternative to quarantine.  By the late 19th century, the country had eschewed the use of the same.  
Current British emergency measures might be extended to quarantine, but they do not overtly 
recognize such powers and the use of quarantine is rejected in the country’s policy documents. 
The current state of play in both countries, and the potential historical explanation raise myriad 
questions:  Should pandemic disease and biological weapons be treated in like manner?  Ought 
both types of threats fall within a national security rubric?  To what extent are the legal changes 
merely cosmetic?  What constitutional concerns are raised by the most recent measures?  These and 
further questions remain rich for further discussion. 
